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Abstract
The four refereed journal articles and one government research report that 
form the core of this submission for a PhD represent my work in the subject 
area of institutional investment and responsible investing. The research, as a
whole, has two major areas of focus. 
One area of focus is the behaviour of institutional investors. The research first 
examines different types of institutional investor and their demand for the 
characteristics of social and environmental performance within their equity 
portfolios. The research next examines the fund managers that institutional 
investors appoint to manage their assets. Attention is paid to the different
locations of fund management as well as the features that determine the 
degree of competition between fund managers. The research examines these 
different fund management settings and the demand for the characteristics of 
social and environmental performance within their equity portfolios. A further
issue investigated is whether different types of institutional investor pay
greater attention to responsible investment when investing domestically than 
overseas. 
The second area of focus is the study of responsible investment based on 
grounded research methods. The main contributions are an assessment of 
how fund managers perceive that responsible investment achieves financial
performance, the communication between fund managers and corporate 
directors for the purpose of responsible investment, the use of information and 
staff within responsible investment, and costs and charges associated with 
responsible investment. 
Both areas have contributed to policy debates and development, and have 
prompted other researchers to publish and undertake fieldwork. 
The commentary, which forms Part A of this submission, illustrates these 
features by reference to the five publications that are reproduced in their 
entirety in part B. 
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Doctoral Criteria 
This submission is a collection of five published papers. Four are refereed 
journal articles. The fifth is a published research report for the Department For 
Work and Pensions. All five papers were published during the five years from 
summer 2004 to summer 2009. During this period I have been lecturer in 
finance at the Business School, University of Exeter. The papers in this 
submission have been selected from a longer list of publications that
represent my academic career to date at the Business School. The published 
papers selected are those that represent my work in the subject area of
institutional investment and responsible investing. 
My interest in institutional investment and responsible investing started in the 
1990s when I was a fund manager. In 2001, I decided on a career change 
and started academic study of investment institutions and responsible 
investment on a full-time PhD programme at the University of Bath School of
Management. In 2002, I transferred from MPhil to PhD status. In January 
2004, I started as lecturer in finance at the Business School, the University of 
Exeter. This was prior to completing my PhD. 
I have continued with this research and now have a collection of papers in this
subject area all published during the past five years. The research, as a 
whole, makes a number of contributions to the subject area. It is therefore 
natural to select institutional investment and responsible investing as my PhD
submission. 
The Papers as a Coherent Whole 
All five papers share the same subject area and intellectual development. This 
is most apparent amongst the four refereed journal articles. By design the four
papers were intended to be a unified and coherent whole, with each paper
building on the previous. Their design originates in the planning of my 
research as a full-time PhD candidate. Each draws on the same statistical 
model, dataset, sample, time period and methods. Each of the four involves 
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the same basic research inquiry. This is to estimate the demand for the 
characteristics of social and environmental performance in institutional equity
portfolios. The fifth paper on responsible investment draws on a separate and 
more recent dataset. This took the form of interviews and surveys with 25 
fund management firms between June and November 2007.  
Independence of Study
This section describes the nature and extent of the independence of the 
overall study. I first describe the independence of study for the four refereed 
journal papers. I then describe the independence of study for paper 5. 
The four refereed journal papers are publication outputs from my research as 
a supervised, full-time PhD candidate. The first 6 months of my enrolment on
this full-time doctoral programme was spent reviewing literature, performing a 
gap analysis, drawing on contacts to obtain data, and arriving at a set of 
investigative research questions. This was a completely personal and 
independent endeavour. 
I then moved on to working and marrying the datasets. This involved bringing 
together seven different databases at the company level and ensuring the 
integrity and reliability of the data. I designed the statistical models and 
performed the multiple regressions and supporting analysis. This took a 
further 12 months. During the statistical methods stage my two doctoral 
supervisors lent some support. They helped me to interpret the statistical 
outputs, for example around error terms, heteroscedasticity, significance and 
robustness. They helped in the specification of some of the variables, for
example, whether a variable should be linear or logged. They also suggested 
various specifications for the regression equation, for example the choice of 
an ordinary least squares or censored model. I proceeded based on their
advice, and undertook all work that arose from this advice. 
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At this stage, and based on the very positive results obtained from the 
empirical work, my supervisors and I agreed that there was merit in writing-up
the results as a series of papers aimed at journals. This process took several 
years to complete. I wrote each of the paper drafts, including introduction, 
literature, hypotheses, methods, results, discussion, conclusion and abstract.
During the writing process my two doctoral supervisors lent some support. 
They helped me to craft the literature reviews toward a journal style. As I took 
the papers through the revision process they also helped me interpret the 
reviewers suggestions as to revisions and publication. 
Overall, the entire research endeavour was based on independent study but
with periodic oversight and advice. My more mature age, professional 
experience, and good knowledge of the data meant I probably worked more
independently than one might expect from a student and supervisor
relationship within a typical UK doctoral programme in financial economics. 
The very large contribution that is my own work within the papers, certainly
accounting for far more than 90% of the total effort, is reflected in my being
the lead author of each paper even though my surname is not first 
alphabetically. In short, I was responsible for the very large majority of the four 
journal papers. 
I am the sole author of the fifth paper. I determined the research question,
performed the literature review, constructed the interview and survey
questions, performed the interviews, analysed the results and wrote the paper 
from start to finish. The only support received was in transcribing the audio 
recorded interviews. The paper was reviewed by the Department For Work 
and Pensions and signed off by the Minister for Pensions. 
Originality
I demonstrate originality within my work by drawing on three examples from
the four refereed journal articles.  
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One originality was that my research applied an institutional share selection 
model to a UK context. The concept of an institutional share selection model 
is not new, and has been used by Badrinath, Gay and Kale (1989), Badrinath,
Kale and Ryan (1996), Bushee (1998), Coffey and Fryxell (1991), Cready
(1994), Del Guercio (1996), Eakins, Stansell and Buck (1998), Falkenstein 
(1996), Gompers and Metrick (2001), Graves and Waddock (1994), Hessel 
and Norman (1992), Johnson and Greening (1999) and O’Brien and Bhushan 
(1991). However, all this work is performed from a US perspective. My focus 
was the UK. 
A second originality is that I disaggregated the concept of a firm’s social and 
environmental performance into separate factors. Other researchers were 
starting to do the same but this was not established practice within research
on responsible investment (Griffin and Mahon, 1997). I created separate 
variables for environment, workplace and community (philanthropic)
performance as well as overall corporate social performance.  
The third originality is my typology of institutional investors. Existing research 
using share selection models had only examined institutional investors at a 
relatively high level of aggregation.  I created detailed clienteles for unit trusts
(open-end mutual funds), investment trusts (closed-end mutual funds), 
charities, life insurance funds and pension funds. I created separate pension 
fund clienteles for universities, churches, charities, local authorities, labour 
unions, public sector and private sector funds, inhouse and externally
managed pension funds and pension funds in which fund managers faced 
different levels of competition because they were in tournaments with one
another. 
The intention of these endeavours was to shed light on the behaviour of 
different types of institutional investor as well as the fund managers they 
appoint to manage their assets. Pension funds were a particularly useful 
vehicle to investigate such aspects because there are so many types. 
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I was able to create the investor clienteles due to the availability of a highly
granular database that listed the beneficial ownership of all UK shares. There 
was not a database like this in the US. For example, the database showed
that some 2,300 different pension funds held shares in FTSE AllShare 
companies. It listed the name, country of origin, appointed fund managers and 
the number of shares held in each UK company. Altogether, the database 
calculated that pension funds owned 16% of shares outstanding of FTSE 
AllShare companies. This figure fits well with that estimated by the National 
Statistics Office (National Statistics, 2007).  
Incorporation of the originality within the research 
I incorporated the originality highlighted above throughout the research
methods. To take the example of Vodafone PLC, this involved me bringing 
together the percent of shares outstanding held by each class of institution in
Vodafone, a measure of the social and environmental performance of
Vodafone, and economic control variables. This procedure was repeated for 
almost 700 firms in the UK FTSE AllShare index. 
For the econometric technique, the dependent variable was the percent of
shares outstanding held by a class of institutional investor in each FTSE 
AllShare security. The principal independent variables were environment,
workplace, community and overall corporate social performance. The other 
independent variables were economic controls that included firm size, 
profitability, leverage (debt), risk, beta (expected return), liquidity (trading
volume), free float (percent of shares available) and information availability
(news items). 
A multiple regression was performed that estimated the relationship between 
the percent of shares held by a particular class of institutional investor in a 
particular firm and the firm’s social and environmental performance. In this
way the degree of ownership by a type of investor in a company was 
explained by the company’s social and environmental performance, including 
the economic controls. 
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When the UK FTSE AllShare index constituent weights were entered into the 
model there was no statistical significance on the social and environmental 
performance variables. This was relevant because it meant that if statistical 
significance on the social and environment performance variables were found 
when looking at the various classes of institutional investor this would indicate 
that institutional investors were tilting their portfolio equity holdings either
toward or away from these variables. 
Contributions and Implications of the Submission as an Entire 
Work 
The theme that is common to all the papers within this submission for a PhD 
is responsible investment. In 2001, when I began studying for a PhD, 
responsible investment was not as high profile as it is today. During the past 9 
years, responsible investment has grown in importance in several ways. 
There has been increasing interest in sustainable lifestyles, with several 
governments and jurisdictions making commitments to achieving sustainable 
development. These have helped to grow the market for sustainable and 
responsible products and services. 
Companies have responded to increasing interest in sustainable lifestyles by
providing better social and environmental reporting. In Europe, social and 
environmental reporting has been incorporated into corporate reporting and 
pension disclosure requirements. One example is the EU Accounts
Modernisation Directive. This Directive requires certain companies domiciled
in the EU to produce a Business Review. This needs to include narrative 
information and key performance indicators on matters of the environment,
employees, social and community issues, including policies, effectiveness of 
policies, and the impact of the business on the environment. This 
development in reporting has assisted investors in adopting a responsible
investment approach. 
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Recent trends in globalisation have increased the complexity of the 
environment that companies operate within, making knowledge of social and 
environmental factors fundamental to understanding risks and opportunities 
for investors. A responsible investment strategy tends to prioritise the impact
of these interactions and factors on the potential value of a portfolio. Related 
to this, the 2006 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change has
firmed-up demand for responsible investment by illustrating the impact that
not pursuing responsible investment might have on companies and the global 
economy. 
It is not only that responsible investment has grown in importance; it has also 
grown in breadth. In 2001, when I began studying for a PhD, responsible 
investment was not as linked with corporate governance as it is today. During 
the past 9 years research and practice have increasingly linked the 
environment, employees, society, and community to corporate governance. 
Whilst in 2001 it was natural to investigate the topics of environment, 
employees, society and community separate to corporate governance, this
might require some justification if doing so starting today. 
The developments above have made study of responsible investment in the 
first decade of the 21st century a lively, exciting and at times high profile 
activity. The papers within this submission have contributed both to this 
activity and to the growing importance of the subject area. The section below 
summarises further contributions and implications of this submission as an 
entire work. This is performed by grouping together and commenting on 
Papers 1 – 4, followed by commenting separately on Paper 5. 
Papers 1 - 4 
One overall contribution is the dataset constructed in order to produce papers
1 – 4. In 2002, I reviewed the literature in the area of institutional share 
selection. This revealed several potentially important accounting and market 
variables as determinants of institutional share selection. Previous research 
had not used all of these variables. This was a gap which was possible to 
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address within the timescale of PhD research and with significant focus at the 
data collection stage. I deliberately and carefully assembled a dataset from 7 
different data sources. This included a share ownership database that had 
never been used in academic research. I was able to obtain all the data I 
needed by drawing on industry contacts that I had built-up as a result of my 
previous career as a fund manager. Marrying the seven data sources resulted 
in a final dataset that was both unique and capable of investigating a great 
many research questions around share ownership. The table below reports 
the data used within the models and how they appeared in the final dataset.
The notes to the table explain the data in more detail. 
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A second overall contribution is the data themselves on share ownership.
Academic research had not before used the share ownership database I had 
obtained. More significantly perhaps, academic research had not before 
empirically examined the determinants of share ownership within UK 
companies. The database I obtained was extensive, real time, and maintained 
and owned by the largest UK company registrar. The registrar in turn pulled 
its data from the London Stock Exchange, and so was of high quality. I was
aware of the database through my previous career as a fund manager and 
obtained the database relatively easily. This put me in a position where I was 
able to investigate research questions around share ownership that had never
before been asked. Papers 1 – 4 are therefore the first to study in detail the 
empirical determinants of share ownership of UK firms and to speak to this 
area within a UK context. 
A third overall contribution concerns evidence on institutional investor
incentives to consider social and environmental factors within share selection. 
Theory and evidence suggests that social and environmental factors are more
likely to impact companies over the long term than the short term. For
example, significant movements in prices for waste, landfill, pollution and 
carbon, or changes to government subsidies, taxes or legislation are each
thought to be long-term drivers of value. By intentionally entering variables
that proxy for the long term into the regression models, i.e. social and 
environmental corporate performance, papers 1 – 4 speak to how the location 
and structure of fund management contracts are more or less likely to yield
long term investment or short term investment styles.  
Paper 5 
Although not directly aimed at an academic audience, this paper speaks to, 
and lends support to, academic research in the three following areas.  
The first is support of the academic literature on direct communication 
between institutional shareholders and corporate directors. Communication 
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between institutional shareholders and corporate directors is rooted in the 
oversight entitlement of shareholders. An entitlement to monitor and oversee 
corporate management comes about because shareholders provide the 
permanent risk capital of a company and shoulder almost all of the 
idiosyncratic risk. In the event of bankruptcy the common shareholders have a 
low priority over a company’s operating assets and receive a payout only after 
all creditors have first been paid. If there is nothing left the share price falls to
zero and shareholders lose their entire investment. The Financial Reporting 
Council notes that in order for this monitoring and oversight model to be 
effective, a sufficient number of major shareholders need to take a long-term 
view and interact constructively with the companies in which they invest
through dialogue and the use of voting and other rights (FRC, 2009). In 
contrast to this stylised model, both academic research and the results of 
Paper 5 find that institutional shareholders prefer to use meeting time with 
corporate directors to acquire information and intelligence for trading. Of 
particular relevance to this area of research is that Paper 5 confirms this result
even for a sample of fund management firms that perform responsible
investment. This result is relevant because one might expect a sample of 
responsible investment fund management firms to be precisely those most 
likely to take an interest in monitoring, oversight, transparency and 
accountability. 
The second is support of the academic literature around voluntary corporate 
reporting. Accounting theory expects firms to make judgements about the 
appropriate quantity and quality of voluntary information to disclose. This is 
expected to be based on the costs and benefits of doing so and on decisions 
about whether to disclose in the Annual Report or outside it. Shareowners are 
an important user of annual reports and are typically expected to prefer more 
disclosure within the Annual Report. One reason for this is that the Annual
Report is audited. A second reason is that in some jurisdictions shareholders
have the opportunity to demonstrate satisfaction or otherwise with a 
company's disclosures in the Annual Report by voting to approve them. Paper
5 confirms a preference for information to be included within the Annual 
Report. Most of the sample fund managers wanted information contained in
16
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dedicated social and environmental reports either to be migrated into the 
annual report or where there was good reason to keep it separate for
companies to initiate a separate vote at the Annual General Meeting on the 
approval of the corporate responsibility report.  
The third is that Paper 5 suggests certain governance related variables that 
may help future researchers investigate the determinants of the quantity and 
quality of responsible investment performed by fund managers. For example, 
Paper 5 finds that the closer responsible investment staff were to the 
investment committee and trading within the fund management firm, the more 
captured they appeared to be by conventional fund management thinking, the 
less decision taking discretion they had, the more junior and less experienced 
the staff, the less likely it was that board support existed for responsible 
investment and the lower the overall quantity and quality of responsible 
investment performed. This speaks to academic literatures in the fields of
governance, internal control, power, complexity and barriers to performance 
within financial entities.
Contribution of Each Paper 
The results of the papers have contributed to policy development. For 
example, results were extensively cited in the 2009 Personal Accounts
Delivery Authority’s Discussion Paper on Investment, and were also used to
build the evidence base of the 2005 A New Pension Settlement for the 
Twenty-first Century: The Second Report of the Pensions Commission. 
Results have also contributed to academic work. Three examples of academic
research that have cited and extended the work include:
1. Madhala Adam, A., and Shavit, T. 2008. How can a ratings-based method 
for assessing corporate social responsibility (CSR) provide an incentive to 
firms excluded from socially responsible investment indices to invest in 
CSR? Journal of Business Ethics, 82(4) pp 899-905. 
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2. Hallahana, T., and Faff, F.	 2009. Tournament behavior in Australian 
superannuation funds: A non-parametric analysis. Global Finance Journal,
19(3) pp 307-322. 
3. Toms, S., Anderson, K., and Salama, S. 2009. 	Does community and 
environmental responsibility affect firm risk? Evidence from UK panel data 
1994-2006. University of York Management School Working Paper No 49,
August. 
The key contributions of each of the five papers are described below. 
Paper 1 
This paper was published in a special issue on responsible investment. The 
paper’s focus was pension funds, life insurance funds, charities, unit trusts
and investment trusts. The objective of the paper was to determine whether
these classes of investor had different demand for the characteristics of social
and environmental performance within their equity portfolios. 
The relationship between the equity holdings of pension funds and social and 
environmental performance characteristics was positive and significant at the 
1 percent level. The relationship between the equity holdings of life insurance 
funds and social and environmental performance characteristics was positive 
and significant at the 5 percent level. Results for charities and unit trusts were
not statistically significant. The relationship between the equity holdings of 
investment trusts and social and environmental performance characteristics 
was negative and significant at the 1 percent level.  
Whilst the finding for investment trusts was of real interest this was not taken 
further because investment trusts hold such a small proportion of UK shares.
Breaking down investment trusts into more granular clienteles based on their 
different types risked a loss of robustness within the regression results. 
Investment trusts might make for interesting future research, perhaps using 
other methods. 
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The results of this research help buyers of fund management products to 
better understand the average level of social and environmental performance 
delivered by different products. Results are also important to legislators 
interested in building an evidence base about the effectiveness of pension 
disclosure legislation, commencing in 2000. 
Paper 2 
This paper extended Paper 1 by focusing on broad differences amongst 
pension funds. Separate clienteles were created for public sector funds, 
private sector funds, inhouse managed funds, externally managed funds, 
public sector inhouse managed funds, public sector externally managed 
funds, private sector inhouse managed funds and private sector externally
managed funds. 
One result was that the relationship between the equity holdings of public
sector funds and social and environmental performance characteristics was
not statistically significant. This contrasts with a mostly theoretical literature 
that suggests the investment holdings of public sector funds will be highly
idiosyncratic because they are influenced by social, political and other non-
price factors. 
A second result was that the relationship between the equity holdings of
inhouse managed pension funds and social and environmental performance 
characteristics was positive and significant at the 1 percent level whereas the 
relationship between the equity holdings of externally managed pension funds
and social and environmental performance characteristics was negative but
not statistically significant. It did not matter whether the clienteles examined 
referred to inhouse and externally managed public sector pension funds,
inhouse and externally managed private sector pension funds, or all inhouse 
and all externally managed pension funds. The result was similar. 
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This result suggests that the location of the fund managers that pension funds
appoint to invest and manage their assets is a key determinant of a particular 
preference for social and environmental performance. This provides a 
challenge to the conventional advice of investment consultants that 
outsourced fund management will generally lead to improved outcomes. The 
results of this research are also important in suggesting that public sector and 
private sector pension funds do not, of themselves, have significantly different 
preferences for social and environmental performance. 
Paper 3 
This paper extended Paper 2 by investigating competition among fund 
managers and preferences for social and environmental performance 
characteristics. The paper argued that the more investment managers a 
pension fund hires to manage a particular subset of securities, the greater is
the manager tournament and the less social and environmental performance 
will be of interest. 
Pension fund clienteles were created based on the number of managers each 
pension fund hired to manage UK equities. This started with a clientele in
which only 1 fund manager was hired, then a clientele in which 2 fund 
managers were hired, a clientele in which 3 fund managers were hired, and
so on up to 6. 
For pension funds that hired 1 or 2 fund managers, the relationship between 
their equity holdings and social and environmental performance was positive
and significant at the 5 percent level. For pension funds that hired 3 or 4 fund 
managers, the relationship between their equity holdings and social and 
environmental performance was negative and insignificant. For pension funds
that hired 5 fund managers, the relationship between their equity holdings and 
social and environmental performance was negative and significant at the 10 
percent level. 
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The results confirmed the expected inverse relationship between the number
of fund managers hired to manage a particular subset of securities and the 
social and environmental performance characteristics of the equities held. 
The paper provides insight for trustees of pension schemes who decide both 
the delegation of fund management and the number of fund managers to 
appoint over each subset of securities. The paper also raises awareness 
generally on the design of investment management contracts and possible 
differences in the short and long term focus of different types of fund 
manager. 
Paper 4 
The focus of this paper was again pension funds. A working draft of the paper 
received a best paper award at the 2006 Academy of Management 
conference. The objective of the paper was to determine whether there was
different demand for social and environmental performance characteristics
according to whether pension funds were investing domestically or overseas.  
This was performed by comparing the UK equity holdings of UK and US
pension funds, the former being domestic and the latter overseas. The paper 
argued that comparing both sets of investors UK equity holdings was justified 
because UK and US pension schemes are sufficiently similar on a number of 
key criteria. 
UK and US clienteles were matched to remove potential extraneous 
differences in the revealed preference for social and environmental 
performance. This involved creating UK and US clienteles for local authority
pension funds (state in the US), corporate pension funds, labour union 
pension funds and university, church and charity pension funds. University,
church and charity pension funds were combined because each was too small 
to investigate individually.  
21
 
21
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results indicate that pension funds paid greater attention to responsible 
investment when investing at home than overseas. The exception to this was 
labour union pension funds. Regardless of whether labour union pension 
funds were investing domestically or overseas, the relationship between their
equity holdings and workplace performance was positive and significant at the 
5 percent level or better. This suggests an alignment between the 
organisational principles of labour unions and the investments made within 
their pension funds. 
The results of this research are important to lobby groups interested in 
responsible investment as a global trend and not just a domestic trend. The 
results also provide insight as to the alignment between the investments that
some pension funds make and their organisational principles and causes. 
Paper 5 
The fifth paper drew on a separate dataset. This took the form of interviews
and surveys with 25 fund management firms between June and November
2007. The research was used to assist the Department For Work and 
Pensions develop an understanding of responsible investment. This study 
makes three contributions to knowledge. 
One contribution is new evidence on communication between fund managers, 
as investors, and corporate directors, as stewards of investors’ funds, for the 
purpose of responsible investment. Fund managers gave a total of six
reasons for communicating with corporate directors. These were obtaining
investment information as ideas for trading securities, communicating to
achieve influence, building and maintaining relationships, consultancy,
corporate disclosure and influence on public policy. The paper provides an 
extended description for each reason, ranks their importance, and highlights 
conflicts through the use of case examples. This extends work by Holland 
(1998), Hendry, Sanderson, Barker and Roberts (2006) and Roberts, 
Sanderson, Barker and Hendry (2006). 
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A second contribution is evidence on how responsible investment achieved 
financial performance. Fund managers gave three reasons. One way was to
understand and capture the financial dividend attached to more responsible 
firms. The paper performs an extended literature review to examine this. A 
second way involved bringing about influence at the level of the firm. The third 
way involved bringing about influence at the level of public policy that would 
then benefit all of a fund’s holdings. The paper provides an extended 
description on each of these as well as case examples. 
A third contribution is evidence on operational and delivery aspects of
responsible investment. This includes detailed examination of information and 
staff as inputs into responsible investment, measurement of the quality of
responsible investment within fund management firms, and an assessment of
costs and charges associated with the range of responsible investment
possibilities. This more discursive analysis develops and extends 
understanding of responsible investment within an institutional fund 
management setting. 
Future Research 
During the next 2 years I intend to draw on the work included within this
submission for a PhD in order to yield a further three refereed journal articles. 
A summary of each intended article is provided below. 
Paper on Defined Contribution and Defined Benefit Pension Schemes 
One potential future paper is to distinguish and separately investigate defined 
contribution and defined benefit pension schemes’ demand for the 
characteristics of social and environmental performance within their equity 
portfolios. My original intention as a full-time PhD student was to produce a 
paper on this topic. At the methods stage of my full-time PhD programme I 
coded all the data so that I could readily distinguish between defined
contribution and defined benefit pension schemes. At the time this involved 
manually coding each pension scheme in my dataset using the 2002 book 
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‘Pension Funds and their Advisors’ and the 2003 book ‘National Association 
of Pension Funds Year Book 2003: 80th Anniversary Edition’. Each book held 
detailed pension scheme information for the year 2002, the same year as my
dataset. This classification permits me to perform regressions on these two 
classes of pension scheme and examine demand for the characteristics of 
social and environmental performance within their equity portfolios. I intend to 
finish and submit the paper to a finance or management journal in 2010. 
Such a paper might be timely because the topic of defined contribution 
pension schemes has risen in importance of late. Within the workplace there
has been significant closure of defined benefit (DB) schemes1 and a switch to 
individual defined contribution (DC) schemes.  For example, in the UK the 
number of active members in private sector workplace DB schemes has more 
than halved in recent years, and in 2008 just 31% of private sector DB 
schemes remained open to new entrants (Pension Protection Fund 2008).  
The closure of private sector workplace DB schemes has been accompanied
by increased participation in individual DC schemes.  For example, in 2007 
92% of open private sector workplace schemes in the UK were DC (Office for 
National Statistics, 2008), and for the first time in 2006 the amount of money
flowing into DB schemes was less than the amount flowing into DC schemes
(ABI, 2008). 
This shift towards DC membership will be underlined further from 2012, when 
all employers in the UK will be required to automatically enrol employees into
a workplace pension.  The reforms are expected to increase membership of 
workplace pension schemes by over 6 million (including membership within 
the new personal accounts DC scheme – now called NEST).  Much of this
increase is likely to be within DC schemes. 
Most of the work on this paper will involve writing-up and developing 
expectations for why DC and DB schemes may have different demand for the 
1 Including closing to new members and stopping future accruals for existing members. 
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characteristics of social and environmental performance within their equity 
portfolios. 
Paper on Direct Communication between Institutional Shareholders and 
Corporate Directors 
A second potential future paper concerns direct communication between 
institutional shareholders and corporate directors. Information for such a 
paper is contained in Paper 5 of this submission for a PhD. An early draft of a 
potential journal output has been submitted and accepted for presentation to 
the British Accounting Association conference in April 2010. I intend to submit 
the final paper to a finance or management journal toward the end of 2010. 
Once again, the research is relatively timely, with the Financial Reporting 
Council recently expressing a desire to see new research in this area in order 
to better understand communication between major shareholders and 
companies.
Although the entitlement of major shareholders to maintain oversight of
corporate directors and to discharge this by direct communication is rooted in
the governance process, there has been recent concern that the meeting time 
is more often used to acquire information and intelligence for trading. The
potential importance of the purpose and emphasis of these communications 
makes it a natural source of interest. Very few studies have so far yielded 
insight into this process, so this potential paper can help close that gap. The 
contribution of the paper would be to add new insight and evidence to this 
area and to do so based on a significant sample and robust investigative 
methods. 
Paper on Voting of Shares and Ownership by Institutional Shareholders  
A third potential future paper is another extension of Paper 5 This draws on 
data that I did not include with this submission for a PhD. I have data and 
evidence on the voting of shares by professional fund managers in routine 
and controversial situations, voting in segregated and pooled funds, voting of 
domestic and overseas shares, the proportion of recalling of shares on loan 
for voting in contentious situations, how voting interacts with stock lending, the 
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escalation of problems when voting is not thought to be enough, and 
escalation when problems between major shareholders and corporate 
directors are unable to be satisfactorily resolved in private. 
An early draft of a potential journal output has been submitted and accepted 
for presentation to the British Accounting Association conference in April 
2010. I intend to submit the final paper to a finance or management journal 
some time in 2011. My intention is to collaborate with a co-author on this
particular area. The reason for this is that this subject area represents a 
widening of my research into areas where other scholars have good and 
complementary knowledge and experience.
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4. Cox, P., and Schneider, M. 2008. 	Is US socially responsible investing 
global or local in perspective? A study of US pension plan investment in 
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5. Paul Cox, 2009. Responsible investment in fund management: It works, 
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ABSTRACT. This study investigates the pattern of 
institutional shareholding in the U.K. and its relationship 
with socially responsible behavior by companies within a 
sample of over 500 UK companies. We estimate a set of 
ownership models that distinguish between long- and 
short-term investors and their largest components and 
which incorporate both aggregated and disaggregated 
measures of corporate social performance (CSP). The 
results suggest that long-term institutional investment is 
positively related to CSP providing further support for 
earlier studies by Johnson and Greening (1999, Academy 
of Management Journal 42, 564–576) and Graves and 
Waddock (1994, Academy of Management Journal 37, 
1034–1046). Disaggregation of CSP into its constituent 
components suggests that the pattern of institutional 
investment is also related to the form which CSP takes. 
Investigation of the impact of investment screens on the 
selection of stocks suggests that long-term institutional 
investors select primarily through exclusion, rejecting 
those ﬁrms which have the worst CSP. 
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Introduction 
The recent evolution of the pattern of ownership of 
the stock of large corporations is marked by two 
signiﬁcant trends. First, the extent to which the 
common stock of companies has come to be owned 
by institutions, such as pension and mutual funds, 
rather than individual investors has risen dramatically 
over the last 25 years (National Statistics, 2002; 
Ryan and Schneider, 2002; Useem, 1996). Second, 
the rapid growth of the socially responsible invest­
ment (SRI) movement has stimulated interest in 
aspects of corporate behavior other than those di­
rectly associated with corporate ﬁnancial perfor­
mance (Social Investment Forum, 2002a; Sparkes, 
2000; UK Social Investment Forum, 2003). These 
developments have prompted researchers to examine 
the link between corporate social performance 
(CSP) and the extent of institutional ownership in 
company stock (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Graves 
and Waddock, 1994). 
The growth in individual institutional share-
holdings has both increased the visibility of institu­
tional investors and reduced the ﬂexibility of 
institutions to exit investments without signiﬁcantly 
damaging their value. It has been hypothesized that 
these developments may have resulted in an increase 
in shareholder activism and greater focus on long-
term returns (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson 
and Greening, 1999). At the same time, institutional 
investors have come under increasing pressure to 
encompass social performance in investment selec­
tion. Recent evidence suggests that SRI accounts for 
a signiﬁcant proportion of total investment in both 
the U.S. and the U.K. For example, the Social 
Investment Forum estimated that US$2.3 trillion of 
social funds were under management in the U.S. in 
Journal of Business Ethics 52: 27–43, 2004.
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2001,1 equivalent to one in every eight dollars under 
professional management, while the corresponding 
amount invested in U.K. social funds in the U.K. 
stood at approximately £25 bn in 2000 (Sustain-
Ability, 2000). However, while specialized SRI 
investment instruments have developed in both 
countries, the legal and institutional framework 
through which institutional investors view CSP 
differs signiﬁcantly between the U.K. and the US. In 
particular, long-run institutional investors (e.g. 
Pension Funds, Life Assurance Companies) have 
become subject to regulatory and institutional social 
investment requirements in the U.K. (Association of 
British Insurers, 2001; Local Authority Pension 
Fund Forum, 2002; National Association of Pension 
Funds, 2002; Occupational Pension Schemes, 1999). 
The developments in the U.K. suggest both that the 
study of SRI should encompass broad institutional 
categories as well as specialist SRI funds, since both 
pension and life assurance ﬁnds have become subject 
to legal and institutional requirements, and that 
signiﬁcant differences may exist in the holdings of 
long-run institutional investors based on the inci­
dence and level of CSP and the institutional and 
legal framework within which investment decisions 
are made. 
Relatively few studies have considered the rela­
tionship between social performance and the hold­
ings of different types of institutional shareholder and 
all of these are based on U.S. data. Graves and 
Waddock (1994) ﬁnd that the number of institu­
tional investors in a corporation’s stock is positively 
related to ﬁrm social performance within a model 
that draws on efﬁcient markets theory (Fama, 1970) 
supporting earlier work by Coffey and Fryxell 
(1991). Johnson and Greening (1999) place the 
analysis within agency theory but also ﬁnd a positive 
relationship between pension fund investment and 
two aspects of social performance, a people dimen­
sion (community, women and minorities, employee 
relations) and a product quality dimension (envi­
ronment, product quality). 
This paper extends and develops the existing lit­
erature in three ways: 
(1) The paper investigates the impact of CSP on 
the pattern of institutional investment in the 
U.K. within a set of ownership models that 
distinguish between long- and short-term 
investors and their largest components (Pen­
sion Funds, Life Assurers, Charities, Unit 
Trusts, and Investment Trusts). The study 
therefore provides an investigation of the 
relationship between institutional investment 
and CSP within a fundamentally different 
institutional and regulatory environment. In 
so doing, the analysis sheds light on the 
preferences of institutional investors for CSP 
as revealed in the pattern of their investments. 
The use of disaggregated ownership data 
permits the exploration of disparities in 
behavior between long- and short-term 
investors and the impact of differences in 
regulatory and institutional social invest­
ment requirements on the pattern of institu­
tional ownership. The typology builds on 
recent conceptual work which has high­
lighted the diversity of institutional inves­
tors and argued that the behavior of 
institutional investors is conditioned by a 
complex set of characteristics (Ryan and 
Schneider, 2002). 
(2) In spite of the recognition that ﬁrm social 
performance is a fundamentally multidimen­
sional construct (Carroll, 1979) the diversity 
of social performance is only partially exam­
ined in existing empirical work (Cofey and 
Fryxell, 1991; Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
The analysis in this study employs both an 
aggregated CSP construct and also separate 
measures of the community, environment 
and employee-relations dimensions of social 
responsibility. This permits the analysis to 
investigate whether the preferences of differ­
ent institutional investors vary across different 
dimensions of CSP. 
(3) Existing studies say very little about the pro­
cess by which CSP is linked to the behaviour 
of institutional investors. Some studies have 
suggested that institutional investors employ 
screens that distinguish in a binary fashion 
between admissible and inadmissible stocks on 
the basis of ﬁrm social performance (Barnett 
and Salomon, 2002). Our methodology 
tests for this possibility through the inclusion 
of dummy variables that highlight the com­
panies with the best and worst social perfor­
mance. 
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The paper is structured as follows. The next section 
discusses the conceptual background to the study 
and outlines our hypotheses. The third introduces 
the sample and variable deﬁnitions. The ﬁnal section 
reports the ﬁndings and the theoretical and policy 
implications are then outlined in the concluding 
section. 
Conceptual background and hypotheses 
development 
In this paper the relationship between institutional 
shareholdings and CSP is investigated within a 
model which draws on portfolio theory (Foster, 
1986; Markowitz, 1952) and the typology of insti­
tutional investors generated by Ryan and Schneider 
(2002). Portfolio theory suggests that investors 
should consider both the rate of return and the level 
of risk when making investment decisions (Graves 
and Waddock, 1994). The trading preferences of 
institutional investors are largely dictated by the 
nature of the products that they sell and a broad 
distinction can be drawn between short- and long-
term investors which inﬂuences the time horizon 
within which the pattern of investment returns will 
be considered (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Ryan 
and Schneider, 2002). This implies that the impor­
tance of social factors in institutional investment 
decisions may be expected to depend on the ﬁnan­
cial returns to CSP, the relationship between CSP 
and risk, and the time horizon within which these 
beneﬁts accrue. Institutional investors are also sub­
ject to a set of regulatory, institutional and social 
pressures which impact upon individual types of 
institutional investor and may affect the preferences 
of institutions for ﬁrms with different social perfor­
mance attributes. Each of these factors is considered 
below. 
Financial performance, risk and CSP 
Given that institutional investors buy and hold stock 
with the aim of generating risk adjusted ﬁnancial 
returns both for the institution and for their cus­
tomers, expectations concerning the relationship 
between corporate social and ﬁnancial performance 
are expected to play a crucial role in inﬂuencing the 
pattern of institutional investment. There is a broad 
consensus in the conceptual literature that many of 
the ﬁnancial gains from improved social perfor­
mance accrue in the long run while social perfor­
mance initiatives may require companies to make 
signiﬁcant investments in the short run. Hillman and 
Keim (2001) argue that improved social performance 
can contribute positively to ‘‘long-term value crea­
tion’’ (Hillman and Keim, 2001, p. 127) through the 
creation of ‘‘socially complex resources’’ (Hillman 
and Keim, 2001, p. 127). Other authors have simi­
larly argued that ﬁnancial performance and social 
performance might be positively associated in the 
long run because improved social performance 
confers better resource competitiveness (Cochran 
and Wood, 1984; Hart, 1995; Waddock and Graves, 
1997), lower transaction costs (Ruf et al., 2001), 
employee quality and motivation (Moskowitz, 1972; 
Turban and Greening, 1997), and customer good­
will (McGuire et al., 1988). At the same time, low 
levels of social performance may increase a ﬁrm’s 
ﬁnancial risk (Ullmann, 1985) by signaling low 
management skill (Alexander and Bucholtz, 1978; 
Spicer, 1978), uncertain and possible increased 
government regulation and ﬁnes (McGuire et al., 
1988), and increased uncertainty regarding the level 
and variability of future cash ﬂow (Richardson et al., 
1999; Shane and Spicer, 1983). This discussion 
suggests that long-run investors may be more likely 
to exhibit a preference for ﬁrms with good social 
performance because of its potentially favorable 
impact upon long-run risk and return (Graves and 
Waddock, 1994). 
CSP is generally considered to be multidimen­
sional (Carroll, 1979; Grifﬁn and Mahon, 1997) and 
a comprehensive assessment of a ﬁrm’s social per­
formance should encompass a range of aspects 
(Carroll, 2000). However, existing empirical and 
conceptual contributions have argued that different 
types of corporate social activity have different 
implications for ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance (Grifﬁn 
and Mahon, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001). Grifﬁn 
and Mahon (1997) highlight the variety of senses in 
which a ﬁrm can be deﬁned as being socially 
responsible and demonstrate that perceptions of the 
link between social and ﬁnancial performance is 
contingent upon the dimension of social perfor­
mance considered. Hillman and Keim (2001) argue 
that aspects of ﬁrm social performance that help to 
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propagate good relationships with key stakeholder 
groups such as employees can lead to long-term 
competitive advantages that confer improved 
ﬁnancial performance and ﬁnd strong empirical 
support for their view. Signiﬁcant differences can 
also be observed between CSP attributes and the 
potential for risk reduction. Thus investments in 
employee related initiatives may be expected both to 
improve ﬁnancial performance and to reduce the 
risk of employee related legal action and resultant 
poor public relations. Hart (1995) indicates that 
many environmental policies such as ‘end-of-pipe’ 
approaches, source reduction and process innovation 
(Hart, 1995) tend to be ﬁxed cost investments, 
having physical asset properties (Russo and Fouts, 
1997), with beneﬁts spread over many years. While 
such developments may result in efﬁciency gains, the 
primary impact of environmental initiatives is likely 
to lie in long-term risk reduction. In contrast com­
munity contributions have the shortest-term pay-off 
(Carroll, 1979), are largely external to the company 
and are not directly linked to areas which are subject 
to regulation and/or legal action in the company. 
Institutional and regulatory pressure and CSP 
In addition to the purely ﬁnancial aspects of insti­
tutional investor decision-making, institutional 
investors are also subject to regulatory, institutional 
and social forces (Ryan and Schneider, 2002) which 
may inﬂuence the importance they attach to CSP. In 
the U.K. CSP has come under increasing scrutiny 
from ethical investment research services and fund 
managers as institutional investors have responded to 
external pressures. This development reﬂects legis­
lative pressure, U.K. pension funds were required to 
identify the role of social, environmental and ethical 
considerations in investment planning in 2000 
(Occupational Pension schemes, 1999), pressures 
from industry trade bodies who have set social 
agendas for institutional investors (e.g. Association of 
British Insurers, 2001; Local Authority Pension 
Fund Forum, 2002; National Association of Pension 
Funds, 2002), and signiﬁcant public interest in SRI, 
with National Opinion Poll survey results suggesting 
that 77% of respondents supported ethical pensions 
(The Ethical Investor, 1999). Both the extent to 
which investment selection is subject to external 
pressure for socially responsible stocks, and the form 
it takes (legal requirement, voluntary) differs be­
tween types of institutional investors. 
The preceding discussion suggests that, on bal­
ance, the beneﬁts of CSP, whether ﬁnancial or 
through risk reduction, are long run rather than 
short run while the costs must be carried in the short 
run. Furthermore, the returns to investment in CSP 
and the time period in which they accrue may de­
pend on the particular attributes (employment, 
environment, community) which underpin CSP. 
Institutional investors are also subject to signiﬁcant 
regulatory and institutional requirements which may 
affect investment patterns. The implications of these 
characteristics for the pattern of institutional invest­
ment are discussed in detail below. 
Institutional investment and CSP 
The relationship between institutional ownership 
and CSP is explored within a set of institutional 
ownership equations which encompass both long-
and short-term investors and ﬁve different institu­
tional types: pension funds, life assurance, charities, 
unit trusts, and investment trusts. The relationship 
between each of these and CSP is analyzed below 
within a discussion which emphasizes differences in 
the regulatory and institutional requirements for 
CSP. Although differences in CSP attributes 
(employees, environment, community) are expected 
to have a differential impact on long- and short-term 
institutional investors no a priori relationship is ex­
pected between CSP attributes and different types of 
short- and long-term investor; the discussion of 
different types of CSP is therefore restricted to the 
distinction between long- and short-term investors. 
A common set of control variables which may be 
expected to inﬂuence the pattern of institutional 
investor holdings is then considered. 
Long-run investors 
Long-term investors (e.g. Pension Funds, Life 
Assurance Funds, Charitable Funds) typically have 
predictable cash outﬂows, a long investment horizon 
and invest for long periods (Ryan and Schneider, 
2002). Since the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of CSP are 
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expected to accrue in the long-term we hypothesize 
that: 
Hypothesis 1a: The extent of long run institutional 
investor fund holdings in companies will be positively 
associated with corporate social performance. 
The earlier discussion suggested that employee re­
lated CSP would produce both efﬁciency gains and a 
reduction in risk while environmental initiatives are 
hypothesized to result in a reduction in risk and the 
consequent cost of environmental failures. Com­
munity initiatives are expected to have the weakest 
links to both long-term ﬁnancial performance and 
risk reduction. We therefore hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1b: The expected positive association be­
tween the extent of long run institutional investor 
fund holdings and corporate social performance will be 
stronger for companies with good employee relations 
performance than for companies with good commu­
nity or environmental performance. 
Hypothesis 1c: The expected positive association be­
tween the extent of long run institutional investor 
fund holdings and corporate social performance will be 
stronger for companies with good environmental 
performance than for companies with good commu­
nity performance. 
Short-run investors 
In contrast, the requirements of many institutional 
investors are for short-term ﬁnancial performance 
and for liquidity. For example, the immediate 
redemption rights afforded to owners of unit trusts, a 
form of open-end mutual fund, encourage mutual 
fund managers to adopt a short-term investment 
horizon and favor ownership of ﬁrms with high 
trading liquidity from which exit can take place 
quickly without adversely affecting market prices 
(Droms and Walker, 1996; Johnson and Greening, 
1999; Social Investment Forum, 2002b; Zera and 
Madura, 2001). Since the beneﬁts of CSP accrue in 
the long run while much of the investment takes 
place in the short run we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 2a: The extent of short run institutional 
investor fund holdings in companies will be negatively 
associated with corporate social performance. 
Since employee related initiatives are argued to have 
the strongest relationship with ﬁnancial performance 
it is tentatively suggested that: 
Hypothesis 2b: The expected negative association 
between the extent of short run institutional investor 
fund holdings and corporate social performance will be 
weaker for companies with good employee relations 
performance than for companies with good commu­
nity or environmental performance. 
Pension funds 
Pension funds have a long average duration of lia­
bilities (Davis and Steil, 2001), a long minimum 
investment period before any pension beneﬁts can 
be received (Copeland and Weston, 1988), pre­
dictable cash outﬂows (Ryan and Schneider, 2002), 
a long investment horizon or planned liquidation 
date of investment and low asset turnover (Ryan 
and Schneider, 2002). U.K. pension funds face 
some regulatory pressure to adjust their investments 
for CSP. As of July 2000 U.K. pension funds have 
had a legal requirement to make public in their 
statement of investment principles the importance 
they attach to social performance in investment 
selection (Occupational Pension Schemes, 1999). 
Strong industry trade bodies also set social agendas 
for both public and private pension funds (Local 
Authority Pension Fund Forum, 2002; National 
Association of Pension Funds, 2002). A survey 
conducted at the time of this change found 19% 
of private sector funds and 31% of public sector 
funds taking social considerations into account 
in investment selection (Targett, 2000).2 Since 
Pension Funds may be expected to beneﬁt from the 
long-run ﬁnancial beneﬁts ﬂowing from CSP and 
are subject to signiﬁcant regulatory and institu­
tional pressure which inﬂuence the importance 
they attach to CSP, a positive relationship may 
be expected between pension fund holdings and 
CSP. Earlier evidence from the U.S., within an 
agency framework, provides tentative support for 
the expected relationship (Johnson and Greening, 
1999). 
Hypothesis 3: The extent of pension fund holdings in 
companies will be positively associated with corporate 
social performance. 
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Life assurance companies 
Stock holdings by life assurers are more signiﬁcant 
in the United Kingdom than in the United States 
(National Statistics, 2002; Ryan and Schneider, 
2002), perhaps reﬂecting the absence of limits to the 
extent to which such funds can consist of equity 
investments in the United Kingdom (Dickinson, 
1998). Life assurance companies have relatively 
predictable cash outﬂows, typically invest for long 
periods and have close links with pension funds 
through insurance provided to small deﬁned-beneﬁt 
pension funds, direct provision of deﬁned-contri­
bution pensions and guaranteed investment con­
tracts purchased by pension funds (Davis and Steil, 
2001). The industry trade body for life insurance 
companies has set a social investment agenda for 
insurance company equity investment (Association 
of British Insurers, 2001). This agenda differs from 
the legal requirements which constrain CSP 
investment policy in pension funds in two ways. 
First, it is more demanding and rigorous in its ap­
proach to corporate social issues and their role in 
investment selection and secondly it is voluntary and 
without the force of law. While this suggests that 
life assurance equity investments will be inﬂuenced 
by CSP, the voluntary nature of institutional pres­
sure in this sector and the requirement for small 
amounts of short-term liquidity to cover early sur­
render of policies, coupled with the uncertain tim­
ing of life policy payouts,3 may reduce the relative 
importance of CSP in this sector. It is therefore 
hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 4: The extent of life assurance fund hold­
ings in companies will be positively associated with 
corporate social performance. 
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between life assurance 
fund holdings and corporate social performance will be 
weaker than that between pension fund holdings and 
corporate social performance. 
Charities 
The overall size of U.K. charity investment amounts 
to only 1% of the total stock of large U.K. ﬁrms 
(National Statistics, 2002) and is therefore relatively 
small in terms of overall U.K. ﬁrm ownership. The 
perpetuity characteristic of their permanent 
endowment imparts charities with a long investment 
horizon. Although the Charity Commission does 
not set a social agenda for trustees’ consideration and 
under U.K. common law charity trustees are re­
quired to act in the best interests of beneﬁciaries, 
investing prudently, without speculation, to achieve 
both income and capital growth (Responsibilities of 
Charity Trustees CC3, 2002; Responsibilities of 
Charity Trustees: A Summary CC3, 2002), charities 
face considerable regulatory pressure from other 
sources to consider social performance in their 
investment decisions. The trustee act of 2000 
‘‘which came into force in February 2001, requires 
charity trustees to make sure investments are suit­
able, not only ﬁnancially, but also with regards to the 
charity’s own stated aims’’ (Eiris, 2001/2002). Re­
cent empirical evidence suggests that the vast 
majority (84%) of charities employed some form of 
ethical screening of their investments, with 59% 
excluding tobacco companies from their investments 
and 25% having a formal or informal ethical 
investment policy (Eiris, 2001). The application of a 
typically narrow selection of negative screens is 
estimated to reduce the pool of stocks available for 
investment by charities by only 5% (WM Company, 
1999). Since charitable funds are expected to beneﬁt 
from the long-run ﬁnancial beneﬁts ﬂowing from 
CSP, are subject to regulatory pressure to consider 
CSP, and have inherently pro-social performance 
pre-ferences given their social remits, we hypothe­
size that: 
Hypothesis 6: The extent of charity fund holdings in 
companies will be positively associated with corporate 
social performance. 
Unit trusts 
U.K. unit trusts own 12% of U.K. listed ﬁrms 
(National Statistics, 2002) and are the largest short-
term investor. Whilst a very small minority of U.K. 
unit trusts have a social investment mandate (UBS 
Warburg, 2001) the vast majority have a purely 
ﬁnancial interest in a portfolio of ﬁrms (Ryan and 
Schneider, 2002). The absence of institutional and 
regulatory pressure to consider ﬁrm social perfor­
mance suggests that short-term purely ﬁnancial 
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interests enter most signiﬁcantly into unit trust 
investment. Therefore we expect that 
Hypothesis 7: The extent of unit trust holdings in 
companies will be negatively associated with corporate 
social performance. 
Investment trusts 
Whereas Ryan and Schneider do not separately 
categorize investment trusts they are of greater sig­
niﬁcance in the U.K., owning 2.2% of listed ﬁrms 
(National Statistics, 2002). An investment trust is a 
closed end public listed, ﬁxed share capital, mutual 
fund in which liquidity is stock market provided. 
Because investors need to sell their shares in the 
investment trust company to other investors to 
realize their investment, rather than simply redeem 
their investment at the currently quoted price as in 
the case of unit trusts (Lofthouse, 2001), the 
investment trust share price need not equal the price 
of the underlying assets (Investment Management 
Association, 2003). Whereas open-end funds are 
obliged to buy and sell at net asset value the value of 
closed end funds therefore ﬂuctuates according to 
the demand for the shares on the stock market. The 
absence of social performance regulatory pressure, 
short investment time horizon and the immediate­
ness and transparency of investor disappointment 
with investment trust managerial performance leads 
us to expect a strong negative relationship between 
investment trust ownership and social performance 
as ﬁnancial interest enters most signiﬁcantly into 
investment trust decisions. 
Hypothesis 8: The extent of investment trust holdings 
in companies will be negatively associated with cor­
porate social performance. 
The hypothesized relationships between the extent 
of institutional investment holdings and CSP are 
summarized in Table I. 
Control variables 
A range of control variables were included in the 
analysis. Following earlier work, ﬁrm size is included 
both because some investors may ﬁnd large ﬁrms less 
attractive since their ownership will be relatively 
small, limiting their ability to inﬂuence management 
(Graves and Waddock, 1994), and because invest­
ment in small ﬁrms may only be viable for small 
investors or institutions managing funds of small 
average size. In addition, client mandates may place a 
ceiling on the percent of ownership able to be 
owned in any one ﬁrm, effectively conﬁning 
investment to large ﬁrms where maximum owner­
ship limits will not be breached. 
Company leverage was included to control for the 
possibility that the higher risk of insolvency associ­
ated with more indebted companies deters some 
institutional shareholders (Chaganti and Daman­
pour, 1991). Alternatively, high leverage may 
commit management to high earnings and thereby 
reduce agency costs through motivational effects 
(Duke and Hunt, 1990) or it may reduce the ability 
of managers to prioritize external growth through 
merger and acquisition rather than proﬁtability 
(Myers, 1984; Weston et al., 2001). These other 
arguments suggest that investors may prefer to invest 
in high leverage companies. 
Since the ﬂow of accounting proﬁts is expected to 
contribute to the market performance of stocks, we 
expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship between the 
proportion of institutional ownership and proﬁts 
(Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and Greening, 
1999). 
In order to adjust for the presence of large block 
holders in the form of controlling families, company 
cross holdings or government and director holdings 
that may discourage interest from large investors 
seeking to inﬂuence the management of ﬁrms, we 
include the proportion of total equity which is not 
controlled by block holders (the free ﬂoat propor­
tion) as an explanatory variable. A positive rela­
tionship is expected between free ﬂoat and 
institutional investment. 
Finally, we include a set of industry dummy 
variables to account for the possibility that owner­
ship of ﬁrms across different industries may be 
inﬂuenced by the general relationships industries 
have with expected risk and return but also by the 
negative and positive investment screens of social 
investors. Recent commercial research (Commerz­
bank, 2002) suggests that risk and return differences 
between socially constrained and unconstrained 
36
34 Paul Cox et al. 
TABLE I 
Summary of key hypotheses 
Investor group Hypothesised relationship 
between extent of holdings and 
corporate social performance 
Reason(s) 
Long term investors +	 Expectation that investments in CSP will 
pay off in long run; reduced risk associated 
with investment in socially responsive 
companies. Higher preference for employ­
ee and environmental aspects of CSP than 
for community aspects of CSP. 
Pension funds +	 As for other long term investors plus some 
regulatory pressure 
Life assurance +	 As for other long term investors but 
comparatively higher need for a degree of 
short term liquidity; presence of reguatory 
pressure 
Charities +	 As for other long term investors plus 
inherent preference for social performance 
characteristics of companies 
Short term investors )	 Expectation that investments in CSP will 
be detrimental to short term ﬁnancial 
performance; need for liquidity to meet 
redemptions; absence of regulatory impera­
tive. Higher preference for employee and 
environmental aspects of CSP than for 
community aspects of CSP. 
Unit trusts )	 As for other short term investors 
Investment trusts )	 As for other short term investors; strong 
market discipline to maintain fund perfor­
mance 
stock portfolios may simply be the result of industry 
effects. Therefore we need to control for the inﬂu­
ence of industry on stock ownership in order to 
isolate the contribution due to social performance. 
Methods 
Our sample was drawn from the constituent com­
panies of the FTSE AllShare index. This index of 
approximately 600 of the largest U.K. quoted ﬁrms 
is rebalanced quarterly (FTSE, 2003a) to allow ﬁrms 
that have dropped out of the 600 largest to be re­
placed by new additions. It is not uncommon for 
ﬁrms to periodically leave and re-enter the index at 
rebalancings and, therefore, the membership of an 
index is subject to volatility. Because of this, our 
sample consisted of all ﬁrms that have been index 
constituents in any quarter during 2001 and 2002. 
This yielded a sample of 678 ﬁrms. 
The analysis requires that data concerning the 
social performance of this sample of companies be 
matched to accounting and company ownership 
data. Social performance data were obtained from 
the Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS), 
the U.K.’s oldest independent research company 
specializing in the assessment of CSP for investors. 
EIRIS has 20 years dedicated social research expe­
rience, the largest and most complete multidimen­
sional social performance coverage of U.K. ﬁrms and 
more than 75% of U.K. ethical funds subscribing to 
its data. Accounting data were extracted from Da­
tastream. Ownership data was drawn in June 2002 
from a share ownership analysis database of more 
than 2000 listed U.K. ﬁrms managed by one of the 
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U.K.’s largest company registrars. Ownership data 
are continually updated to incorporate underlying 
beneﬁcial ownership changes and investment man­
agers’ holdings from share trading information re­
corded daily on the London Stock Exchange. The 
database disaggregates share ownership according to 
32 different types of beneﬁcial owner. Missing social 
performance data reduced our dataset from 678 to 
576 ﬁrms. Missing ﬁnancial data further reduced it to 
541 ﬁrms. This provides us with the largest share 
ownership and social performance research sample so 
far examined, signiﬁcantly greater than the 430 and 
252 ﬁrm samples of Graves and Waddock (1994) and 
Johnson and Greening (1999), and one that captures 
80% of the largest 678 U.K. quoted ﬁrms between 
2001 and 2002. 
Given that the model is fundamentally one of 
investor choice, the dependent variables analyzed are 
designed to capture the preferences of various groups 
of institutional owners for socially responsive attri­
butes among the sample companies. Recent research 
has highlighted that not all the stock in a company is 
traded and that it is important to adjust for this 
phenomenon in empirical work (Hamon and Jac­
quillat, 1999). The free ﬂoat proportion is the frac­
tion of shares tradable within the market place for a 
given stock. Adjusting ﬁrms share capital for free ﬂoat 
overcomes situations where an investor owns a 
proportion of a line of stock that is unlikely to be for 
sale and so ensures an accurate representation of the 
proportion of a ﬁrm’s stock that is available for 
institutional investors to own. This adjustment re­
ﬂects government holdings in privatization stocks, 
ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm trade investments and cross holdings, 
signiﬁcant long-term holdings by founders, directors 
and director’s families, employee share schemes and 
portfolio investment subject to lock-in clauses 
(FTSE, 2003a, b). The relatively recent calculation of 
the free ﬂoat proportions allows researchers to now 
control for tradable ﬁrm size in a manner unavailable 
to prior research in this area. Seven dependent vari­
ables were created each of which is deﬁned as the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of total holdings by a 
given group of institutional investors to the total 
number of shares in the company adjusted for the 
free-ﬂoat. Following the discussion earlier the seven 
groups are: All long-term investors, pension funds, 
life assurance, charities, all short-term investors, unit 
trusts, and investment trusts. 
The key independent variables concern CSP. 
Carroll (1979) emphasizes the fundamentally mul­
tidimensional nature of this construct and, reﬂecting 
this, Grifﬁn and Mahon (1997) suggest that CSP 
should be disaggregated into its individual compo­
nents so as to avoid the information losses associated 
with aggregation into a single construct. At the 
same time, a good aggregate CSP measure will 
comprise a consistent range of important social is­
sues that are uniformly measured across a wide range 
of companies (Graves and Waddock, 1994). Fol­
lowing this our analysis employs both a single 
aggregated CSP construct and three constituent 
constructs that reﬂect speciﬁc dimensions of the 
overall CSP construct. In order to investigate the 
possible impact of investment screens on the selec­
tion of stocks on the basis of ﬁrm social performance 
a third measure of CSP is also derived which 
highlights companies with the best and worst social 
performance. 
EIRIS social performance information comprises 
data concerning ﬁve CSP attributes: environment, 
employment, community, human rights and supply 
chain management. Full information is available for 
our sample ﬁrms for the environment, employment 
and community dimensions of social performance. 
Fewer data are available for human rights and supply 
chain management. Since including all ﬁve CSP 
attributes would unnecessarily restrict our sample 
size the analysis is restricted to three dimensions of 
social performance: environment, employment and 
community. 
Employment comprises ﬁve separate components 
relating to information on health and safety, training 
and development, equal opportunities, employee 
relations and job creation and security. Environment 
comprises separate components relating to informa­
tion on policies, systems, reporting and performance. 
Community is entered as a single measure by EIRIS. 
Following the general approach used by Graves and 
Waddock (1994) for KLD data we translated the 
EIRIS text-grade rating for each measure into a 
number-grade rating. Each environmental measure 
has ﬁve text categories; the employment measures 
have three text categories, while community has 
four text categories. We coded each of these text 
scales into ﬁve point scales for aspects of environ­
mental performance, a four point scale for commu­
nity involvement and three point scales for employee 
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involvement. In each case the codes began with a 
value of 1 and larger numbers indicated a higher 
degree of social responsiveness. 
To arrive at a single measure for employment 
(EMPLOYEES), environment (ENVIRONMENT) 
and community (COMMUNITY) CSP attributes 
we sum the number-grade ratings for each attribute. 
This results in an environment score out of 20, 
employment score out of 18 and community score 
out of 4. Our environment measure has a Cron­
bach’s Alpha4 of 0.85 and employment of 0.88. Fi­
nally, to arrive at a single aggregate CSP measure 
(CSRCOMP) we normalized the score on each 
stakeholder theme to 4 so as to effectively give them 
equal weight. This generates a possible range of 
scores from 3 to 12 and a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.92. 
In order to obtain a measure of the best and worst 
CSP the aggregate CSP rating for each company was 
ranked, the ranked sample was then divided into 
quartiles of equal numbers of ﬁrms and two dummy 
variables were deﬁned. BEST takes a value 1 if the 
ﬁrm has a CSP ranking in the top quartile. WORST 
takes a value 1 if the ﬁrm has a CSP ranking in the 
bottom quartile. 
The ﬁnancial control variables were estimated 
using data obtained from DataStream. Following 
Johnson and Greening (1999) ﬁrm size (SIZE) is 
measured by the natural logarithm of company as­
sets. Logged values are used in order to minimize the 
impact of extreme values and reduce heteroscedas­
ticity. Leverage (LEVERAGE) is measured by the 
ratio of total debt to total assets (Graves and Wad-
dock, 1994). Following Johnson and Greening 
(1999) and Graves and Waddock (1994) we measure 
proﬁtability (ROTA) by the ratio of pre-tax proﬁts 
to total assets. 
The free ﬂoat proportion (FREE FLOAT) is 
estimated by stock market index publishers to reﬂect 
availability of stock in the market for public invest­
ment. FTSE calculates free ﬂoat as a proportion of 1 
where 1 is complete tradable stock availability and 0 
is no tradable stock availability. We use the mean 
free ﬂoat of 8 quarters from start 2001 in order to 
measure the overall tradability of sample ﬁrms. 
Finally, we deﬁned a set of industry dummy 
variables to account for the possibility that owner­
ship of ﬁrms across different industries may be 
inﬂuenced by the general relationships industries 
have with expected risk and return but also by the 
negative and positive investment screens of social 
investors. Industry sectoral dummies were created 
using the FTSE Global Industry Classiﬁcation Sys­
tem which groups listed stocks into nine economic 
groups: Basic industries, general industries, resource 
extraction industries, cyclical consumer good 
industries, cyclical services, non-cyclicals, utilities, 
ﬁnancials and information technology industries. 
Nine dummy variables were constructed that took a 
value of one if the company was a member of that 
sector and zero otherwise. The basic industry sector 
was chosen as the comparator sector. 
Results 
Table II reports the results of regressing the com­
posite measure of corporate social performance 
(CSRCOMP) and the set of control variables on the 
extent of a range of different types of institutional 
ownership in companies. The key aim is to identify 
the revealed preference of institutional investor 
groups for socially responsive attributes. On average 
the model explains approximately a quarter of the 
variance in the pattern of institutional ownership 
which compares favorably with earlier studies 
(Graves and Waddock, 1994). The results provide 
substantial support for the hypothesized relationships 
between CSP and the pattern of institutional 
investment in companies. The proportion of a 
company owned by long-term investors is signiﬁ­
cantly and positively related to company social per­
formance (p < 0.01) and a positive relationship is 
also found between CSP and the proportion of 
company ownership for two of the three long-term 
investors identiﬁed, life assurance and pension fund 
holdings (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 and respectively). 
The relationship between CSP and charitable 
holdings is positive but not signiﬁcant at the 10% 
level or better. Although pension funds have come 
under regulatory pressure to disclose the role of 
ethical and social requirements in investment plan­
ning the coefﬁcients on CSRCOMP are not sig­
niﬁcantly different in the Pension Fund and Life 
Assurance models (0.038 and 0.039, respectively). 
This may suggest that regulatory pressure upon 
pension funds to disclose their preferences for CSP 
does not generate extra incentives to buy stock in 
socially responsive companies beyond those attrib­
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TABLE II 
Estimates of the inﬂuences on the extent of institutional ownership 
Independent variables Dependent variables 
Long-term Pension Life Charities Short-term Investment Unit trusts 
investors funds assurance investors trusts 
CONSTANT 2.526*** 5.575*** 5.303*** )0.445 6.975*** 7.736*** 8.667*** 
(0.215) (0.223) (0.306) (0.533) (0.214) (0.470) (0.208) 
SIZE 0.054*** 0.077*** 0.039* 0.244*** )0.083*** )0.222*** )0.114*** 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.038) (0.016) (0.035) (0.016) 
ROTA 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.010*** )0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
FREE FLOAT 1.154*** 0.476*** 0.627*** 1.015*** 1.026*** 0.972*** 0.297** 
(0.140) (0.146) (0.199) (0.350) (0.139) (0.309) (0.136) 
CSRCOMP 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.039** 0.016 )0.0004 )0.096*** )0.01 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.031) (0.013) (0.028) (0.013) 
RESOURCES )0.247** )0.165 )0.335* )1.157*** 0.022 )0.342 )0.028 
(0.126) (0.131) (0.179) (0.297) (0.126) (0.275) (0.122) 
GENERAL INDS 0.149 0.173* 0.079 )0.067 0.042 )0.392** )0.001 
(0.090) (0.094) (0.128) (0.218) (0.090) (0.197) (0.088) 
CYC. CONS GOODS )0.098 )0.037 )0.248* )0.380* )0.036 )0.522*** )0.155* 
(0.088) (0.092) (0.126) (0.214) (0.088) (0.195) (0.086) 
CYC. SERVICES 0.103 0.134* 0.029 )0.208 )0.006 )0.329** )0.046 
(0.069) (0.071) (0.098) (0.168) (0.068) (0.150) (0.067) 
NON)CYCLICALS )0.149 )0.237* )0.247 )0.354 )0.113 )0.550** )0.326*** 
(0.128) (0.133) (0.182) (0.302) (0.127) (0.279) (0.124) 
UTILITIES )0.128 )0.122 )0.273 )0.018 0.017 0.541* )0.025 
(0.148) (0.154) (0.210) (0.348) (0.148) (0.323) (0.144) 
FINANCIALS )0.018 )0.051 )0.058 )0.540** 0.036 0.184 0.000 
(0.079) (0.082) (0.112) (0.191) (0.079) (0.172) (0.077) 
IT 0.125 0.236** 0.010 )0.081 )0.140 )0.494** )0.140 
(0.099) (0.103) (0.141) (0.240) (0.099) (0.217) (0.097) 
R2 30.60% 19.40% 9.60% 21.00% 23.30% 24.10% 18.50% 
Fstat 17.904*** 9.747*** 4.264*** 10.169*** 12.316*** 12.734*** 9.188*** 
n 540 539 537 509 540 534 538 
Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
utable to the long-term ﬁnancial beneﬁts which may 
accrue to CSP or institutional pressure from industry 
trade associations for SRI which characterizes both 
ﬁnancial sectors. The relatively small and statistically 
insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient on CSRCOMP in the 
charities model (0.016) is surprising in light of both 
of the regulatory and institutional pressures for so­
cially responsible behavior in this sector and the 
inherently pro-social preferences of charitable 
investments. 
In contrast, there is no signiﬁcant relationship 
between the extent of aggregate ownership by 
short-term investors and company social perfor­
mance. However, the results highlight an important 
degree of heterogeneity within the short-term 
investor group. The extent of investment trust 
ownership in companies is signiﬁcantly negatively 
associated with company social performance 
(p < 0.01). It appears, therefore, that social perfor­
mance is unattractive to at least some short-term 
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investors. It should be noted that these results are 
found while controlling for ﬁrm size and industry 
effects, both of which have been found to be asso­
ciated with social performance attributes in earlier 
work (Grifﬁn and Mahon, 1997). 
The coefﬁcients on the control variables are 
broadly consistent with the expected relationships 
and earlier ﬁndings (e.g. Graves and Waddock, 
1994). The extent to which companies are owned 
by most groups of institutional shareholders 
is strongly positively associated with company 
proﬁtability (ROTA) suggesting that ﬁnancial per­
formance attributes also play an important role in 
inﬂuencing institutional investors. Long-term 
investors are found to have larger ownership shares 
in larger companies (SIZE) while the share of 
ownership by most groups of short-term investors 
appears to be higher in small companies. The 
proportion of shares that are freely tradable in a 
company (FREE FLOAT) is positively associated 
with the degree of institutional ownership of all 
types. 
Table III focuses on the impact of the constituent 
parts of CSP on the degree of ownership by long-
and short-term investor groups. Once again there 
are signiﬁcant differences between long- and short-
term investors. As hypothesized each component of 
CSP is found to be signiﬁcantly positively associated 
with the degree of ownership by long-term inves­
tors. As expected the degree of statistical signiﬁcance 
and magnitude of the effect is strongest for em-
ployee-related components of CSP. Although the 
coefﬁcient on EMPLOYEES is larger than that on 
ENVIRONMENT the difference between the 
coefﬁcients is not signiﬁcant at the 10% level or 
better, however, the difference between the coefﬁ­
cients on employee-related CSP (EMPLOYEES) 
and community CSP (COMMUNITY) is statisti­
cally signiﬁcant (p < 0.10). Among short-term 
investors there are no signiﬁcant relationships be­
tween social performance and the degree of own­
ership. However, the coefﬁcient on employee-
related CSP is positive and is signiﬁcantly larger than 
the coefﬁcient on environmentally-related CSP. 
These ﬁndings provide tentative support for the 
hypothesized relationships between the attributes of 
CSR and the pattern of investment holdings. Insti­
tutional investors appear to discriminate between 
CSP attributes favoring employee related CSP rather 
than community or (long-run investors) or envi­
ronment. In both cases the revealed choice is con­
sistent with the expected ﬂow of beneﬁts. 
Table IV examines the form of the relationship 
between CSP and institutional ownership in more 
detail through the inclusion both of the level of CSP 
as captured by our multi-dimensional construct 
(CSRCOMP) but also through the inclusion of two 
dummy variables (BEST and WORST) that indicate 
membership of the top (i.e. most socially responsive) 
quartile of companies and the bottom (i.e. least so­
cially responsive) quartile of companies. This test 
aims to examine whether a simple linear relationship 
between CSP and the extent of ownership exists or 
whether institutional owners tend to operate simple 
investment screens as earlier studies have suggested 
(Barnett and Salomon, 2002). 
The coefﬁcient on WORST is found to be 
negative and highly statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.03) 
while neither the coefﬁcient on CSRCOMP or 
BEST is signiﬁcant. This suggests that negative 
screens may play a signiﬁcant role in investment 
decisions by long-term institutional investors. Long-
term investors appear to screen out companies 
with poor social performance attributes from their 
portfolios but in other respects the degree of 
company social performance plays no role in inﬂu­
encing the degree of ownership by long-term 
investors. 
Discussion and conclusions 
This study investigates the pattern of institutional 
shareholding in the U.K. and its relationship with 
socially responsible behavior by companies within a 
set of ownership models which distinguish between 
long- and short-term investors and their largest 
components (Pension Funds, Life Assurance, Char­
ities, Unit Trusts, and Investment Trusts) and 
incorporates both CSP and its principal attributes. 
The use of disaggregated institutional ownership data 
provides further insight into differences in the 
behavior of long- and short-term investors and 
contributes to an existing literature which analyses 
investment behavior within a relatively restricted 
investment typology (Graves and Waddock, 1994; 
Johnson and Greening, 1999). Our focus on the 
U.K. develops our understanding of institutional 
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TABLE III 
Short- and long-run investor preferences for different types of CSP 
Independent variables Dependent variables 
Long-term investors Short-term investors 
CONSTANT 2.381 *** 2.453 *** 2.454 *** 6.999 *** 6.915 *** 6.957 *** 
(0.201) (0.218) (0.216) (0.201) (0.216) (0.215) 
SIZE 0.063 *** 0.065 *** 0.066 *** )0.089 *** )0.076 *** )0.081 *** 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) 
ROTA 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LEVERAGE 0.001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FREE FLOAT 1.148 *** 1.186 *** 1.182 *** 1.007 *** 1.037 *** 1.030 *** 
(0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) 
EMPLOYEES 0.113 *** 0.032 
(0.033) (0.033) 
ENVIRONMENT 0.059 * )0.025 
(0.034) (0.033) 
COMMUNITY 0.053 * )0.007 
(0.028) (0.028) 
RESOURCES )0.241 * )0.245 * )0.243 * 0.021 0.025 0.023 
(0.126) (0.127) (0.127) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) 
GENERAL INDS 0.140 0.154 * 0.141 0.042 0.037 0.042 
(0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
CYC. CONS GOODS )0.123 )0.067 )0.082 )0.054 )0.035 )0.034 
(0.089) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.087) (0.088) 
CYC. SERVICES 0.082 0.128 * 0.100 )0.015 )0.012 )0.004 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
NON-CYCLICALS )0.169 )0.125 )0.152 )0.122 )0.119 )0.112 
(0.128) (0.129) (0.128) (0.128) (0.127) (0.127) 
UTILITIES )0.119 )0.090 )0.092 )0.004 0.034 0.023 
(0.147) (0.148) (0.148) (0.146) (0.147) (0.147) 
FINANCIALS )0.048 )0.004 )0.035 0.033 0.022 0.036 
(0.078) (0.081) (0.079) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) 
IT 0.102 0.142 0.118 )0.145 )0.148 )0.139 
(0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.100) (0.099) 
R2 31.10% 30.00% 30.00% 23.40% 23.40% 23.30% 
Fstat 18.272 *** 17.353 *** 17.400 *** 12.410 *** 12.371 *** 12.323 *** 
n 540 540 540 540 540 540 
Signiﬁcance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
investment behavior within a fundamentally differ­
ent institutional and regulatory environment from 
much of the received literature. 
The results suggest that long-term institutional 
investment is positively related to CSP providing 
further support for earlier studies by Johnson and 
Greening (1999) and Graves and Waddock (1994). 
Although signiﬁcant differences occur in the pattern 
of this relationship, dependent on the type of long-
term investor, these differences do not suggest that 
the statutory obligation for pension funds to disclose 
their approach to social investment within their 
formal Statement of Investment Principles is 
reﬂected in larger investments in socially responsible 
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TABLE IV 
Short-and long-term investor preferences for companies with extreme social performance 
Independent variables Dependent variables 
Long term investors Short term investors 
CONSTANT 2.684 *** 7.017 *** 
(0.244) (0.245) 
SIZE 0.055 *** )0.083 *** 
(0.016) (0.016) 
ROTA 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) 
FREE FLOAT 1.112 *** 1.023 *** 
(0.140) (0.141) 
CSR COMP 0.020 )0.008 
(0.024) (0.024) 
BEST )0.008 0.035 
(0.094) (0.094) 
WORST )0.148 ** )0.017 
(0.068) (0.068) 
RESOURCES )0.226 * 0.024 
(0.126) (0.126) 
GENERAL INDS 0.152 * 0.043 
(0.090) (0.090) 
CYC. CONS GOODS )0.091 )0.033 
(0.089) (0.089) 
CYC. SERVICES 0.104 )0.002 
(0.069) (0.069) 
NON-CYCLICALS )0.142 )0.110 
(0.128) (0.128) 
UTILITIES )0.091 0.027 
(0.150) (0.150) 
FINANCIALS )0.002 0.041 
(0.080) (0.080) 
IT 0.142 )0.135 
(0.100) (0.100) 
R2 31.40% 23.30% 
Fstat 16.045 *** 10.647 *** 
n 540 540 
Signiﬁcance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
companies by pension funds. Indeed life assurance 
companies which have similar ﬁnancial characteris­
tics but are not subject to the same regulatory 
requirements are as likely to invest in socially 
responsible companies. However, our results indi­
cate no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between 
CSP and the extent of ﬁrm ownership by charities. 
This is surprising given the pressure on charities to 
consider CSP in their investments and the pro-social 
agenda of charitable organizations. 
Disaggregation of CSP into its constituent com­
ponents suggests that the pattern of institutional 
investment is also related to the form which CSP 
takes and implicitly the relationship between each 
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attribute (employment, environment community), 
ﬁnancial performance and risk. Thus employee based 
CSP is seen to have a stronger relationship with 
long-term investment than community based CSP, a 
ﬁnding which may reﬂect the positive relationship 
between employee-based CSP, efﬁciency and risk 
reduction. Although comprehensive assessment of a 
ﬁrm’s social performance should encompass a range 
of aspects (Carroll, 2000) these results emphasize the 
value of disaggregation when considering the stra­
tegic choices of investors and ﬁrms. 
Investigation of the impact of investment screens 
on the selection of stocks suggests that long-term 
institutional investors select through exclusion, 
rejecting those ﬁrms which have the worst CSP. At 
the same time an insigniﬁcant relationship with 
upper quartile social performance ﬁrms seems to 
suggest that poor social performance enters strongly 
and negatively into long-term investors share selec­
tion decisions whereas good social performance plays 
an insigniﬁcant role in attracting institutional 
investors. These ﬁndings may suggest that ﬁrm social 
performance may be viewed as a signiﬁcant deter­
minant of ﬁrm exposure to long-term risks. Long-
term investors may therefore screen out companies 
with poor social performance from their portfolios 
because of their increased exposure to risk which 
could, in the long-run, lead to poorer ﬁnancial 
performance. 
The results have implications for both regulators 
and managers. Although a causal relationship be­
tween regulation and the pattern of investment 
cannot be ascribed within this cross sectional study, 
the results suggest that the impact of regulatory 
action on the pattern of institutional investment and 
in particular pension fund holdings has been at best 
limited; a pattern which is consistent with recent 
reports which have questioned the impact of 
legislation on fund managers (Courtenay, 2001). 
Although each of the long-term investors faced 
some regulatory or institutional pressure either 
to disclose their stance regarding social impacts of 
their investment or to consider the congruence of 
their investment policies with their broader objec­
tives, we observed considerable differences across 
these investor’s preferences for CSP. The fact that 
charities failed to demonstrate any signiﬁcant pref­
erence for CSP is particularly striking and may 
reﬂect the importance of ﬁnancial returns to the 
voluntary sector in an environment where a 
declining stock market leads to reductions in the 
value of, and the income earned from, invested 
endowments. 
Evidence of systematic variation in the pattern of 
institutional investment which reﬂects both CSP and 
its constituent parts may also suggest that CSP could 
provide a mechanism through which ﬁrms could 
mould their desired shareholder proﬁle (Ryan and 
Schneider, 2002; Useem, 1996). Thus, our ﬁndings 
suggest that activities that promote the perceived 
social responsibility of ﬁrms may form part of 
investor relations activities undertaken so as to 
achieve a stable ownership base in order to reduce 
the likelihood that a ﬁrm’s stock price is destabilized 
by short-term developments. 
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Notes 
1 Of these $2.3 trillion of social funds, $2.03 trillion are 
‘‘screened funds’’. Screened funds are funds that apply one 
or more social screens to investment selection. It is worth 
noting both that many funds employ a single screen (often 
involving an exclusion of tobacco companies) and that 
these ﬁgures may be designed to serve a promotional 
purpose for the social investment industry. 
2 It is worth noting that some recent research has 
questioned the extent to which Pension Funds that have 
adopted ethical policies have actually altered their 
approach to environmental and social issues in their 
investments (Guptara, 2001). 
3 This assertion is tentatively supported by their some­
what higher equity turnover than pension funds (Eng, 
1999). 
4 Cronbach’s alpha measures how well a set of items (or 
variables) measures a single unidimensional latent con­
struct. It gives an indication of the degree of consistency 
among the survey items or variables being used to capture 
a construct (such as CSP). Its value increases as the 
average pairwise correlation between the items increases. 
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This has intuitive appeal – if the inter-item correlations 
are high, then there is evidence that the items are 
measuring the same underlying construct. 
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This study examines the relationship between pension fund ownership 
of companies and corporate social performance using a unique database 
of more than 500 publicly listed U.K. companies. The empirical analysis 
emphasizes the heterogeneous character of pension fund holdings and the 
multidimensional nature of corporate social performance. The results high­
light that the characteristics of pension fund management are significant 
drivers of preferences for social performance and that employee-related aspects 
of social performance are preferred by pension funds. 
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During the past 25 years, the ownership of large corporations has come to be dominated by institutions, such as pension funds and mutual funds, 
rather than individual investors (National Statistics, 2002; Ryan & Schneider, 
2002; Useem, 1996). Recent evidence suggests that the growth of large-scale 
institutional ownership of firm stock may have reduced the flexibility of insti­
tutions, compared to individuals, to sell investments without adversely affect­
ing their value (Ryan & Schneider, 2002, 2003). This may, in turn, have 
resulted in a greater focus on long-term outcomes and an increase in share­
holder activism (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Johnson & Greening, 1999). 
These developments have prompted researchers to examine the characteristics 
of different types of institutional investor (Ryan & Schneider, 2002, 2003) and 
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the links between institutional ownership and strategic decisions concerning 
corporate social performance (Coffey & Fryxell, 1991; Graves & Waddock, 
1994; Johnson & Greening, 1999), internationalization and diversification 
(Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003), firm R & D and innovation 
(Bushee, 1998; David, Hitt & Gimeno, 2001), and CEO compensation (David, 
Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998). 
Within the context of corporate social performance (CSP), corporate 
behavior has come under scrutiny from ethical investment research services 
(e.g., The Ethical Investment Research Service–or EIRIS–and KLD) and from 
portfolio managers as the latter have responded both to pressure to consider 
ethical concerns from legislators (e.g., HMSO, 1999) and investors (e.g., 
Denham, 1998; Sparkes & Cowton, 2004) and to the potential improvements 
in corporate financial performance which may flow from improved CSP. It has 
been suggested that CSP may reduce regulatory (McGuire, Sundgren, & 
Schneeweis, 1988) and legal risks (Richardson, Welker, & Hutchinson, 
1999) while offering improved financial returns (Hillman & Keim, 2001; 
Turban & Greening, 1997; Waddock & Graves, 1997). Although most of the 
gains from CSP accrue in the long run, significant costs must be incurred in 
the short run (Graves & Waddock, 1994), suggesting that CSP will be posi­
tively related to long-term rather than short-term investment (Coffey & 
Fryxell, 1991; Graves & Waddock, 1994; Johnson & Greening, 1999). 
However, the distinction between long-term and short-term institutional 
investors may mask the complexity of ownership arrangements that char­
acterize institutional investments. Recent work by Ryan and Schneider 
(2002, 2003) has identified the diverse range of influences that may shape 
the behavior of institutional shareholders and have significant implications 
for attitudes toward CSP. Among other factors, they emphasize the dif­
ference between internal and external fund management, the distinction 
between public sector and private sector pension funds, and variations in 
the extent of legal and institutional pressures. The location of management 
may have significant implications for the relationship between institutional 
investment and CSP that reflect the characteristics of the fund in which 
management is located (Ryan & Schneider, 2002, 2003). The management 
of investment funds may be outsourced from a long-run beneficial owner 
(e.g., pension plan) to a short-run fund (e.g., mutual fund), and internal 
and external portfolio managers may be subject to different incentive 
systems (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Gimbel, 2003). Significant differ­
ences may also be expected in the behavior of public pension funds and pri­
vate pension funds and their preferences for CSP. Although both public and 
private pension funds are long-term investors, “the performance expectations 
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of private pension funds have traditionally been purely financial” (Ryan & 
Schneider, 2002, p. 565), whereas public pension funds may place more 
emphasis on social and political considerations (Monks & Minow, 2001; 
Murphy & Van Nuys, 1994; Romano, 1993). This suggests that the impact 
of CSP on institutional investor decisions may vary significantly both 
between and within institutional investor categories. 
This article investigates the relationship between CSP and the extent of 
pension fund stock ownership in companies. The study makes use of detailed 
data that disaggregate the institutional ownership in a sample of more than 
500 publicly listed U.K. companies. In particular, the data permit us to dis­
tinguish between public and private pension fund holdings and identify 
whether holdings are managed within or outside the pension plan. The article 
extends and develops the literature in three ways. 
First, our analysis is the first to attempt an analysis of the relationship 
between pension fund holdings and CSP that recognizes the heterogeneity 
present within pension plan management. We examine the significance of 
distinctions between internal and external management and public and pri­
vate ownership for pension fund preferences for CSP. This approach can be 
contrasted with earlier empirical work that has focused either on insti­
tutional shareholders as a group (Coffey & Fryxell, 1991; Graves & 
Waddock, 1994) or on only a subset of pension funds (Johnson & Greening, 
1999). Our approach allows us to clearly identify the influence of owner­
ship type (public or private) and the location of portfolio management 
(internal or external) on revealed institutional preferences for CSP. 
Understanding the relationship between pension fund ownership and firm 
behavior is important in several regards. It is of interest to the buyers of 
pensions because it provides an insight into how their funds are managed. 
Legislative and regulatory significance arises both because of recent 
changes in the pressures on pension funds to develop investment policies 
concerning CSR issues and because general taxation is affected by the 
investment performance of public pension funds. 
Second, the article focuses on a single category of institutional investor, 
pension funds within the context of the United Kingdom. Because both the 
extent of legal and regulatory pressure and the tendency to outsource the 
management of fund assets vary systematically across types of institutional 
investors, it is important to focus on a particular type of institutional 
investor to control for these effects. Pension funds are an important and rela­
tively politicized segment of the institutional investment market (Murphy & 
Van Nuys, 1994), and the U.K. pension industry has been subject to 
significant institutional and legal pressure to consider CSP in investment 
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decisions during the study period. The results shed some light on the influence 
of legislative and institutional pressure on institutional investment prefer­
ences for CSP and show how these may be mediated through managerial 
structures that are subject to different incentive systems. 
Third, our study extends the analysis of institutional investor preferences 
to encompass CSP. The article draws on financial models of the revealed 
preference of institutional stock holdings for corporate characteristics (e.g., 
Eatkins, Stansell, & Buck, 1998; Gompers & Metrick, 2001) to specify a 
more complete empirical model of the relationship between institutional 
investment and CSP that controls for a range of financial dimensions of cor­
porate stock ownership (e.g., exposure to risk, stock liquidity, expected 
returns) and industry effects. 
The analysis is carried out in four sections. The next section introduces 
the conceptual framework and outlines our hypotheses. The sample and 
variable definitions are then discussed in the second section, where we pay 
particular attention to the derivation of the U.K. data sources. The results 
are reported in the third section, and the implications are then discussed in 
a concluding section. 
Conceptual Background and Hypotheses Development 
This article investigates the relationship between institutional share-
holdings and CSP within a model that draws on portfolio theory (Foster, 
1986; Markowitz, 1952) and the typology of institutional investors gener­
ated by Ryan and Schneider (2002). Long-term institutional investors such 
as pension funds differ from short-term investors such as mutual funds in 
that they have more predictable requirements for cash outflows and much 
longer investment horizons (Ryan & Schneider, 2002). In addition to the 
purely financial aspects of institutional investor decision making, institu­
tional investors are also subject to regulatory, institutional, and social forces 
(Johnson & Greening, 1999; Ryan & Schneider, 2002) that may influence 
the importance they attach to CSP. 
Because institutional investors make investments to generate financial 
returns for themselves and for their customers, the nature of the relationship 
between corporate social and financial performance is expected to play a 
crucial role in shaping institutional preferences for firm social performance. 
A substantial literature examines the link between firm social and financial 
performance, and the broad consensus is that many of the financial gains 
from improved social performance accrue in the long run, whereas social 
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performance initiatives may require companies to make significant invest­
ments in the short run. Hillman and Keim (2001) argue that improved social 
performance can positively contribute to “long-term value creation” through 
the creation of “socially complex resources” (p. 127). Other authors have 
argued that financial performance and social performance might be positively 
associated in the long-run because improved social performance confers 
better resource competitiveness (Cochran & Wood, 1984; Hart, 1995; 
Waddock & Graves, 1997), lower transaction costs (Ruf, Muralidhar, Brown, 
Janney, & Paul, 2001), improved employee quality and motivation 
(Moskowitz, 1972; Turban & Greening, 1997), and enhanced customer good­
will (McGuire et al., 1988). At the same time, poor social performance may 
increase a firm’s financial risk (Ullmann, 1985) by signaling low manage­
ment skill (Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; Spicer, 1978), uncertain and possi­
bly increasing government regulation and fines (McGuire et al., 1988), and 
increased uncertainty regarding the level and variability of future cash flow 
(Richardson, Welker, & Hutchinson, 1999; Shane & Spicer, 1983). 
CSP is generally considered to be multidimensional (Carroll, 1979; 
Griffin & Mahon, 1997), and a comprehensive assessment of a firm’s social 
performance should encompass a range of aspects (Carroll, 2000). In addi­
tion, existing empirical and conceptual contributions have argued that dif­
ferent types of corporate social activity have different implications for firm 
financial performance (Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Hillman & Keim, 2001). 
Hillman and Keim (2001) argue that aspects of firm social performance that 
help to propagate good relationships with key stakeholder groups such as 
employees can lead to long-term competitive advantages that confer 
improved financial performance and find some strong empirical support for 
their view. Hart (1995) indicates that many environmental policies such as 
“end-of-pipe” approaches, source reduction, and process innovation tend to 
be fixed-cost investments, having physical asset properties (Russo & Fouts, 
1997), with benefits spread over many years. Environmental performance 
also forms a significant focus for external stakeholder pressure. In contrast, 
community contributions have the shortest-term payoff (Carroll, 1979), are 
largely external to the company, and are not directly linked to areas that are 
subject to regulation and/or legal action in the company. 
The preceding discussion suggests that, on balance, the benefits of CSP, 
whether financial or through risk reduction, are long run rather than short 
run, whereas the costs must be carried in the short run. However, the returns 
to investment in CSP and the period in which they accrue are dependent 
on the particular attributes (employment, environment, community) that 
underpin CSP. Pension funds are also subject to significant stakeholder 
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pressures that may be expected to affect the relationship between the 
pattern of investment and CSP. Continuing legislative pressure has resulted 
in significant changes to the legal framework in which pension funds oper­
ate. U.K. pension funds were required to state their investment principles in 
1995 and subsequently to identify the role of social, environmental, and 
ethical considerations in investment planning (HMSO, 1999). Public inter­
est in socially responsible investment (SRI) is reflected in National Opinion 
Poll survey results that suggest that 73% of respondents supported ethical 
pensions (Denham, 1998). At the same time, the increasing salience of 
environmental issues and the growing strength of environmental pressure 
groups (Dean, 2002) have placed greater pressure on companies and pen­
sion funds to encompass social and in particular environmental perfor­
mance in their investment decisions. 
Pension Fund Investment and CSP Pension Funds Holdings 
Our basic model hypothesizes that the relationship between pension 
fund holdings and CSP varies systematically by type of ownership (public-
and private-sector pension funds) and location of portfolio management 
(inside and outside the pension fund). The relationship between pension 
fund holdings and CSP is explored within a series of regression models in 
which the dependent variable reflects the ownership (public or private) and 
location of portfolio management (internal or external) of pension fund 
holdings. Although CSP is expected to have a differential impact in each of 
these models, no a priori relationship is expected between CSP attributes 
(community, employee, environment) and different types of pension fund 
holding (internal or external, private or public). Regression results are pre­
sented for different CSP characteristics, and the conceptual discussion is, 
therefore, restricted to the relationship between aggregate CSP and differ­
ent types of pension fund. 
As highlighted above, pension funds have been subject to regulatory, 
institutional, and social pressures in the United Kingdom to consider 
aspects of business social responsibility in investment decisions. These 
pressures have encompassed legal requirements to identify the role of 
social, environmental, and ethical considerations in investment planning 
(HMSO, 1999), the setting of social agendas by industry trade bodies (e.g., 
Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, 2002; National Association of 
Pension Funds, 2005), and significant public interest in SRI (Ethical 
Investor, 1999).1 In addition, earlier evidence has suggested that there is a 
positive relationship between the degree to which a company is owned by 
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pension funds and its social performance (Johnson & Greening, 1999). 
Following these discussions, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between the extent of company own­
ership by pension funds and CSP. 
Internal Versus External Fund Management 
Investment portfolio managers may be internal to the pension fund or 
undertaken by independent external fund management companies (Davis & 
Steil, 2001, p. 114). Approximately 20% of U.K. and about one third of 
European pension funds by value are internally managed (Davis & Steil, 
2001, p. 154). Internal and external management may also be mixed within 
the same institution. The relationship between an institutional investor and 
its portfolio managers is governed by mandates that specify the extent of 
responsibility being delegated to the portfolio manager and may also 
prescribe other aspects of the portfolio manager’s behavior, including 
applying limitations to stock size, liquidity, growth, dividend, leverage, 
valuation, and investment proportion. Internal and external mandates differ 
in several respects, including length, form of compensation, and perfor­
mance expectation. 
External mandates typically last 3 years (Davis & Steil, 2001; Gimbel, 
2003) and are evaluated at each quarter and year-end (Lakonishok, Shleifer, 
Thaler, & Vishny, 1991). Poor performance is rapidly punished by loss 
of mandate (Del Guercio & Tkac, 2002). Because portfolio management 
firms are compensated as a percentage of assets under management (Del 
Guercio & Tkac, 2002), they have strong incentives to maximize the value 
of the fund, there being no limit on the amount of fees paid to the portfolio 
management firm (Herman, 1963). Strict performance expectations accom­
pany most external mandates and are commonly specified in terms relative 
to the performance of comparable funds, in terms of a certain excess return 
above the industry mean, or by reference to beating an overall market index 
(Davis & Steil, 2001, p. 155). Switching costs of sacking an existing man­
ager, of liquidating a whole portfolio, and of searching for and hiring new 
management discourage institutions from changing portfolio managers after 
a single bad year (Gimbel, 2003). 
In contrast, internal mandates are managed by salaried employees who are 
typically responsible only for their employer’s money (Gimbel, 2003). The 
decision to outsource would radically alter the working practices of the insti­
tution and would encounter high redundancy costs (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 
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1999). Fund underperformance is therefore less likely to be punished by 
loss of mandate, and internal managers are more likely to view their invest­
ment mandate in a more stable and permanent context. Fees levied by an 
internally managed pension plan are not based on the value of assets. 
Compensation of officers, directors and portfolio managers is largely inde­
pendent of the value of assets managed, and, in the case of internal public-
sector portfolio managers, it is rare to receive a performance-related bonus 
(Monks & Minow, 2001, p. 124). 
The incentive systems facing internal and external portfolio managers 
are therefore subject to significant differences. Compared to their internal 
counterparts, external portfolio managers have sharper incentives to focus 
on the financial performance of the fund and typically face shorter invest­
ment horizons. Because the benefits of CSP are associated with improved 
financial performance in the long run, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: The association between the extent of pension fund ownership in a 
company and CSP will be stronger and more positive for internally managed 
pension funds than for externally managed pension funds. 
Public and Private Sector Pension Funds 
Pension funds may be used to finance the retirement plans of public-
sector (public pension funds) or private-sector (private pension funds) employ­
ees. Funded public-sector retirement schemes are some of the largest funds 
comprising local authority employers and nationalized and previously nation­
alized industries such as UK Coal (Lex, 2000). Because public funds may 
be backed by government or statutory bodies that raise income through tax­
ation, funding problems are solved at a public level.2 This characteristic, cou­
pled with the preferences of fund sponsors and the beneficiaries of individual 
pension plans, suggests that the investment choices of public pension funds 
may not be narrowly constrained by economic factors. 
Monks and Minow (2001) argue that public pension funds are not strictly 
motivated by economic returns. Murphy and Van Nuys (1994) suggest port­
folio managers and trustees of public assets lack incentives to maximize fund 
value and expect that their investment strategies include political motiva­
tions. Romano (1993) argues that political pressures on public pension 
funds may in fact harm investment performance; however, Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1999) fail to find empirical support for this. Having the longest 
investment holding period of any institutional investor (Ryan & Schneider, 
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2002) and being the most patient form of capital raises the possibility that 
long-term strategies, such as those associated with CSP, enter significantly 
into public pension fund investment decisions. 
In contrast, private pension funds comprise single employer and multiem­
ployer (largely union) retirement plans. Ryan and Schneider (2002, 2003) sug­
gest that private pension funds are unlikely to pursue activist policies because 
of “the golden rule of nonintervention with fellow corporations” (Ryan & 
Schneider, 2002, p. 565) and because companies avoid voting against each 
other because of the danger of retaliation (Brown, 1998; Conrad, 1988; Roe, 
1994). Under these conditions, the relationship between CSP and pension fund 
investments is likely to be determined by share selection. In the case of defined 
benefit (final salary) pension schemes, the company (sponsor) bears complete 
responsibility for a shortfall in value (Ryan & Schneider, 2002). Ultimately, 
this must come from profits. For defined contribution schemes, the pension 
fund company bears no responsibility for unexpectedly low terminal fund val­
ues, and the employee bears the shortfall risk (Ryan & Schneider, 2002). 
Although the company is not obligated to ensure adequate investment fund 
value, persistent poor performance may motivate employees and policy hold­
ers to pressure management for greater company contributions, and therefore 
poor performance may still threaten future corporate profitability. 
The risk that top-up payments may have to be made to make good short­
falls in private pensions may depress the share price of a listed company and 
may therefore jeopardize managerial security via the market for corporate 
control. This could exert pressure on private sector funds to maximize finan­
cial returns. Management pressure for greater employer contributions in the 
case of underperforming defined contribution schemes and unit linked annu­
ities may lead to similar pressure for financial returns. Performance expecta­
tions of private pension funds are, therefore, traditionally purely financial, 
having higher portfolio turnover than public funds (Brancato, 1995; Eng, 
1999; Ryan & Schneider, 2002). 
In summary, the financial performance of public pension funds is subject 
to less scrutiny and pressure than that of private pension funds. This suggests 
that public pension funds are more likely to favor CSP both because they have 
more scope to pursue noneconomic objectives and because the financial gains 
from CSP are essentially long run. We therefore hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3: The association between the extent of pension fund ownership in a 
company and CSP will be stronger and more positive for public funds than for 
private funds. 
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Control Variables 
A range of control variables was included in the analysis. Following 
earlier work, a range of firm attributes is expected to play an important role 
in shaping the pattern of institutional ownership, including firm size 
(Badrinath, Gay, & Kale, 1989; Eatkins et al., 1998; Gompers & Metrick, 
2001; Graves & Waddock, 1994; Johnson & Greening, 1999), leverage 
(Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Duke & Hunt, 1990; Myers, 1984; Weston, 
Siu, & Johnson, 2001), current financial performance (Graves & Waddock, 
1994; Johnson & Greening, 1999), expectations concerning future financial 
performance (Gompers & Metrick, 2001), typical trading volumes and bar­
gain sizes (Eatkins et al., 1998; Gompers & Metrick, 2001), the extent and 
type of risk associated with stock ownership (Badrinath et al., 1989; Chan 
& Lakonishok, 1995; Del Guercio, 1996; Eatkins et al., 1998; Sias, 1996), 
and industry (Commerzbank, 2002). 
Method 
Sample 
Our sample was drawn from the constituent companies of the FTSE All-
Share index. The All-Share index is the broadest index of U.K. listed 
stocks, representing more than 98% of the U.K. market capitalization. At 
the date of our study, the All-Share index comprised approximately 700 
companies (excluding investment trusts) drawn from a wide spectrum of 
business activities. Our analysis requires that data concerning the social 
performance of this sample of companies be matched to accounting and 
company ownership data. Social performance data were obtained from 
EIRIS, the United Kingdom’s oldest independent research company spe­
cializing in the assessment of CSP for investors. Accounting data were 
extracted from DataStream. Ownership data were drawn in June 2002 from 
a share ownership analysis database of more than 2,000 listed U.K. firms 
managed by one of the United Kingdom’s largest company registrars. 
Missing data reduced our data set to a sample of 540 firms. This provides 
us with the largest share ownership and social performance research sam­
ple so far examined and one that captures 80% of the largest 678 U.K. 
quoted firms between 2001 and 2002.3 Table 1 provides a point of compar­
ison with the existing literature (and especially with Ryan & Schneider, 
2002, p. 557) by providing a breakdown of the beneficial ownership of 
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Table 1 
Beneficial Ownership of U.K. Shares, 2002 to 2004 
2002 (%) 2003 (%) 2004 (%) 
Rest of the world 32.1 32.3 32.6 
Insurance companies 19.9 17.3 17.2 
Pension funds 15.6 16.0 15.7 
Individuals 14.3 14.9 14.1 
Unit trusts 1.6 2.0 1.9 
Investment trusts 1.8 2.3 3.3 
Other financial institutions 10.5 11.1 10.7 
Charities, churches, etc. 1.1 1.2 1.1 
Private nonfinancial companies 0.8 0.7 0.6 
Public sector 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Banks 2.1 2.2 2.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: National Statistics. 
London Stock Exchange listed companies during the period of 2002 to 
2004. The data in Table 1 demonstrate the high degree of concentration of 
stock ownership among institutional investors and the importance of non-
U.K. investors in total stock ownership. Much of this overseas ownership is 
also held by investment institutions. Regarding the split of ownership 
between public and private pension fund holdings in the United Kingdom, 
roughly one third of total pension fund holdings are held by public pension 
funds, with two thirds held by private sector pension funds. 
Dependent Variable Definition 
Given that the model is fundamentally one of investor choice, the depen­
dent variables analyzed are designed to capture the preferences of public 
and private pension funds and internally managed and externally managed 
funds for socially responsive attributes among the sample companies. In 
addition to identifying the beneficial owner of an investment fund (e.g., the 
pension fund), our database of company ownership identifies the location 
of the portfolio manager of the fund. We first identified all the pension fund 
holdings in the sample companies. If the beneficial owner was a public pen­
sion fund, it was coded public; if it was a private pension fund, it was coded 
private. The location of the portfolio manager was then used to determine 
whether the fund was internally or externally managed, and the extent of 
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internally and externally managed funds in each of the sample companies 
was identified. Nine dependent variables were created, each of which is 
defined as the ratio of total holdings by a given group of pension fund 
investments to the total number of shares in the company, adjusted for the 
free float.4 Following our earlier discussion and to separate the effects of 
ownership (public or private) and location of management (internal or 
external), the nine variables are defined as the proportion of free-float 
adjusted share capital owned respectively by all pension funds, public pen­
sion funds, private pension funds, externally managed pension funds, inter­
nally managed pension funds, externally managed private pension funds, 
internally managed private pension funds, externally managed public pen­
sion funds, and internally managed public pension funds. 
Independent Variable Definitions 
The key independent variable is CSP. CSP is a fundamentally multidi­
mensional construct (e.g., Carroll, 1979), and a large number of relevant 
dimensions have been identified in existing studies. For example, several 
studies have identified dimensions of social performance that relate to 
employee relations, community relations, issues concerned with women 
and minorities, environmental responsibility, and product safety (e.g., 
Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Johnson & Greening, 
1999). These, and some other, operationalizations of the CSP construct fun­
damentally derive from the identity of the particular stakeholders (employ­
ees, customers, communities, the environment) being addressed by the 
firm’s behavior. In a similar way, our measures focus on firm behavior 
toward salient stakeholder groups. The social performance data we analyze 
were obtained from EIRIS who specializes in the measurement of CSP 
against a consistent and objective set of criteria, principally for the con­
sumption of investors. It offers the largest and most complete multidimen­
sional social performance coverage of UK firms, covering issues relating to 
employment, the environment, community, human rights, and supply chain 
management, and the data have been analyzed in several published studies 
(see Brammer & Pavelin, 2004, 2006). Because of the limited availability 
of data regarding the last two CSP dimensions, we will restrict our atten­
tion to the first three dimensions of social performance. 
EIRIS uses publicly available information, such as annual reports and 
company publications, in addition to direct surveys of sample companies to 
construct a set of relatively objective criteria relating to corporate social 
impacts and their management. These criteria are used to devise ratings of 
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broad dimensions of social responsiveness. These ratings are comparable to 
the method adopted in the construction of the KLD’s “strengths”; however, the 
EIRIS data do not comprise a corresponding set of “weaknesses.” Hence, 
although our analysis conforms to the approach suggested by Mattingly and 
Berman (2006), the emphasis on strengths has to be borne in mind. For 
example, our indicator of employee responsibility is based on five separate 
components relating to health and safety systems, training and development, 
equal opportunities practices, employee relations, and job creation and secu­
rity, each of which is in turn based on a wide range of objective criteria. EIRIS 
provide a text-grade rating for each component (e.g., the quality of equal 
opportunity systems), and, following the general approach used by Graves and 
Waddock (1994) for KLD data, we translated these into a number-grade rat­
ing. For each area of social performance, text-rating schemes are constructed 
to reflect the underlying data. For example, the text rating for the quality of 
equal opportunity systems ranges from “little or no evidence” of such systems, 
which is reflected in a firm’s inability to provide information on factors such 
as employee demography or flexible working arrangements, to “very clear evi­
dence” of systems, as reflected in the presence of assigned responsibility for 
equal opportunities to a senior manager, policy monitoring, a percentage of 
women and minority managers that is at least four fifths the figure for the per­
centage of these groups in its workforce as a whole, and the provision of a 
wide range of flexible working arrangements. 
In a similar manner, we construct indicators of environmental (based on 
four separate components relating to the quality of environmental policies, 
systems, reporting, and performance) and community responsiveness (a 
single item). Reflecting the number of text categories available for each 
component, we coded each of the environment text scales into 5-point 
scales, coded each of the employee responsibility text scales into 3-point 
scales, and created a 4-point scale for community responsiveness. In each 
case, the codes begin with a value of 1, and larger numbers indicate better 
social performance. To summarize, our measures of the three dimensions of 
social performance are community performance (COMM), graded 0 to 3; 
environmental performance (ENVCON)—policies, systems, reporting, and 
performance, each category graded 0 to 4 (environmental impact score out 
of 16); employee performance (EMPCON)—health and safety, training and 
development, equal opportunities, employee relations, job creation, and job 
security, each category graded 0 to 2 (employment responsibility score out 
of 12). To arrive at a single aggregate measure (termed social performance), 
we summed the three scores, having normalized each to a 0 to 3 grading. 
This generates an overall score out of 9. 
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The financial control variables were estimated using data obtained from 
DataStream or were obtained from Barra Inc., a leading risk specialist. 
Following Johnson and Greening (1999), firm size (SIZE) is measured by the 
natural logarithm of company assets. Logged values are used to minimize the 
impact of extreme values and reduce heteroscedasticity. Leverage (LEVER­
AGE) is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets (Graves & 
Waddock, 1994). Following Johnson and Greening (1999) and Graves and 
Waddock (1994), we measure profitability (ROTA) by the ratio of pretax 
profits to total assets. We include one measure of risk associated with stock 
ownership. Following Badrinath, Gay and Kale (1989) we select Beta, a 
gauge of the expected response of a stock to the overall market. Beta is pro­
vided by Barra Inc. Following Gompers and Metrick (2001), Eatkins et al. 
(1998), and Badrinath et al. (1989), we measure trading volume as annual 
trading volume (TRADING VOLUME) in a firm’s stock, divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding. Bargain size (BARGAIN SIZE) is measured 
as the average bargain size traded, divided by the total number of shares out­
standing. Trading volume and bargain size data were obtained from monthly 
London Stock Exchange trading files, and we constructed annualized aver­
ages using monthly data. 
Market perceptions concerning future stock performance were captured 
through the inclusion of a variable, GROWTH, that is based on two dimen­
sions of corporate growth, growth in assets and earnings, both measured 
during a 5-year period, also obtained from Barra Inc. 
The free-float proportion (FREE FLOAT) is estimated by stock market 
index publishers to reflect availability of stock in the market for public 
investment. FTSE calculates free float as a proportion of 1, where 1 is com­
plete tradable stock availability and 0 is no tradable stock availability. We 
use the mean free float of eight quarters from the start of 2001 to measure 
the overall tradability of sample firms. 
Finally, we defined a set of industry dummy variables to account for the 
possibility that ownership of firms across different industries may be influ­
enced by the general relationships industries have with expected risk and 
return but also by the negative and positive investment screens of social 
investors. Industry sectoral dummies were created using the FTSE Global 
Industry Classification System, which groups listed stocks into ten economic 
groups: basic industries, general industries, resource extraction industries, 
cyclical consumer good industries, cyclical services, noncyclical goods, non-
cyclical services, utilities, financials, and information technology industries. 
The basic industry sector was chosen as the comparator sector. 
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Method of Estimation 
The extent of ownership in a particular company by a specific category 
of institutional investors is a censored variable in the sense that it cannot 
take negative values. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations of the influ­
ences on the extent of institutional ownership in companies would intro­
duce sample selectivity biases, and, therefore, the use of a truncated 
regression technique is necessitated to avoid the biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates that can be associated with OLS estimation. A variety 
of approaches exist that overcome such statistical difficulties (see Greene, 
1993). However, the most commonly adopted solution is to estimate a Tobit 
model of the extent of pension fund ownership in companies by maximum 
likelihood. We proceed with the estimation of a Tobit model. The basic 
Tobit model estimated here takes the following form: 
y* i = Xiβ + εi 
where an observed dependent variable, yi (which is equal to yi*) is generated 
if Xiβ + εi > 0 and is otherwise equal to zero. Xi is a vector of explanatory vari­
ables that are hypothesized to influence pension fund investment decisions. 
Results 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for 
the independent variables.5 The magnitudes of the correlation coefficients 
suggest some limited evidence of multicolinearity, but at these levels it is 
unlikely to present significant statistical difficulties. An exploratory analy­
sis of variance inflation factors indicated that they are all less than 4, 
a threshold commonly accepted in empirical work (Greene, 1993; Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). 
The Tobit results for aggregate pension funds (Model 1) and the disag­
gregated results for externally (Model 2) and internally managed (Model 3) 
pension funds and for public (Model 4) and private (Model 5) pension 
funds are presented in Table 3. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that 
the relationship between CSP and aggregate pension funds is significant 
and positive (p = .061), supporting earlier findings that suggest that institu­
tional investors (Graves & Waddock, 1994) and in particular pension funds 
(Johnson & Greening, 1999) are more likely to favor CSP. However, the 
location of portfolio management (internal or external) and the type of pen­
sion fund (private or public) are both found to have a significant impact on 
the relationship between pension fund holdings and CSP. 
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Table 3
 
The Relationship Between Company Characteristics 

and Pension Fund Holdings
 
Dependent Variable 
Externally Internally 
All Managed Managed Public Private 
Pension Pension Pension Pension Pension 
Funds Funds Funds Funds Funds 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant .042 .042 –.002 .008 .032 
(.051) (.037) (.028) (.017) (.043) 
Size .007 .006 .001 .002 .005 
(.003)** (.002)*** (.002) (.001)** (.002)** 
Free float .021 –.001 .023 .009 .014 
(.025) (.018) (.014)* (.008) (.021) 
ROTA .0008 .0004 .0005 .0003 .0006 
(.0002)*** (.0001)*** (.0001)*** (.0001)*** (.0002)*** 
Leverage .0003 .0001 .0002 .00006 .0003 
(.0002)** (.0001) (.0001)** (.0001) (.0001)** 
CSP .003 –.0001 .003 .0001 .003 
(.002)* (.001) (.001)*** (.001) (.002)** 
Growth .001 –.004 .005 –.001 .002 
(.003) (.002) (.002)** (.001) (.003) 
Beta .025 .018 .008 .004 .021 
(.014)* (.010)* (.008) (.005) (.011)* 
Bargain size .000 .001 –.001 –.0003 .0001 
(.004) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.003) 
Trading volume .013 .011 .001 .004 .008 
(.006) (.004)*** (.003) (.002)** (.005)* 
Resources –.036 –.022 –.014 –.010 –.026 
(.017)** (.012)* (.009) (.006)* (.014)* 
General industries .004 .002 .002 .002 .002 
(.012) (.009) (.007) (.004) (.010) 
Cyclical consumer goods –.040 –.038 –.002 –.006 –.034 
(.021)* (.015)** (.012) (.007) (.018)* 
Cyclical services –.018 –.010 –.007 –.001 –.016 
(.013) (.009) (.007) (.004) (.011) 
Noncyclical goods .006 .002 .004 .004 .003 
(.010) (.007) (.005) (.003) (.008) 
Noncyclical services –.038 –.030 –.007 –.004 –.033 
(.017)** (.012)** (.010) (.006) (.014)** 
Utilities –.016 –.014 –.002 –.003 –.012 
(.021) (.015) (.012) (.007) (.018) 
(continued) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Dependent Variable 
Externally Internally 
All Managed Managed Public Private 
Pension Pension Pension Pension Pension 
Funds Funds Funds Funds Funds 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Financials –.020 –.022 .003 –.007 –.012 
(.011)* (.008)*** (.006) (.004)** (.009) 
IT –.013 –.010 –.003 –.003 –.009 
(.015) (.011) (.008) (.005) (.012) 
No. of observations 541 541 541 541 541 
Log likelihood 739.9 918.6 1056.7 1318.0 837.7 
ANOVA-based .222 .182 .139 .159 .182 
fit measure 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
 
*Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.
 
The results provide strong support for the hypothesized relationship 
between the location of portfolio management and revealed preferences for 
CSP (Hypothesis 2). The results indicate that there is no statistically sig­
nificant relationship between the extent of externally managed fund owner­
ship in firms and their social performance (p = .968). In contrast, there is 
a strongly significant and positive relationship between company social 
performance and the degree to which firm stock is owned by internally 
managed funds (p = .000). It appears, therefore, that the stronger incentives 
for achieving short-term financial performance faced by external fund 
managers reduce their preference for ownership of stock in highly socially 
responsive companies. 
In relation to other characteristics of companies, the preferences of inter­
nal and external fund managers are found to differ in several respects. In 
particular, these externally managed pension funds appear to a stronger 
preference for larger companies, as evidenced by a significantly positive 
relationship between stock holdings and firm size (p = .003), for firms with 
larger trading volumes (p = .005), and for firms with higher betas (p = .061) 
when compared to internally managed funds. Internally managed funds 
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exhibit greater preferences for growth stocks (p = .015) and highly lever­
aged companies (p = .031) than externally managed funds, but both funds 
exhibit strong positive preferences for firms with higher operational prof­
itability (p = .004 and p = .000, respectively). 
Regarding the hypothesized relationship between the differences 
between public and private pension funds concerning their preferences 
for CSP (Hypothesis 3), our evidence provides no support for our hypoth­
esis. Although the relationship between CSP and the extent of private 
pension fund ownership in firms was positive and significant (p = .028), 
no significant relationship was found between CSP and the extent of 
public pension fund ownership in firms (p = .828). Public pension funds 
do not, therefore, appear to have a stronger preference for CSP than 
private pension funds. 
To investigate this finding further and to explore the interrelationship 
between the location of management (internal or external) and the type of 
pension fund (public or private), four additional dependent variables that 
reflect the available combinations of management location and ownership 
type were defined. The TOBIT results are shown in Table 4. In Model 8, the 
dependent variable is defined as the extent of private pension fund owner­
ship under external portfolio management. In Model 9, the dependent vari­
able is defined as the extent of private pension fund ownership under 
internal portfolio management. The results emphasize the central impor­
tance of the location of fund management control for revealed preferences 
for CSP. CSP is significant and positive when the fund is under internal 
control (p = .001) but insignificant when the fund is under external man­
agement (p = .681). The implications for public pension funds are revealed 
in Model 6 (the dependent variable is defined as the extent of public pen­
sion fund ownership under external portfolio management) and Model 7 
(the dependent variable is defined as the extent of public pension fund own­
ership under internal portfolio management). The results emphasize, again, 
the dominance of the location of management over the type of pension 
fund. CSP is positive and significant when public pension funds are inter­
nally managed (p = .039) but negative and insignificant when they are man­
aged externally (p = .358). It is, however, important to notice that contrary 
to prior expectations (Hypothesis 2), the coefficient on CSP is significantly 
lower (p < .05) for public internally managed pension funds (Model 7) than 
for private internally managed pension funds (Model 9). 
Table 5 investigates the relationship between the type of pension fund 
and the constituent parts of CSP. Once again there are significant dif­
ferences between internally and externally managed pension funds, with a 
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Table 4
 
The Relationship Between Company Characteristics 

and Pension Fund Holdings
 
Dependent Variable 
Public Pension Funds Private Pension Funds 
Externally Internally Externally Internally 
Managed Managed Managed Managed 
Independent Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant –.011 .015 .049 –.018 
(.016) (.008)* (.029)* (.024) 
Size .003 –.0005 .0035 .001 
(.001)*** (.0005) (.002)** (.001) 
Free float .0050 .005 –.005 .019 
(.008) (.004) (.014) (.012) 
ROTA .0002 .0001 .0002 .0004 
(.0001)*** (.00003)*** (.0001)* (.0001)*** 
Leverage .00001 .00005 .0001 .00013 
(.0001) (.00002)** (.0001) (.0001)* 
CSP –.001 .0006 .0004 .0029 
(.001) (.0003)** (.001) (.001)*** 
Growth –.002 .001 –.002 .004 
(.001)* (.001) (.002) (.002)** 
Beta .005 .0008 .015 .007 
(.004) (.002) (.008)* (.006) 
Bargain size –.0001 .00001 .001 –.001 
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
Trading volume .004 .001 .008 .001 
(.002)** (.001) (.003)** (.003) 
Resources –.009 –.0001 –.012 –.013 
(.005)* (.003) (.010) (.008)* 
General industries .002 .0005 .000 .002 
(.004) (.002) (.007) (.006) 
Cyclical consumer goods –.011 .006 –.027 –.008 
(.007)* (.003) (.012)** (.010) 
Cyclical services .0002 –.001 –.009 –.006 
(.004) (.002) (.007) (.006) 
Noncyclical goods .003 .001 .000 .004 
(.003) (.002) (.006) (005) 
Noncyclical services –.007 .0024 –.023 –.009 
(.005) (.003) (.010)** (.008) 
Utilities –.002 .000 –.010 –.002 
(.006) (.003) (.012) (.010) 
(continued) 
Downloaded from http://bas.sagepub.com at University of Bath on October 12, 2009 
67
Cox et al. / Pension Funds 233 
Table 4 (continued) 
Dependent Variable 
Public Pension Funds Private Pension Funds 
Externally Internally Externally Internally 
Managed Managed Managed Managed 
Independent Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Financials –.008 .001 –.013 .002 
(.003)** (.002) (.006)** (.005) 
IT –.002 –.001 –.008 –.001 
(.004) (.002) (.008) (.007) 
No. of observations 541 541 541 541 
Log likelihood 1312.2 1657.9 1038.5 1136.3 
ANOVA-based fit measure .130 .052 .126 .134 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
 
*Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.
 
positive and significant relationship (p < .05) between EMPCON and inter­
nally managed private and public pension funds. Neither COMM nor 
ENVCON is significant in any of the models, and the difference between 
EMPCON and COMM is significant in each case (p < .05). The difference 
between EMPCON and ENVCON is significant (p < .05) in the public pen­
sion fund model. As in the earlier models, the distinction between public 
and private pension funds does not appear to be related to CSP. In general, 
internally managed pension funds appear to discriminate between CSP 
attributes favoring employee-related CSP rather than community or envi­
ronmental dimensions of firm social performance. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This study has examined the relationship between the extent of pension 
fund stock ownership in companies and their social performance. The 
empirical analysis emphasizes the heterogeneous character of these invest­
ments by distinguishing both between public and private pension funds and 
between whether they are internally or externally managed. Although earlier 
work has focused on beneficial institutional ownership, this article suggests 
that the location of fund management control may have a significant impact 
on the pattern of institutional investments and its relationship with CSP. 
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Table 5
 
The Relationship Between Company Characteristics 

and Pension Fund Holdings
 
Dependent Variable 
Public Pension Funds Private Pension Funds 
Externally Internally Externally Internally 
Managed Managed Managed Managed 
Independent Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant –.010 .015 .045 –.013 
(.016) (.009)* (.030) (.025) 
Size .003 –.0004 .0036 .001 
(.001)*** (.0005) (.002)** (.001) 
Free float .0045 .005 –.003 .019 
(.008) (.004) (.014) (.012) 
ROTA .0002 .0001 .0001 .0004 
(.0001)*** (.00003)*** (.0001) (.0001)*** 
Leverage .00001 .00005 .0001 .00014 
(.0001) (.00002)** (.0001) (.0001)* 
COMM .001 .0004 –.0034 .0009 
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.002) 
ENVCON –.0003 –.00014 .001 .001 
(.0004) (.0002) (.001) (.001) 
EMPCON –.0003 .0003 .0003 .001 
(.0003) (.0002)** (.001) (.0005)** 
Growth –.002 .001 –.002 .004 
(.001)* (.001) (.002) (.002)** 
Beta .005 .0003 .012 .007 
(.004) (.002) (.008) (.007) 
Bargain size .000 .000 .001 –.001 
(.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
Trading volume .004 .001 .007 .000 
(.002)** (.001) (.003)** (.003) 
Resources –.009 .000 –.013 –.013 
(.005)* (.003) (.010) (.008) 
General industries .002 .0004 .001 .002 
(.004) (.002) (.007) (.006) 
Cyclical consumer goods –.012 .006 –.027 –.007 
(.007)* (.004) (.012)** (.010) 
Cyclical services .000 –.001 –.010 –.006 
(.004) (.002) (.007) (.006) 
Noncyclical goods .003 .001 .000 .004 
(.003) (.002) (.006) (.005) 
Noncyclical services –.007 .0021 –.024 –.009 
(.005) (.003) (.010)** (.008) 
(continued) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Dependent Variable 
Public Pension Funds Private Pension Funds 
Externally 
Managed 
Internally 
Managed 
Externally 
Managed 
Internally 
Managed 
Independent Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Utilities 
Financials 
IT 
No. of observations 
Log likelihood 
ANOVA-based fit measure 
–.003 
(.006) 
–.008 
(.003)** 
–.002 
(.005) 
541 
1310.0 
.131 
.000 
(.003) 
.000 
(.002) 
–.001 
(.002) 
541 
1655.9 
.053 
–.012 
(.012) 
–.013 
(.007)** 
–.006 
(.009) 
541 
1040.2 
.127 
–.001 
(.010) 
.002 
(.005) 
.000 
(.007) 
541 
1134.6 
.135 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
 
*Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.
 
The results indicate that internally and externally managed funds have dif­
ferent preferences for firm social performance. The extent of company own­
ership by internally managed funds is positively related to CSP, whereas no 
relationship was found between CSP and the degree of ownership by exter­
nal portfolio managers. The apparent disparity between the social perfor­
mance of internally managed and externally managed funds may reflect 
the greater pressure (and incentives) for short-run returns inherent in the 
contracts that govern the relationship between external fund managers and 
pension funds. Faced with greater incentives for short-term financial perfor­
mance than their internally managed counterparts, external fund managers 
allocate their funds away from companies that make significant investments 
in social responsiveness, the financial returns from which arise only in the 
long term. In this sense, share selection may be more important than investor 
activism in the sample of U.K. companies investigated. The results may also 
reflect the relative importance of CSP to shareholder activists. External port­
folio managers may have greater potential than internal portfolio managers to 
behave actively (Ryan & Schneider, 2002, 2003) but may choose to pursue 
objectives that directly relate to short-term economic performance (e.g., exec­
utive pay) and their operating mandates. 
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Although the existing literature (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Romano, 
1993; Ryan & Schneider, 2002, 2003) suggests both that public pension 
funds are more likely to be active shareholders and that they will have 
greater freedom to pursue long-term and social objectives, private pension 
funds were found to have a stronger and positive relationship with CSP. 
This result is particularly surprising in the context of the substantial fall in 
stock market values that characterized the study period. It is exactly under 
these conditions that private sector funds might be expected to face greater 
pressure for short-term financial performance relative to public pension 
funds, which may be underwritten by the public sector. Three factors may 
underpin and partially explain this result. First, public pension funds are 
more likely to be externally managed than private pension funds, and exter­
nal funds appear to be dominated by short-run demands. Second, the 
explanatory power provided by the model for internally managed public 
pension funds is relatively low, and in particular the performance of the 
financial variables is poor. This may suggest that the investment decisions 
of public sector pension funds are subject to a range of nonfinancial deter­
minants. Third, to the extent that these decisions are based on ethical or 
political considerations, their impact will not be reflected in the model 
because the definition of CSP is restricted to three elements: employee 
responsibility, environmental responsibility, community responsibility. 
Disaggregation of CSP into its constituent components suggests that the 
pattern of institutional investment is also related to the form that CSP takes. 
Thus, employee-based CSP is seen to have a stronger relationship with the 
location of fund management (internal or external) than ownership type 
(public or private). Although environmental issues have achieved consider­
able salience, this is not reflected in the revealed preferences of pension 
funds; neither community nor environmental performance were found to 
play a significant role. Although comprehensive assessment of a firm’s 
social performance should encompass a range of aspects (Carroll, 2000), 
these results emphasize the value of disaggregation when considering the 
strategic choices of investors and firms. 
The results suggest that corporate managers face a complex financial 
stakeholder environment where long-term investors have distinct and dif­
ferent revealed preferences for CSP. Although the results provide broad 
support for earlier work that suggests pension fund holdings are positively 
associated with firm social performance (e.g., Johnson & Greening, 1999), 
our evidence suggests that the preferences of pension funds for social per­
formance is contingent on whether the fund is internally or externally man­
aged. Although U.K. pension funds have been subject to legislative and 
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institutional pressure (HMSO, 1999; Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, 
2002; National Association of Pension Funds, 2005) for SRI, positive pref­
erences for CSP appear to be restricted to the most visible investment deci­
sions, those that are made internally. If legislators wish to encourage 
corporate preferences for socially responsible behavior through institu­
tional investors, they might consider mechanisms through which external 
investment mandates might be influenced to encourage SRI. 
This study has been concerned with revealed preferences for CSP rather 
than the mechanisms through which firms may achieve these goals (e.g., 
share selection, investor activism). Future work could consider the mecha­
nisms through which institutional investors achieve their goals and the rela­
tionship between these strategies (share selection or investor activism), the 
investor typologies developed by Ryan and Schneider (2002, 2003), and insti­
tutional differences between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Recent work suggests that U.K. investors may use share selection to exclude 
firms with weak CSP records (Cox, Brammer, & Millington, 2004), whereas 
U.S. investors may be more likely to pursue these goals through share 
activism. In developing this work, further exploration of the EIRIS measures 
of CSP is necessary. In particular, exploring ways to construct variables anal­
ogous to the KLD’s “weaknesses” would considerably strengthen the analy­
sis and offer a way to examine the preferences of institutions regarding 
negative aspects of corporate activities. 
Notes 
1. National Opinion Poll survey results suggest that 77% of respondents supported ethical 
pensions. 
2. For example, one London borough in 2003 stated it had had to increase local property 
taxes to narrow its pension deficit (Bruce & Targett, 2003). In other cases—for example, the 
national postal service’s additional annual pension payments of UK£100 million in 2003—this 
requirement will be met through general taxation (Lex, 2003). 
3. U.S. stock ownership data are commonly organized by investor (portfolio manager in 
investment bank, portfolio manager in bank trust, portfolio manager in pension fund) rather 
than by beneficiary (e.g., pension plan, life insurance, charity, investment trust; Del Guercio, 
1996, p. 36). One limitation with this unit of observation is that institutional portfolio man­
agers typically include all beneficial client accounts when making the required quarterly 13F 
disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission. This aggregates the assets of different 
beneficiaries within a single disclosure despite the likelihood that portfolio managers invest 
their assets reflecting the potentially diverse preferences of the various institutional owners 
(Del Guercio, 1996, p. 38). A second limitation is that it is unclear if the management of assets 
is internal or external to the institution. The extent to which the U.S. stock was owned by 
investment advisors market grew from 23% in 1980 to 69% in 1996 (Gompers & Metrick, 
2001). However, because investment advisors invest funds both for their own clients and on 
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behalf of institutional investors, the data suggest that many groups of institutional investors 
control declining proportions of the U.S. stock market (Gompers & Metrick, 2001). This is 
only true in the sense that institutional investors have partially relinquished the investment 
authority for the management of their assets to investment advisors rather than investing the 
assets themselves. Because our data are disaggregated both by beneficial owner and by port­
folio manager, it is possible to more accurately study the distinction between internal and 
external management of institutional assets. 
4. The free float proportion is the fraction of shares tradable within the market place for a 
given stock. Adjusting firms share capital for free float overcomes situations where an investor 
owns a proportion of a line of stock that is unlikely to be for sale and so ensures an accurate 
representation of the proportion of a firm’s stock that is available for institutional investors to 
own (Hamon & Jacquillat, 1999). This adjustment reflects government holdings in privatiza­
tion stocks, firm-to-firm trade investments and cross-holdings, significant long-term holdings 
by founders, directors and directors’ families, employee share schemes, and portfolio invest­
ment subject to lock-in clauses (FTSE, 2003a, 2003b). 
5. The unusually large standard deviation on profitability and its relatively low mean compared 
to other studies (e.g., Adams & Hardwick, 1998) reflects the losses made by a subset of Internet 
companies during the period under consideration. Because these companies form part of the pop­
ulation of stocks from which pension funds were selected, they were retained in the sample. 
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Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between the tournament incentives of pension 
fund managers and the characteristics of equities they choose to hold. Using a comprehensive 
data set on pension fund portfolio holdings, we determine the intensity of fund manager 
tournaments by sorting pension funds into portfolios based on the number of concurrent 
managers each pension fund employs. We then investigate which corporate characteristics are 
preferred by each of these portfolios by estimating share selection models that include a range 
of corporate characteristics that are expected to shape the returns to investment in stocks over 
the short and long run. We find that the intensity of the tournament faced by fund managers 
plays a significant role in shaping preferences over corporate characteristics. Managers facing 
more intense tournaments exhibit significantly weaker preferences for attributes associated with 
long run payoffs, such as social performance and growth potential, and significantly stronger 
preferences for short term attributes, such as operational efficiency, when compared to managers 
that face weak or no tournament incentives. 
Keywords: pension funds, tournaments, investment management, social investing 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the past 20 years there has been a dramatic increase in the extent to which 
the stock of major corporations is owned by institutional investors such as pension 
funds, mutual funds and investment trusts, rather than private individuals (Useem, 
1996; Ryan and Schneider, 2002; Klumpes and McCrae, 1999; and Blake, 2003). 
Institutional investors have become particularly significant in the United Kingdom 
where recent estimates suggest that collectively they control approximately 70% of the 
stock in the largest companies (National Statistics, 2002). One consequence of the 
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growing importance of institutional investment is that the control of corporate stock 
has been increasingly concentrated into the hands of a relatively small number of 
professional fund managers who determine how institutional funds are invested. This 
change has sparked considerable interest regarding the role that fund manager skills 
play in shaping fund performance (e.g., Brown et al., 1997) and the extent to which 
professional portfolio managers adapt their investment behaviour to the economic 
incentives they are provided (Dow and Gorton, 1997; Goldman and Slezak, 2003; and 
Blake et al., 2002). 
Conceptual and empirical research has begun to investigate these incentive struc­
tures. Some of this work has investigated aspects of manager tournaments, whereby 
managers contest their portfolio performance relative to others with the aim of avoiding 
a loss of existing accounts or to win additional mandates (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 
1990; Khorana, 2001; Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; 
Meyer and Vickers, 1997; Goriaev, Palomino and Prat, 2000; Koski and Pontiff, 1999; 
Chen and Pannachi, 2001; and Acker and Duck, 2006). However, much of this work has 
focused on tournaments in the context of mutual funds (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 
1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Goriaev, Palomino and Prat, 2000; and Khorana, 
2001) where manager performance is highly visible and is made available according 
to reporting standards designed to facilitate inter-fund comparability. In the context 
of mutual funds, empirical evidence suggests that managers mould their portfolio 
holdings over time to either consolidate or win performance relative to results posted 
by other portfolio managers, and that investment manager behaviour is sensitive to 
incentives (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996). However, comparatively little research 
has explored the importance of incentive effects in the context of other types of 
institutional investor. A notable exception is Acker and Duck (2006) which develop 
a theoretical model of the risk taking behaviour of fund managers and test it using 
data relating to UK investment trusts. Their analysis suggests that fund managers that 
are doing badly compared with peers tend to adopt riskier investment strategies as the 
time at which their performance is evaluated approaches. Another exception is Blake 
et al. (2002) which explores the role played by fee structures in shaping pension fund 
asset allocations and performance. Their findings, that there is a significant degree of 
clustering in fund performance, indicate that fee structures play only a very weak role 
in shaping asset allocations, and highlight the homogeneity of investment styles relative 
to similar research carried out in other countries (Blake et al., 2002; and Lakonishok 
et al., 1992). This research suggests both that exploring other aspects of the incentive 
systems faced by pension fund managers may yield important findings and that research 
in non-US contexts might identify important cross-country differences. 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between the variation in tournament 
incentives faced by pension fund managers and their preferences for a variety of 
corporate characteristics. Pension funds are the single largest group of institutional 
investors and are comparatively socially and politically visible compared with other areas 
of the institutional investment market (Murphy and Van Nuys, 1994). Pension funds 
long investment horizon and fiduciary responsibility to tomorrow’s pensioners should 
make them a patient form of capital that is ideal for investing long and overseeing 
public corporations (Porter, 1992; and Ryan and Schneider, 2002). Within this context 
UK pension funds have been subject to regulatory, institutional and social pressures 
to consider aspects of business social responsibility in investment decisions. These 
pressures have encompassed legal requirements to state their investment principles and 
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subsequently to identify the role of social, environmental and ethical considerations 
in investment planning (Occupational Pension Schemes, 1999), the setting of social 
agendas by industry trade bodies (e.g., Just Pensions, 2001; and Local Authority Pension 
Fund Forum, 2002) and significant public interest in socially responsible investment 
(The Ethical Investor , 1999).1 
Although earlier research suggests that pension funds have a preference for firms 
with corporate characteristics which are associated with long term performance, such 
as better social and environmental performance, higher research and development 
expenditures, and good corporate governance (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson 
and Greening, 1999; Porter, 1995; and Bushee, 1998), other evidence indicates that the 
behaviour of pension fund managers is little different from short-term investors and a 
product of the incentives they are provided. The UK Government finds that: 
the timescale over which portfolio manager performance is to be judged . . . . is a real 
cause of short-termism in fund managers’ approach to investment (Myners, 2000 p.2) 
and that the relationship: 
between institutional investors and their clients, notably pension and life funds . . . . set 
fund managers’ incentives, behaviour and attitudes (Department for Work and Pensions, 
1998, Chapter 8). 
Under these conditions the extent to which incentive systems, and in particular 
tournament intensity, affects the time horizon within which investments are made may 
be expected to have implications for portfolio composition, pension fund preferences 
for corporate social performance (CSP) and therefore, the effectiveness of regulatory 
and institutional pressures to consider CSP within the investment decision. 
This paper investigates the relationship between CSP and the pattern of pension 
fund stock ownership in companies making use of detailed data which disaggregate 
the institutional ownership in a sample of over 500 publicly listed UK companies. In 
particular, the data permit us to identify the portfolio composition of pension fund 
managers facing different tournament intensities. In each case we were able to identify 
the ultimate beneficial owner (i.e. the final owner) and the investor (i.e. the investment 
manager) of stock holdings, thus overcoming the difficulties that arise when using US 
data because of aggregating different clients’ holdings, within a single SEC disclosure 
rather than separately reporting each client account (Del Guercio, 1996; and Gompers 
and Metrick, 2001), and the incomplete coverage of state pension funds who are not 
required to file their security holdings via 13-F statements with the SEC (Badrinath 
and Wahal, 2002). Using the data we are able to document the variation across pension 
funds in the allocation of their equity investments to single, or multiple, fund managers. 
Thus we are able to shed light on the relationship between tournament intensity and 
the ways in which pension funds typically allocate their assets. 
The paper extends and develops the literature in two ways. First, this is the first study 
to critically evaluate the impact of tournament intensity on the pattern of pension fund 
assets. Although earlier studies have focused on the relationship between tournament 
intensity and portfolio management in mutual funds (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996), 
recent work highlights the disparate characteristics of different institutional investor 
1 NOP survey results suggest that 77 per cent of respondents supported ethical pensions. 
C� 2007 The Authors 
Journal compilation C� Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007 79
1310 COX, BRAMMER AND MILLINGTON 
categories (Ryan and Schneider, 2002), suggesting that incentive systems may have 
different impacts on different types of institutional investors. Blake et al., (2002) argue 
that UK pension funds provide an under-explored and significant context within which 
to explore the importance of incentive effects on asset allocations since pension fund 
managers in the UK are highly unconstrained in their asset allocations, and adopt 
relatively homogeneous investment styles characterised by balanced fund management. 
Secondly, our analysis is the first to attempt an analysis of the relationship between 
pension fund holdings and CSP which recognizes the heterogeneity present within 
pension fund management. We examine the significance of tournament intensity for 
fund manager attitudes towards corporate social performance. This approach can 
be contrasted with earlier empirical work which has focused either on institutional 
shareholders as a group (Graves and Waddock, 1994; and Coffey and Fryxell, 1991) 
or only a subset of pension funds (Johnson and Greening, 1999). These contributions 
are significant in that they provide insights into the role played by incentive systems in 
shaping the ability of pension funds to play a long-term stewardship role in general, 
and consider social and environmental aspects of firm performance in investment in 
particular. Since our analysis reveals the way pension funds are actually invested, the 
study is of interest to the buyers of pensions because it provides an insight into how 
their funds are managed. Legislative and regulatory significance arises both because 
of recent changes in the pressures on pension funds to develop investment policies 
concerning corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues and because general taxation 
is affected by the investment performance of public pension funds. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the conceptual 
background to the study and outlines the hypothesis. Section 3 introduces the sample, 
methods, data and variables. Section 4 reports the findings and theoretical and policy 
implications outlined in the concluding section. 
2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In this paper we examine the relationship between the tournament incentives faced by 
pension fund managers and their attitudes towards corporate social and environmental 
performance within a model that draws on portfolio theory (Fabozzi and Markowitz, 
2002; Bodie et al., 2006; and Merton, 2003). Portfolio theory suggests an investor will 
appraise the expected rate of return and the level of risk of each financial asset in 
relation to his or her own time preference when making portfolio decisions. Whilst 
the risk and return of each financial asset is determined in the market, the time 
preference of a professional investment manager may be influenced by the frequency 
over which his or her performance is evaluated with the associated risks of account 
loss. These time horizon determinants and the period within which the benefits of 
different corporate characteristics are realised are expected to play a crucial role in 
determining the specific balance of firm characteristics that pension fund managers 
prefer to hold in their portfolios. We first discuss the way in which tournament incentives 
shape the preferences of fund managers concerning the financial performance 
attributes of their portfolios, before examining the nature of the relationships between 
tournament incentives and specific corporate characteristics including risk, and social 
and environmental performance. 
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(i) Tournaments, Incentives and Fund Manager Objectives 
A pension fund may delegate the security selection of its entire fund to a single portfolio 
manager, as with the Bank of England and Navy Army & Air Force Institute pension 
funds, or apportion the management of its equity assets to a number of different 
portfolio managers, as with the UK Universities Superannuation Scheme and many UK 
local authority pension funds (Gimbel, 2003). Most often, pension funds apportion 
all or part of their fund to more than one portfolio manager (Fabozzi and Markowitz, 
2002; Bodie et al., 2006; Merton, 2003; Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler and Vishny, 1991) 
and request the different managers to select from the same subset of securities rather 
than different subsets of securities. Significantly, portfolio managers are not generally 
expected to make selections that fit well with the remainder of the fund and usually 
each manager will have no knowledge of the composition of the rest of the fund, only 
of who the other managers are (Blake et al., 2002). Therefore, individual managers 
often have considerable discretion in determining the composition of the portfolios 
they manage (Blake et al., 2002). Empirical evidence suggests that there is considerable 
variation across countries and time in the average number of competitors faced by an 
individual pension fund manager. For example, a survey of UK pension funds found 
those employing a split mandate structure hired, on average, three managers in 1995 
while those in the United States hired an average of thirteen managers (Targett and 
Wine, 2000). A different US study in the same year found an average of nine hired 
managers (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002). Other surveys record multiple mandates 
involving twenty (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002), thirty-one (Malca, 1975), and one 
hundred and twelve (Sharpe, 1981) different managers. 
When a pension fund hires multiple managers it creates a manager tournament.2 
Financial performance relative to peers and relevant market indices is the dominant 
metric of pension fund manager performance and is typically evaluated quarterly and 
reviewed at each year end generating three month and twelve month performance 
windows over which manager performance is judged (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler 
and Vishny, 1991; and Myners, 2000). Periodic replacement of managers following 
underperformance is a normal part of portfolio management (Ennis, 2001; and Del 
Guercio and Tkac, 2002). Manager replacement rates vary according to the research 
sample but mandates often do not run for the full three year terms that they are 
typically drawn for. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) find that 22% of pension plan 
sponsors terminated an external manager mandate in 1995, Myners (2000) that 33% 
of UK pension plan sponsors terminated an external manager mandate in the 12 
months to September 2000, Greenwich Associates (1998) that 42% hired and fired a 
manager in 1997, and Philips (1997) that 50% of US sponsors terminated a mandate 
in 1996. According to the Chairman of the board of trustees of the UK’s Universities 
Superannuation Scheme: 
If a manager has a bad year you live with that. But if he has two bad years, then you really 
start to get into them (Gimbel, 2003). 
2 As highlighted by an anonymous referee, competition across the fund management industry generates a 
broader tournament within which all fund managers compete. In effect, our argument is that the specific 
tournaments that are created within funds add to this general competitive pressure. The higher transaction 
costs associated with shifting mandates across pension funds compared with shifting mandates within a given 
fund could be one reason to expect these competitive pressures to be additive. 
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Myners (2000) finds that pension funds employing more concurrent managers 
devote more resources to manager selection and evaluation, and reallocate their 
funds across managers more frequently. Thus, the importance of a manager’s relative 
performance and the risk of account loss increase with the total number of managers 
in a fund. A manager that is one amongst many, uncertain as to when a mandate may 
be lost, will rationally assume that dismissal could be after any quarter’s performance 
and thus select stocks with characteristics that will realise their value over very short 
term periods (Myners, 2000). Relative underperformance also raises a manager’s 
firing rate, with the loss of an account leading to revenue losses and bad publicity 
(Grinold and Rudd, 1987). Underperformance is particularly damaging for a portfolio 
manager’s likely future inclusion on a pension fund’s interview short-list, these lists 
most often being compiled by investment consulting firms on the basis of a variety of 
past performance criteria (Myners, 2000). 
This discussion suggests that the pressure upon individual pension fund managers to 
demonstrate good performance increases with the number of concurrent managers a 
fund has employed. The probability of mandate termination is slim for the manager of 
an entire fund since no other managers directly select from the same subset of securities, 
relatively few resources have been expended by the fund on manager selection and 
monitoring, and switching costs are therefore relatively high. In contrast, there is a 
high probability of rapid manager replacement following underperformance in a many 
manager contest (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002). As a fund places more managers into 
the same tournament, the investment time horizon of a manager may shorten and 
thus the importance they attach to short term financial performance increases. We 
therefore hypothesise that: 
H1:	 Increasing tournament intensity will be positively associated with a focus on 
short term returns. 
(ii) Tournaments and Fund Manager Attitudes to Corporate Characteristics 
Having established that pension fund manager tournaments sharpen the incentives 
such managers face to deliver good financial performance over relatively short time 
horizons, we turn to an examination of the link between tournaments and fund 
manager attitudes concerning specific corporate characteristics, beginning with a 
discussion of the importance of corporate risk characteristics before considering the 
importance of firm social performance. 
Earlier results suggest that both incentive structures and attitudes to risk are likely 
to vary significantly between mutual and pension funds. While mutual funds are 
subject to a disproportionate reward for exceptional performance (Del Guercio and 
Tkac, 2002), and are unlikely to lose investors when they under perform, discrete 
performance benchmarks and adherence to stated investment policies play a central 
role in employment decisions in pension funds (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002). These 
differences have significant implications for fund manager attitudes to risk. Because 
fund managers are less likely to benefit from exceptional performance but are subject 
to performance benchmarks within an institutional system where managers may be 
fired for deviating from stated investment policies both diversifiable and systematic 
risk may prove unattractive to pension fund managers (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002). 
This suggests that increasing competition in multiple manager tournaments is unlikely 
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to encourage risk taking; indeed increasing competition may result in behaviour 
which is risk averse as managers’ satisfice within incentive structures which reward the 
attainment of minimum benchmarks and compliance with stated investment policies. 
We therefore hypothesise: 
H2:	 Tournament intensity will be negatively related to undiversifiable or systematic 
risk. 
There is a broad consensus that social performance initiatives require companies 
to make significant investments in the short run that cost the firm financial, or 
other, resources. Environmental initiatives such as ‘end-of-pipe’ approaches, source 
reduction, design for life, and process innovation (Hart, 1995) are typically fixed cost 
investments, having physical asset properties that depreciate over several years (Russo 
and Fouts, 1997). Employee programmes may incur costs ranging from the minor (e.g., 
by implementing flexitime or job-sharing), to the moderate (e.g., the costs associated 
with paid parental leave), or even the high (e.g., a Johnson & Johnson childcare facility 
is reported to have cost US$5 million in 1991, Woolsley, 1992). 
Whilst these and other good neighbour and philanthropic investments involve 
specific short run costs, they are also hypothesised to have countervailing benefits. 
‘Socially complex resources’ (Hillman and Keim, 2001, p.127) are created and these 
lead to ‘long-term value creation’ (Hillman and Keim, 2001, p.127). For example, 
investments that reduce environmental impacts help firms to avoid penalties imposed 
by regulators for failed environmental compliance (Lanoie, Laplante and Roy, 1998). 
Other financial gains from environmental investments may arise from consumer 
preferences for environmentally sound products and services (Richardson, Welker and 
Hutchinson, 1999), enhanced customer goodwill and loyalty (McGuire, Sundgren and 
Schneeweis, 1988), and improved overall efficiency that lowers transaction costs (Porter 
and van der Linde, 1995; Cochran and Wood, 1984; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hart, 
1995; and Ruf et al., 2001). Similarly, workplace investments in employee-focused social 
performance may yield a combination of improved employee retention, productivity, 
morale, attractiveness to talented employees, influence in outside lobbying, and 
decreased hiring costs, absenteeism, strikes, community opposition, and legal action 
related to work safety or new factory openings (Turban and Greening, 1997; and 
Waddock and Graves, 1997). Corporate philanthropy may directly improve a firm’s 
external profile through better neighbourhood relations and outside associations. 
These broadcasting effects advertise the firm and provide it reputation and visibility 
(Fry, Keim and Meiners, 1982). A safer firm may also result (Ullmann, 1985). 
Environmental investments may lead to fewer negative environmental events, less 
negative visibility, risk of consumer boycotts and pollution monitoring by regulators 
with powers to impose fines, pollution abatement costs and remove operating licences. 
Work place investments may lower the threat of employee related legal action and 
resultant poor public relations. 
Since most of the gains from CSP accrue in the long run while tournament 
intensity encourages portfolio managers to pursue short run investment objectives 
we hypothesise that: 
H3:	 Tournament intensity is negatively associated with the social and environmental 
performance of firms. 
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(iii) Control Variables 
In our model of stock selection we control for a number of firm characteristics for 
which institutional preferences have been identified in existing studies. These comprise 
investment liquidity, firm size, pension fund size, leverage, operating efficiency and 
industry (Hessel and Norman, 1992; Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Eakins, Stansell and Buck, 1998; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Dyl and 
Anderson, 2002; Chan and Lakonishok; 1995; Hessel and Norman, 1992; Rosenberg, 
1974; Badrinath, Gay and Kale, 1989; Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991; and Duke and 
Hunt, 1990). 
3. METHODS 
Sample 
To examine whether the degree to which competition exists between fund managers 
within a given pension fund influences their preferences over corporate characteristics, 
we examine the pattern of fund holdings in the constituents of the FTSE AllShare index, 
a market capitalization weighted index representing over 98% of the UK market and 
a commonly used investment benchmark. The number of FTSE AllShare constituents 
varied from 675 to 704 between January 2001 and December 2002 as changes in the 
market capitalization and liquidity of firms caused some to leave and others to enter 
during the period. Because fund managers often invest in a stock in anticipation of its 
inclusion on an index and continue to hold a stock that has recently dropped out of an 
index, we include all FTSE AllShare index constituents that were present during any 
quarter from the beginning of 2001 to the end of 2002. This yielded an initial sample of 
746 individual firms. Pension fund stock holding data were drawn in June 2002 from a 
stock ownership database covering 2,000 UK listed firms. This database is professionally 
maintained and continuously updated to reflect daily changes in ownership as recorded 
by equity transaction information on the London Stock Exchange. 
This time period is chosen for two reasons. First, it follows an episode of significant 
stock market decline and volatility and thus may coincide with listed firms placing 
greater value on long term outcomes such as CSP. Second, disaggregated institutional 
ownership data are not available prior to this date. Occupational pension schemes had 
started to consider liability driven and absolute return generating strategies in response 
to equity market falls and the deficits that were exposed as a consequence. However, 
these were at an early stage in 2002, with the vast majority of pension assets still managed 
on a relative basis, with some specialist mandates, and it is only in the last few years that 
liability driven investment has grown in popularity (UBS Global Asset Management, 
2006). 
The particular profile of pension fund held stock drawn in June 2002 is a reflection 
of investment decisions made months, even years prior to this date. To capture this 
decision context we follow Falkenstein (1996) and collect almost all data as time series 
extending back to 2001 that are then averaged. For example, trading volume, trading 
depth and free float are averaged data that commence 2001 and end June 2002. Missing 
institutional holding data reduced the sample from 746 to 677 firms. Missing social and 
environmental company characteristics further reduced this to 576. Missing control 
variable data, mostly relating to DataStream, resulted in a final sample of 541 firms. 
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(i) Dependent Variables 
Ownership data for the sample firms was drawn in June 2002 from a corporate 
ownership database maintained by the UK’s largest company registrar, Computershare. 
It is usual for large UK companies to delegate share registry and investor account man­
agement to a third party registrar so that they may meet their obligation to keep track 
of shareholders under the 1985 Companies Act. Computershare continuously updates 
shareholder account information for 2,000 UK firms, including those it is not registrar 
for, via daily changes in ownership as recorded by equity transaction information on the 
London Stock Exchange. The data are commercially available and used extensively by 
investor relations departments to understand investor demographics and by investment 
professionals to monitor ownership changes and to source stock for trading. For every 
holder of stock the database records the following information: name of the pension 
plan (e.g., Universities Superannuation Scheme), country of domicile (e.g., UK), name 
of the fund manager (e.g., Fidelity), name of the security (e.g., British Airways), and the 
number of shares held. A relational database was used to query the pension plan share 
holding information. Pension funds were then divided into six types according to the 
number of fund managers involved in their management which can vary between one 
and six.3 Six separate dependent variables were then identified which correspond to 
the number of fund managers (1-6) participating in a given pension fund tournament. 
Each dependent variable is then defined as the ratio of total stock in a given company 
held by pension fund tournaments of a given size (1-6) to the total number of shares 
in the company adjusted for free-float.4 
(ii) Independent Variables 
Risk, expected return, and investment time horizons are captured using data from 
BARRA Inc, an investment software and research company. Total risk (RISK) is 
measured as the variance of stock price returns over the previous 60 months. Beta 
is the slope of 60 month stock returns regressed on the market after reflecting changes 
to the company’s financial structure, capitalisation and business operations that have 
occurred within the calculation window (BETA). Investment time horizons are captured 
through the inclusion of two variables, GROWTH and VALUE. Barra measures growth 
by identifying firms which are expensive relative to the overall market as measured by 
five year average earnings per share growth; such firms tend to be associated with 
relatively fast growing markets such as biotechnology, information technology and 
alternative fuels. Value is measured as a weighted composite of earnings to price, book 
value to price, and cash flow to price. 
Social and environmental performance data are drawn from The Ethical Investment 
Research Service (EIRIS), the UK’s oldest independent research company specializing 
3 In aggregate, portfolios managed by 1-6 managers account for over 87% of the total pension fund holdings 
in the stocks analysed. Portfolios for numbers of managers in excess of 6 therefore account for such small 
proportions of stock ownership as to present statistical difficulties. 
4 The free float proportion is the fraction of shares tradable within the market place for a given stock. 
Adjusting firms’ share capital for free float overcomes situations where an investor owns a proportion of a line 
of stock that is unlikely to be for sale and so ensures an accurate representation of the proportion of a firm’s 
stock that is available for institutional investors to own (Hamon and Jacquillat, 1999). This adjustment reflects 
government holdings in privatisation stocks, firm-to-firm trade investments and cross holdings, significant 
long-term holdings by founders, directors and directors’ families, employee share schemes and portfolio 
investment subject to lock-in clauses (FTSE, 2003a and 2003b). 
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in the assessment of corporate social performance for investors, having the largest 
and most complete multidimensional social performance coverage of UK firms with 
more than 75% of UK ethical funds subscribing to its data. For the social performance 
variable (SOCIAL PERFORMANCE) a composite of environment, employment and 
community dimensions of corporate social performance is created. Employment 
comprises six aspects: health and safety, training and development, equal opportunities, 
employee relations and job creation and security. Environment comprises four aspects: 
environmental policies, systems, reporting and performance. Community has only 
one aspect. Each employment aspect has three text categories, each environmental 
aspect has five text categories and community has four text categories. Following the 
general approach used by Graves and Waddock (1994) the EIRIS text-grade rating 
for each measure is translated into a number-grade rating starting at 1 and increasing 
with greater social performance. Numeric transformation means employment data are 
coded 1 to 3, environmental data coded 1 to 5 and community data coded 1 to 4. 
To arrive at a single social and environmental composite the number-grade ratings 
within each of employment, environment and community are summed to give an 
employment score out of 18, environment score out of 20 and community score out of 
4. Lastly, the score on each category is normalized to 4 so as to effectively equal weight 
them. This generates a possible range of scores from 3 to 12 and a Cronbach’s Alpha 
of 0.92.5 
(iii) Control Variables 
Trading liquidity of investments is captured through the inclusion of three variables 
using data from the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and FTSE. The LSE monthly 
trading files provide liquidity data. Following Falkenstein (1996), Del Guercio (1996), 
Gompers and Metrick (2001), Eakins, Stansell and Buck (1998) and Badrinath, Gay 
and Kale (1989) average monthly trading volume (TRADING VOLUME) is measured as 
shares traded per month divided by the total number of shares outstanding, however, 
we adjusted the number of shares outstanding to account for the free float. Trade 
depth is reflected in the average proportion of shares outstanding traded per bargain 
(BARGAIN SIZE), is measured as the number of shares traded per bargain during 2001 
and 2002 divided by the free float adjusted total number of shares outstanding. FTSE 
calculates free float as a proportion of 1 where 1 is complete tradable stock availability 
and 0 is no tradable stock availability. The mean quarterly free float since start 2001 to 
end June 2002 is used (FREE FLOAT). In order to explore the role played by pension 
fund size in shaping asset allocations, we included a measure of the average size of 
pension funds holding stock in each particular firm (PENSION FUND SIZE) weighted 
according to the size of their holdings as a further control variable. 
Accounting data were drawn from DataStream. Following Johnson and Greening 
(1999) and Badrinath, Gay and Kale (1989) firm size is measured as the value of 
5 Cronbach’s alpha measures how well a set of items (or variables) measures a single one-dimensional latent 
construct. It gives an indication of the degree of consistency among the survey items or variables being used 
to capture a construct (such as CSP). Formally, it is given by the formula a = (N *R)/(1 + (N − 1)*R) where 
N is the number of items being used to generate the construct and R is the average pairwise correlation 
between the items. Values of Cronbach’s alpha lie in the range 0-1 with higher values indicating a greater 
degree of reliability and with values in excess of 0.7 commonly being viewed as providing a sufficiently high 
level of correspondence (Hair et al., 1998). 
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company assets at accounting year ends. Following Johnson and Greening (1999), 
Graves and Waddock (1994), Hessel and Norman (1992) and Eakins, Stansell and 
Buck (1998) return on assets (ROA) is measured as the ratio of pre-tax profits to 
total assets at accounting year ends. Following Graves and Waddock (1994), Hessel 
and Norman (1992), Eakins, Stansell and Buck (1998) and Badrinath, Gay and 
Kale (1989) leverage is calculated as total company debt divided by total company 
assets at accounting year ends. Natural log values are used for trading volume and 
depth, and firm size in order to minimize the impact of extreme values and reduce 
heteroscedasticity. 
Industry is measured using the FTSE Global Industry Classification System which 
groups listed stocks into 10 economic groups: basic industries, general industries, 
resource extraction, cyclical consumer goods, cyclical services, non-cyclical consumer 
goods, non-cyclical services, utilities, financials and information technology industries. 
The basic industry sector was chosen as the comparator sector. 
(iv) Estimation Technique 
The estimation model used is: 
PHi = α + ßXi , +e i , 
Where PHi , is the per cent of held stock in firm i by a class of pension fund and Xi is 
the vector of determinants of stock demand. Although some funds hold short positions 
the vast majority do not. In fact for no stock does the entire sample have a net short 
position. Institutional constraints on short positions and a maximum long position of 
100% cause PH to vary between 0 and 1 and imply that a censored model is the most 
appropriate form. Thus the equation is estimated using the commonly adopted Tobit 
model of the form: 
y = 0 if  y ∗ ≤ 0∗ y = ßXi , +εi ,i y = y ∗ if y ∗ ≥ 0. 
An OLS model, not reported, using heteroscedasticity consistent (White) standard 
errors with intercept included is also estimated and has similar results. 
4. RESULTS 
We begin the discussion of our results by describing the state of tournament choices 
made by pension funds in our sample companies. Table 1 reports the number of 
concurrent fund managers hired by the 2,335 pension funds that held stock in the 
sample companies and the proportion of corporate stock owned on average in those 
companies by funds employing a given number of fund managers. On average, a 
pension fund hired approximately 2.2 fund managers but this masks considerable 
diversity across funds. Over 56% of the funds, responsible for investing just over 48% 
of pension fund assets employed only a single fund manager and therefore removed 
all tournament incentives. Those funds that do employ tournament incentives hire, on 
average, 3.8 fund managers, this figure being roughly comparable to that reported by 
(Targett and Wine, 2000), and are responsible for the management of 52% of pension 
fund assets. Those hiring the most concurrent managers tend to be the largest pension 
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Table 1 
The Distribution of Different Intensities of Fund Manager Tournament Within
 
Pension Funds
 
Number of Managers a Pension Number of Pension Average Proportion of 
Fund is Using to Invest Funds Using This Equity Owned for Each 
in UK Equities Mandate Structure Mandate Structure (%) 
1 1,334 7.70 
2 466 3.54 
3 208 0.97 
4 128 1.53 
5 57 0.12 
6 60 0.95 
7 17 0.29 
8 15 0.34 
9 13 0.03 
10 4 0.10 
11 11 0.04 
12 5 0.06 
14 1 0.18 
15 10 0.00 
16 4 0.02 
19 2 0.03 
20 15 0.00 
22 3 0.04 
All 2,353 15.94 
funds. In the US these pension funds include California State Teachers, California 
Public Employees, State of Virginia, IBM, Bell, and General Motors, and in the UK the 
Electricity Supply, Diageo and Strathclyde regional authority. 
Next, we examine the descriptive statistics and correlations between the key variables 
analysed, which are reported in Table 2. The negative relationship between firm size 
and trade depth indicates institutions can achieve their desired portfolio weight in a 
stock from the purchase of a small proportion of the stock outstanding of the largest 
firms (Falkenstein, 1996; and Graves and Waddock, 1994). The magnitude of the 
correlation coefficients suggests that our analysis is unlikely to suffer from significant 
multicollinearity and the variance inflation factors that were estimated and do not 
exceed four in any case (Greene, 1993; and Hair et al., 1998). 
Our TOBIT analyses are presented in Table 3. Overall the results provide significant 
support for the expected relationships outlined in the preceding discussion. The 
insignificance of firm size in all of the models suggests that the overall model 
is well specified. There is little reason for investors to care for firm size. Rather 
investors may care less for size itself than for the characteristics of size: liquidity, and 
risk. 
Models (i)-(vi) document the influences on the pattern of pension fund ownership in 
sample companies for funds with a number of concurrent managers ranging from 0 to 5 
and, in doing so, reveal the preferences of the managers of these portfolios for corporate 
characteristics. The intensity of tournament faced by fund managers increases as we 
move from the left to the right of Table 3. It is useful to benchmark against the revealed 
preferences of portfolio managers that face no tournament incentives (as described in 
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Table 3 
Regression Analysis 
Dependent Variables = Proportion of total firm equity (adjusted for free float) held 
by fund managers facing the number of concurent rivals indicated 
Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) Model (iv) Model (v) Model (vi) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Independent Variables 
CONSTANT 0.1450 0.0455 0.0232 0.0206 0.0036 0.0075 
(0.0425)∗∗∗ (0.0216)∗∗ (0.0094)∗∗ (0.0107)∗∗ (0.0038) (0.0092) 
COMPANY SIZE −0.0002 0.0003 −0.0002 0.0008 −0.0001 0.0000 
(0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
PENSION FUND SIZE 0.000007 0.0000004 0.000006 0.000002 0.000015 0.000000 
(0.000001)∗∗∗ (0.0000004) (0.000000)∗∗∗ (0.0000004)∗∗∗ (0.000002)∗∗∗ 0.000000 
ROTA 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0001) (0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.00003)∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LEVERAGE 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0001)∗∗∗ (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
FREE FLOAT −0.0007 0.0011 −0.0075 −0.0003 −0.0003 0.0037 
(0.0156) (0.0080) (0.0035)∗∗ (0.0040) (0.0014) (0.0034) 
CSRCOMP 0.0021 0.0013 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0002 0.0003 
(0.0010)∗∗ (0.0006)∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001)∗ (0.0002) 
RISK −0.2908 −0.0551 −0.0353 −0.0259 −0.0051 −0.0216 
(0.0525)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗ (0.0119)∗∗∗ (0.0134)∗∗ (0.0048) (0.0115)∗ 
BETA 0.0810 0.0306 0.0148 0.0084 0.0001 0.0058 
(0.017)∗∗∗ (0.0085)∗∗∗ (0.0037)∗∗∗ (0.0042)∗∗ (0.0015) (0.0036) 
GROWTH −0.0008 −0.0036 −0.0020 0.0004 −0.0001 −0.0002 
(0.0022) (0.0011)∗∗∗ (0.0005)∗∗∗ (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
VALUE −0.0077 −0.0003 0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0004 −0.0007 
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0002)∗ (0.0005) 
BARGAIN SIZE 0.0035 0.0036 0.0004 0.0017 −0.0003 −0.0004 
(0.0024) (0.0012)∗∗∗ (0.0005) (0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.0002) (0.0005) 
TRADING VOLUME 0.0059 −0.0004 0.0020 0.0001 0.0007 0.0009 
(0.003)∗ (0.0018) (0.0008)∗∗∗ (0.0009) (0.0003)∗∗ (0.0007) 
RESOURCES −0.0189 −0.0002 −0.0056 −0.0027 −0.0008 −0.0013 
(0.010)∗ (0.0053) (0.0023)∗∗ (0.0026) (0.0009) (0.0022) 
GENERAL INDS 0.0065 0.0043 −0.0007 0.0036 −0.0001 0.0001 
(0.0078) (0.0040) (0.0017) (0.0020)∗ (0.0007) (0.0017) 
CYC. CONS GOODS −0.0080 −0.0069 −0.0070 −0.0054 −0.0002 −0.0028 
(0.0131) (0.0068) (0.0030)∗∗ (0.0034) (0.0012) (0.0029) 
NON CYC. CONS −0.0114 0.0046 0.0005 0.0033 −0.0005 0.0001 
GOODS (0.0084) (0.0043) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0008) (0.0018) 
CYCLICAL SERVICES 0.0073 0.0054 0.0003 0.0016 −0.0008 0.0012 
(0.0062) (0.0032)∗∗ (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0013) 
NON-CYCLICAL −0.0051 0.0052 0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0008 −0.0010 
SERVICES (0.0116) (0.0059) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0010) (0.0025) 
UTILITIES 0.0053 0.0191 0.0032 0.0015 −0.0010 0.0002 
(0.0135) (0.0069)∗∗∗ (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0012) (0.0029) 
FINANCIALS −0.0174 0.0022 −0.0016 −0.0034 −0.0007 −0.0006 
(0.007)∗∗ (0.0036) (0.0016) (0.0018)∗ (0.0006) (0.0015) 
IT 0.0097 0.0030 −0.0022 0.0010 0.0008 −0.0002 
(0.0100) (0.0051) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0009) (0.0022) 
SIGMA 0.0372 0.0191 0.0081 0.0094 0.0030 0.0081 
(0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Log Likelihood 1001.48 1353.15 1516.68 1689.92 1300.34 1735.24 
No. of Observations 541 541 541 541 541 541 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Notes: 
∗∗ ∗∗∗Significance levels:∗ p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01. Variable definitions: COMPANY SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the total value of company assets; PENSION FUND SIZE is the average size of pension 
funds holding stock in each particular firm weighted according to the size of their holdings; ROTA is 
measured as the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets; 
FREEFLOAT is measured by the mean quarterly free float between January 2001 and June 2002; CSRCOMP 
is a composite indicator of firm performance regarding environmental, employee and community issues; 
RISK is equal to the variance of stock price returns over the previous 60 months; BETA is the slope of 60 
month stock returns regressed on the market after reflecting changes to the company’s financial structure, 
capitalisation and business operations that have occurred within the calculation window; GROWTH reflects 
firms which are expensive relative to the overall market as measured by five year average earnings per share 
growth; VALUE is a weighted composite of earnings to price, book value to price, and cash flow to price; 
BARGAIN SIZE is measured as the number of shares traded per bargain during 2001 and 2002 divided by 
the free float adjusted total number of shares outstanding; TRADING VOLUME is shares traded per month 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding adjusted for the free float; Industry is measured using the 
FTSE Global Industry Classification System which groups listed stocks into 10 economic groups. 
Model (i)) in considering how such incentives influence the attitudes of fund managers 
concerning the characteristics of equities they prefer to invest in. 
Model (i) documents that for pension fund portfolios where managers face no 
tournament incentives, a statistically significant positive relationship exists between 
the average degree of portfolio ownership in companies and their expected return 
(Beta, p < 0.01), leverage (p < 0.01), corporate social performance (p < 0.05), and 
trading volume (p < 0.10), and that significant negative relationships exist for risk (p < 
0.01) and value (p < 0.01). The results with respect to risk and expected return are 
consistent with investment theory, and that for trading volume indicates that having 
low transaction costs plays an important role in investment selection. 
As we move across Models (ii)-(vi) the intensity of the tournament incentives faced 
by fund managers increases. For some characteristics, preferences of fund managers 
appear to be independent of the degree of tournament intensity. For example, 
consistent with investment theory and the general importance of low transaction 
costs, most portfolios exhibit strong positive preferences for stocks with high expected 
return, low risk, and high liquidity, manifested either in high trading volumes or trade 
depth. Similarly, the extent of pension fund holdings in firms is positively related to 
their size for most intensities of tournament. However, for other aspects of portfolio 
companies, increases in tournament intensity are associated with important changes 
in the preferences of fund managers for firm characteristics. 
Although the coefficients on growth and value need careful interpretation 
(Lofthouse, 2001) the results provide some support for hypothesis 1 with evidence 
that low tournament intensity is associated with long term investment strategies. Value 
stocks are avoided in low tournament intensity portfolios, but as tournament intensity 
increases growth stocks are most avoided (significantly so for Models (ii) and (iii)). To 
the extent that value strategies have a shorter term focus than growth (Lofthouse, 2001) 
this is consistent with higher tournament intensity portfolios having shorter investment 
time horizons. The results also provide some evidence that fund managers exhibit an 
increasing preference for operating efficiency as tournament intensity increases with 
a clear division between single manager funds and multi-manager funds. Operating 
efficiency, as captured by the return on total assets is found to be significantly positively 
C� 2007 The Authors 
Journal compilation C� Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007 91
1322 COX, BRAMMER AND MILLINGTON 
related to stock holdings in Models (ii) and (iv) (p < 0.01, and p < 0.01 respectively). 
This may reflect a tendency for managers who face significant rivalry from other fund 
managers to adopt an investment approach that more closely reflects the fundamental 
indicators of financial performance of companies than those that don’t face such 
competition. 
The results provide consistent support for hypothesis 2. Tournament intensity is 
negatively related to systematic risk (BETA) with a consistent decline in both the 
coefficient and the level of significance. At the same time tolerance for other sources of 
risk, or diversifiable risk (RISK), increases as tournament intensity increases, although 
the coefficient always remains negative. A greater acceptance of diversifiable risk when 
tournament intensity is high may reflect fund managers search for additional sources 
of return as tournament intensity increases. 
The relationship between portfolio holdings and social and environmental perfor­
mance is positive and statistically significant in Models (i) and (ii) (p = 0.049, and 
p = 0.021). Fund managers therefore exhibit a positive preference for such attributes 
that does not disappear when competition is introduced. However, as we move through 
Models (iii)-(vi), social and environmental performance characteristics play a much less 
significant role in influencing stock selection and there is some evidence that where 
they do enter stock selection decisions, such attributes are viewed negatively (Model 
(v)). Together, these results suggest that there is a threshold level of manager rivalry 
after which managers attitudes towards social and environmental firm characteristics 
significantly alter. At low tournament intensities, fund managers appear to value such 
characteristics, perhaps because they expect them to lead to positive financial returns 
over the long run or because they help to reduce risk. However, once fund managers 
face more rivals, in our analysis, two or more rivals, social & environmental performance 
either play no significant role or enters negatively into share selection decisions. This 
provides strong support for hypothesis 3 and is consistent with increasing rivalry among 
fund managers leading to a focus on short term financial returns. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper explores the relationship between the tournament incentives of pension 
fund managers and the characteristics of equities they prefer to hold in their portfolios. 
Using a comprehensive data set on pension fund portfolio holdings, we determine 
the intensity of fund manager tournaments by sorting pension funds into portfolios 
based on the number of concurrent managers each pension fund employs. We then 
investigate which corporate characteristics are preferred by each of these portfolios 
by estimating share selection models that include a wide range of factors, including 
corporate social performance, that are hypothesised to play a role in shaping the returns 
to investment in stocks over the short and long run. We find that the intensity of the 
tournament faced by fund managers plays a significant role in shaping preferences 
over corporate characteristics. Managers facing more intense tournaments exhibit 
significantly weaker preferences for attributes associated with long run payoffs, such 
as social performance and growth potential, and significantly stronger preferences for 
short term attributes, such as operational efficiency, when compared to managers that 
face weak or no tournament incentives. 
The results also suggest that the impact of tournament intensity on fund manager 
behaviour differs significantly between pension funds and both mutual funds and 
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investment trusts. In contrast to mutual funds (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002) tourna­
ment intensity reduces fund manager preferences for systematic risk whilst increasing 
manager search for other return generating risk proxies, a result which may reflect the 
importance of minimum performance benchmarks and the importance attached to 
compliance with stated investment policies in fund managers evaluations (Del Guercio 
and Tkac, 2002). Our findings also contrast with those of Acker and Duck (2006) 
in that we find that, on average, managers facing low levels of tournament intensity 
exhibit a stronger preference for high Beta stocks than managers facing higher levels 
of tournament intensity. While this observation might reflect our inability to control for 
the relative current performance of fund managers and/or the generally pessimistic 
market forecasts during the period covered by our analysis, it might also be a reflection 
of the relatively low risk of losing mandates faced by pension fund managers with 
few internal rivals compared to both comparable incentives for good pension fund 
performance and the risks of mandate loss by other types of fund manager. 
Our analysis suggests that, in spite of significant pressure from government and 
regulators for pension funds to adopt a long term perspective on investment, only 
those components of pension funds that face weak tournament incentives for short-
term performance tend to view aspects of companies that are expected to provide long 
term returns positively. Thus, although pension funds have the longest investment time 
horizons, are the most sheltered from short-term market developments, and have been 
encouraged to take a more active stance in stimulating the non-financial characteristics 
of companies, significant proportions of their assets appear to be invested in order to 
provide short-term financial returns. 
These observations are significant in that they suggest that, in actuality, pension 
fund investment largely acts so as to incentivise corporate behaviour designed to 
deliver short, rather than long, term financial performance. Such incentives may cause 
companies to shift their investments towards projects which deliver short-term returns 
to the detriment both of their long-run financial performance and the productivity 
of UK companies. A particular concern is the absence of any incentive for companies 
to take actions that mitigate their social and environmental impacts. Such factors are 
increasingly thought to be a source of considerable risk for large corporations and 
their shareholders, and should therefore play a role in share selection. Pressure for 
companies to disclose a policy on social and environmental aspects of investment 
behaviours has not, it seems, led to such issues playing a significant role in share 
selection for many fund managers. If government or financial regulators are serious 
about promoting long-termism among specific groups of institutional investors, then 
our analysis suggests that they will have to carefully consider the way in which the 
incentives that guide the behaviour of individual fund managers can be shaped in 
order to bring about the desired outcomes. 
This work is subject to a number of limitations that might serve as the basis for 
future work. In particular, our data don’t allow us any insight into other aspects 
of fund manager environments that may shape asset allocations. In particular, the 
absence of detailed information concerning mandates, fee and reward structures 
offers the possibility that future work could explore multiple aspects of fund manager 
competitions. In addition, our study used a raw count of the numbers of managers 
in a fund to estimate the tournament properties managers confront. However, some 
managers are hired because they are experts over different subsets of securities rather 
than over the same subset and a more detailed study could further investigate this; 
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exploring such specialist mandates and other important details of fund manager 
tournaments could reveal important new evidence concerning the drivers of the fund 
manager behaviour. 
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This study examines overseas investing by U.S.-domiciled pension plans. The 
authors explore whether U.S. pension plans invest based on corporate social 
performance (CSP) in a core overseas market, the United Kingdom. As a guide 
to social investing opportunities available to U.S. pension funds in the United 
Kingdom, their investments are compared to U.K.-domiciled pension plan 
domestic investments. U.S. labor union plan portfolios have a positive rela­
tionship with workplace practices, and U.S. private plan portfolios, with CSP’s 
community dimension. U.S. state and foundation plan portfolios have no rela­
tionship with CSP. Other than union plans, U.S. pension plans stress corporate 
financial performance in their U.K. investments. U.K. union plan portfolios 
have a positive relationship with workplace practices, and U.K. state, founda­
tion, and private plan portfolios with environment. 
Keywords:	 socially responsible investing; pension plans; institutional invest­
ment; corporate social performance 
Institutionalization of the large, publicly owned corporation in the 20th century brought about the emergence of sometimes unbridled corporate 
power affecting various stakeholders and the larger society (Eberstadt, 
1977). The large, publicly owned corporation also led to managerialism 
(Berle & Means, 1932/1968), in which managers gained great discretion 
with few checks and balances over their dispersed owners or investors. 
There have been several developments to better monitor and mitigate these 
forms of power. With regard to corporate power, the construct of corporate 
1 
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social performance (CSP) came about and is the aspect of corporate per­
formance having to do with principles, processes, and outcomes related to 
the firm’s societal relationships (Wartick & Cochran, 1985). And, the rise 
of institutional investing has led to a more concentrated and, hence, power­
ful owner base to counter managerialism (Brown, 1998). 
In addition to growing emphasis on socially responsible investing (SRI) 
based on CSP criteria and the rise of institutional investors is the mega-trend 
of globalization, the increased interlinkage of socioeconomic systems and the 
institutions and individuals within them. The deployment of information tech­
nologies and political movements toward free trade and privatization of the 
means of production have led to the emergence of global investing. In 2004, 
almost $6 trillion of U.S. securities were held by foreign investors, and the 
value of foreign securities held by U.S. investors was almost $7.4 trillion 
(Securities Industry Association, 2005). In 2005, of the 24 largest global ini­
tial public offerings, only one listed in the United States, with London and 
Hong Kong the most popular locations (Scott & Dallas, 2006). Any investor— 
from small individual investors through major pension plans and mutual 
funds—can gather information on publicly traded companies incorporated 
outside of the investor’s country and trade his or her equities. Thus, the invest­
ment landscape has changed dramatically of late, to include socially responsi­
ble, institutional, and global investing. 
This article brings together the trends of socially responsible, institu­
tional, and global investing and brings forth the issue of whether institu­
tional investors’ SRI affects their nondomestic investments. Pension plans 
are a major type of institutional investor, with U.S. pension plans account­
ing for $2.3 trillion or 26.2% of U.S. institutional investment in equity in 
2004 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). We evaluate U.S. pension plans’ SRI in 
a core overseas market, the United Kingdom. One motivation for selecting 
the United Kingdom is that its stock market has sufficient liquidity to meet 
the needs of large U.S. investors. A second motivation is that it is a major 
market for international corporate issuers and investors. For example, over­
seas investors owned 33% of U.K. shares listed on the London Stock 
Exchange at the end of 2004 (see appendix), worth £483 billion. Of this 
total, £164 billion (34%) was held by investors based in Europe, with the 
remaining £319 billion (66%) held mostly by investors based in the United 
States (National Statistics, 2005). To gauge social investing opportunities 
available to U.S. pension funds in the United Kingdom, we use U.K.­
domiciled pension plan domestic investments as a benchmark. We focus 
this exploratory study on the specific research question, within the U.K. 
equity market, how does U.S. pension plan SRI compare with U.K. pension 
plan SRI? 
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We directly compare U.S. and U.K. pension plan investments in the U.K. 
Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) All Share 300, which is similar to the 
U.S. Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500). Firms in the pension plans’ 
portfolios are evaluated on CSP and corporate financial performance (CFP) 
criteria. A series of hypotheses is developed and tested based on the countries 
of pension plan origin and country of pension plan investing; pension plan 
type; and the CSP dimensions of environment, workplace, and community. 
Among U.S. pension plans, we found that labor union plan portfolios are pos­
itively related to workplace practices and private pension plan portfolios to 
CSP’s community dimension. U.K. union plan portfolios, similar to their U.S. 
counterparts, have a positive relationship with workplace practices, whereas 
U.K. state, foundation, and private plan portfolios have a positive relationship 
with CSP’s environment dimension. Other than union pension plans, U.S. pen­
sion plans tend to invest in U.K. firms for their CFP more so than for their CSP. 
The article’s contributions include theory development and testing with regard 
to the SRI of pension plans as institutional investors, and an extended typol­
ogy of pension plans. 
SRI, Institutional Investing, and the Influence 
of National Environments 
CSP and SRI 
As corporate performance is multidimensional, as seen in the Balanced 
Scorecard approach to performance measurement (Kaplan & Norton, 
2005), it follows that the aspect of performance tied to stakeholder and 
social relations is also multidimensional. As the term performance has an 
outcome orientation, CSP is the set of outcomes that is achieved in response 
to the corporation’s social responsibility. Based on the principle that busi­
ness and society are interwoven, corporate social responsibility (CSR) pro­
poses that society has legitimate expectations for corporate processes and 
performance (Wood, 1991), which extend beyond traditional economic and 
legal expectations. CSR includes levels or categories of social responsibil­
ity, a range of possible corporate philosophies to social responsiveness, and 
a range of social issues (Carroll, 1979). It includes the narrow aspect of 
stakeholder management and the broad aspect of social issues management 
(Clarkson, 1995; Swanson, 1995). 
Although Carroll (1979) and Clarkson (1995) propose that CSR includes 
economic and legal responsibilities, and Carroll (1991) presents a corporate 
hierarchy of responsibilities with economic ones at the base, it remains 
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unclear whether there are positive or negative relationships among the per­
formance outcomes associated with these responsibilities. Although many 
empirical studies have been conducted on the relationship between CSP 
and CFP (e.g., Waddock & Graves, 1997a), the results across the studies are 
often incomparable and thus inconclusive (Griffin & Mahon, 1997). And, 
there is broad consensus in the literature that measurement of the relation­
ship is complicated by the costs of CSP being short term whereas its posi­
tive relationship with CFP is long term (Cox, Brammer, & Millington, 
2004; Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003). 
Hillman and Keim (2001) theorize and find support that the broad aspect 
of CSP tied to social issues might deter CFP, whereas the narrow aspect tied 
to relationship management of stakeholders may enhance the firm’s ability 
to develop sustainable sources of competitive advance and facilitate finan­
cial performance. Thus, the comprehensiveness of CSP becomes problem­
atic in assessing the relationship between it and CFP, as some aspects of 
CSP might aid financial performance whereas other aspects might hurt it. 
There is value in disaggregating the dimensions of CSP (Cox, in press) 
while remaining mindful that individual dimensions are not comprehensive, 
although CSP is necessarily so (Carroll, 2000). 
The Kinder, Lydenburg, Domini (KLD) Index is a commonly used, com­
prehensive index of CSP. We find that its dimensions, which capture spe­
cific industries such as alcohol, reflect firms’ historical path dependence 
(i.e., what they have inherited that might have huge exit costs) rather than their 
actively managed social performance and are therefore less meaningful— 
albeit legitimate—measures of CSP. Similar to others (Hillman & Keim, 
2001; Waddock & Graves, 1997b), we choose to focus on a few dimen­
sions of CSP, those that reflect relationships with stakeholder groups 
(Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Clarkson, 1995; Starik, 1995). Our 
CSP dimensions include environmental performance, workplace practices, 
and community relations. The environment is a primary stakeholder that 
encompasses seminal concerns with regard to the potential negative effects 
of business on society. Employees are the most primary of stakeholders, 
along with other market-driven stakeholders, making workplace practices 
an important CSP dimension. Whereas community is a secondary stake­
holder (Post, Frederick, Lawrence, & Weber, 1996), it provides the firm’s 
local legal/regulatory environment and is often significantly affected by the 
firm’s activities. 
We define SRI as investing based on CSP as well as CFP criteria. Social 
investing violates modern portfolio theory (MPT) developed by Markowitz 
(1959). According to MPT, investment return is largely a function of risk 
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(Miller, 1987), and maximizing the return of a portfolio for a given level of 
risk is achieved through diversification across asset classes whose returns are 
less than perfectly correlated, and preferably uncorrelated or negatively cor­
related (Engebretson, 1995). As stocks of similar expected return are pre­
dicted to substitute for one another, and given the choice of stock found in 
large universes of stocks such as the S&P 500 or FTSE All Share 300, there 
should be no relationship between the level of demand for a stock and the 
stock’s financial and firm-level characteristics (Eakins, Stansell, & Buck, 
1998). Accordingly, use of any criteria other than risk, such as CSP, would 
lead to a suboptimal portfolio and would yield lower investment return. 
However, empirical research contradicts the prescriptions of MPT, sug­
gesting that many investors use their personal or religious values in invest­
ment decisions (“Many Have ‘Faith,’” 2001; Schueth, 2003). SRI is offered 
as a viable investment strategy, given the lower portfolio turnover and lower 
transaction costs of SRI portfolios; the low correlation between SRI and the 
market compared with traditional investing and the market, leading to 
enhanced risk-return choices; and the lack of compelling evidence of a 
financial penalty or investment return cost of SRI (Hickman, Teets, & 
Kohls, 1999). SRI can be promoted as a component of investment strategy, 
including for financial fiduciaries concerning their clients’ investments, as 
long as sectors traditionally underweighted by social investors, such as 
energy, are reflected in the portfolio; careful thought is given to its finan­
cial implications; and a dynamic approach to investment is taken, as old 
social issues will fade and new ones emerge (Kurtz, 2005). There is a bur­
geoning industry in social investing, as it is increasingly becoming part of 
the mainstream (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004). In 2003, there were 200 U.S. 
SRI mutual funds totaling $2.16 trillion, representing 1 of every 9 dollars 
under professional management, and similar SRI products were available in 
21 countries (Social Investment Forum, 2003). 
Pension Plans as Institutional Investors 
The topic of corporate governance has recently expanded discussion 
of the mechanisms by which managers can be empowered and exercise 
necessary discretion while duly acting in the interests of their shareholders 
and other stakeholders. Owner concentration, one of several corporate con­
trol mechanisms (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), has increased in recent 
decades, largely achieved through the use of financial intermediaries such 
as pension and mutual funds (Sellon, 1994). Due to frequent inclusion of 
pension benefits for workers and the appeal of professional management of 
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mutual funds, individuals now tend to channel their investments through 
institutions (O’Barr & Conley, 1992; Sellon, 1994). In 2004, of the $17.2 
trillion in U.S. equities, $6.5 trillion or 37.8% was held by households, and 
the remaining $10.7 trillion or 62% was held by institutions and foreigners 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). 
The broad categories of institutional investors include pension plans, 
mutual funds, insurance companies, and banks. Pension plans are institu­
tional investors that have a legal obligation to provide income to plan par­
ticipants during their retirement (Kidwell, Peterson, & Blackwell, 1993). In 
general, pension plans have a long-term investment horizon compared with 
other institutional investors, with relatively low need for liquidity and pre­
dictable long-term outflows to beneficiaries (Brown, 1998). Given the 
progress of globalization, financial institutions including U.S. pension 
plans have increased their international investments, to reap the benefits of 
greater diversification (Feinberg, 2002, 2003). 
Those involved in pension plan management include the fund sponsor or 
employer who administers the fund, the fund manager or employee who 
oversees the fund, and the portfolio manager, often external to the firm, 
who oversees investments. Plans may be defined benefit, an annuity in 
which investment risk is borne by the sponsor; defined contribution, in 
which investment risk is shifted to the plan member; or hybrid, in which 
risk is shared (Bodie & Crane, 1999). In all cases, there is substantial pres­
sure to earn high investment return, which would be used to fund current 
and future payments to retired members and reduce the burden of current 
and future sponsor contributions to the plan. 
The Influences of National Environment on SRI and CSP 
Despite issues of ambiguous sovereignty and the blurring of national 
boundaries associated with globalization, country-level environment or 
context has great influence on industry (Hillman & Keim, 1995; Murtha & 
Lenway, 1994) and corporate governance (Denis & McConnell, 2003; 
Pedersen & Thomsen, 1999) within a nation. We propose that the country 
of pension plan origin and, given global investing, the country of pension 
plan investing will moderate pension plan SRI and corporate tendencies 
toward CSP, respectively. Legal and regulatory environments may encour­
age or discourage pension plans based in a country from engaging in 
SRI, and legal and regulatory environments will affect the perceived legiti­
macy of CSP among corporations. For example, some emerging economies 
might present few opportunities for SRI. Other countries might make little 
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differentiation between CSP and CFP, viewing both as necessary compo­
nents of performance, and yet others might favor CFP. Therefore, in our 
study, it is necessary to examine the United States and United Kingdom in 
terms of their environments for pension plan SRI, and the United Kingdom 
in terms of its environment for CSP. 
Hypotheses 
Pension Plan Types and SRI 
Prior work (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002; Johnson & 
Greening, 1999) on U.S. pension plan domestic investing indicates that the 
proportion of shares held by U.S. pension plans in U.S. firms is positively 
associated with CSP dimensions that they wish to promote in portfolio 
firms. However, as consolidating all pension plans might well mask rela­
tionships between the plans and the CSP of their portfolio firms, we will 
make use of four types of pension plans while also presenting consolidated 
results across types. 
Labor union pension plans. These are multiemployer systems that are 
administered by members’ labor unions. Whereas Brickley and Smith (1988) 
labeled labor union plans as pressure-indeterminate, meaning that they might 
or might not be susceptible to influence by a portfolio firm’s management 
because of a business relationship with the firm, Ryan and Schneider (2002) 
suggest that they are among the most pressure-resistant of institutional 
investors. Union plan activism is evidenced by increased posturing with port­
folio firms’ managements and use of stockholdings of members’ employers to 
influence their managements (Moberg, 1998), which is in compliance with 
pension plan regulation (Schelberg & Bitman, 1999). Labor union pension 
plans have sometimes coordinated their efforts, forming a cohesive block of 
activist investors (Moberg, 1998), although the efficacy of this activism is 
mixed (Marens, 2004). 
Union goals include expansion of membership, training improvements, and 
continuation of current pension benefits (Ghilarducci & Reich, 2001) and are 
often reflected in union pension plan investing (Swoboda, 1999). Recent 
equity research from Morgan Stanley blames unions’ ideology-before-profit 
principle for bloated corporate cost bases and poor profit. “Rigidity in labour 
costs, processes and pension requirements . . . may prove toxic”; “look for the 
union label . . .  and run the other way” (“Morgan Stanley,” 2002). Diltz (1995) 
finds that the market penalizes family-related benefits, such as parental leave 
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and dependent care assistance, more than any other type of CSP. In a study of 
63 U.S. socially responsible mutual funds, Barnett and Salomon (2002) find 
that funds screening on the basis of labor relations were negatively related to 
financial performance. Preece and Filbeck (1999) compare risk-adjusted 
returns for a portfolio of 29 firms with high family-oriented benefits to a 
matched sample of firms. Over the 10-year period 1987-1996, lower risk-
adjusted returns are observed on the high family-oriented benefit portfolio. 
In a later study, Filbeck and Preece (2003) employ an event study methodol­
ogy and report negative abnormal stock returns to family-oriented award 
announcements at the 1% level of significance. We put forth that union pen­
sion plans will focus their interests in CSP on its workplace practices dimen­
sion, aligning their investment in firms with favorable practices and 
encouraging the managements of existing portfolio firms to improve their 
practices. 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a positive relationship between union pension 
plan investment and their portfolio firms’ CSP in terms of its workplace 
practices dimension. 
Private pension plans. It is thought that private or corporate pension 
plans are pressure-indeterminate (Brickley & Smith, 1988), meaning that 
they might or might not be susceptible to influence by a portfolio firm’s 
management because of a business relationship with the firm. Private plans 
are less likely to press for corporate reforms than public union plans. For 
example, they have tended to not use their voting rights (Ryan & Schneider, 
2002; Useem, Bowman, Myatt, & Irvine, 1993). 
Given that they reflect private sector sensibility and might be subject 
to pressure sensitivity, reflecting the golden rule of nonintervention on 
account of interlocking directorships, a small labour market for executive 
search and selection, and retaliation (Monks & Minow, 2001), private sec­
tor plans will be uninterested in idiosyncratic investment holdings and bias 
toward most dimensions of CSP. Thus, many U.S. private pension plans 
have avoided SRI, due to their conservatism and desire to avoid controversy 
(Arrington, 1999). Yet, they will tend to have an instrumental interest in 
community relations, including corporate philanthropy and general stake­
holder relations. Harmonious outside associations may be instrumental to 
CFP, by increasing revenue and profit via broadcasting effects that adver­
tise the firm and providing it with valuable public relations (Fry, Keim, & 
Meiners, 1982). Per unit of cost, philanthropy may have a short-term pay­
off, for the performance of philanthropy arises in the act of giving and is 
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therefore relatively immediate (Carroll, 1979; Seifert, Morris, & Bartkus, 
2004). A relatively short-term return on investment is more likely to yield 
a positive net present value over a typical investor time horizon and so be 
interpreted positively within investment decisions. A perception of a short-
term positive internal rate of return may interest private pension plans that 
wish to invest ahead of improvements to revenue and profit brought about 
by a strong external profile. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a positive relationship between private pension 
plan investment and their portfolio firms’ CSP in terms of its community 
relations dimension. 
Foundation (university, church, charity) pension plans. This category is the 
most diverse, ranging from the behemoth TIAA-CREF through the small to 
mid-sized plans of religious and nonprofit organizations. One motivation for 
pulling these organizations together is that their sponsors are typically, at least 
in part, endowed. It is usual for endowments to have stipulations that they must 
be held permanently rather than spent as if they were income (Charity 
Commission, 2003; Endowment Funds, 2003), so that sponsors of endowed 
organizations are familiar with managing financial resources as perpetuities, 
and this should impart a common perspective of long-termism and protection. 
A second motivation is that their investment perspective may be different from 
other plan types, for their plan sponsors do not strictly operate only for profit, 
and have a degree of “publicness,” although they are not in the government sec­
tor. Some aspects of their interest in CSR are aimed at corporate governance 
and social issues, which are outside of the dimensions of CSR in our study. 
TIAA-CREF has been a leader in seeking corporate governance reforms 
(Carleton, Nelson, & Weisbach, 1998; “TIAA-CREF on Corporate Gover­
nance,” 2004), and church plans, often acting though the Interfaith Center on 
Corporate Responsibility (Frel, 2005), have pressured their portfolio firms with 
regard to human rights and social justice issues (Izrael, 2002; Proffitt & Spicer, 
2006). 
Plans such as TIAA-CREF have significant business savvy, whereas 
church plans are more idealistic, reflecting the instrumental and normative 
aspects of stakeholder theory, respectively (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Yet, 
we put forth that foundation plans will share an interest in CSP’s environ­
mental dimension because the culture of endowed institutions is one of 
“guardians of the future against claims of the present,” which seems to focus 
on safe-keeping and a long horizon as a policy objective (Weelden, 2006). 
Compliance with ISO 14000 and other environmental standards creates a safer 
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firm and, based on the firm’s complementary assets, reduces costs 
(Christmann, 2000) and creates a corporate image of quality in processes and 
products (Vastag, Corbett, & Kirsch, 2004). This should lead firms to experi­
ence fewer negative environmental events, less negative visibility, fewer con­
sumer boycotts, and less pollution monitoring by regulators—results that will 
sit well with pension plans that view stakeholders from an instrumental per­
spective. And, environmental responsibility is aligned with the general reli­
gious philosophy toward a less materialist, more spiritual existence. Church 
plan shareholder resolutions include ones concerning global warming, emis­
sion reduction, and sustainability (The Pension Boards, 2005). Furthermore, 
the Church of England’s Ethical Investment Advisory Group sets ethical 
investment policies for the investment funds of Church organizations in keep­
ing with its Christian values. These policies seek to invest in companies that 
will successfully develop their business financially in the interests of their 
shareholders but that are conscientious with regard to environmental perfor­
mance and act with sensitivity (CCLA, 2008). For charities, environmental 
sensitivity is also paramount, as being seen to invest in particular sectors or 
companies could damage the reputation of a charity and the public’s percep­
tion of its work. This could be a particular concern for fundraising charities. 
For example, more than 40% of respondents to a 2001 National Opinion Poll 
Survey for Charities Aid Foundation preferred to support charities that invest 
ethically (Charity SRI, n.d.). 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a positive relationship between foundation pen­
sion plan investment and their portfolio firms’ CSP in terms of its envi­
ronmental performance dimension. 
State pension plans. This category, which encompasses state, or local 
authority, pension plans, includes the retirement plans of civil service 
employees. They have a greater rate of employee coverage and a greater 
rate of defined benefit (i.e., guaranteed annuity) coverage than pension 
plans in the private sector (Schneider, 2005). The traditional view is that state 
pension plans are the most activist type of institutional investor (Wahil, 1996), 
pressing the managements of their portfolio firms for improvements in finan­
cial performance, social performance, and corporate governance reform 
(Useem et al., 1993). Some propose that state pension plans are willing to 
sacrifice some investment return to support their activist agendas (Monks & 
Minow, 2001; Romano, 1993). However, theory of fund value maximiza­
tion explains a large proportion of public plan investment return (Schneider 
& Damanpour, 2002). Recent empirical work finds that state plans do earn 
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competitive returns (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999) and invest according 
to MPT (Cox, in press). We therefore expect no positive relationship 
between state pension plans and any aspect of CSP. 
Hypothesis 4: There will not be a positive relationship between state pension 
plan investment and their portfolio firms’ CSP in terms of its environ­
mental performance, workplace practices, and community relations 
dimensions. 
U.S. and U.K. Environments 
Despite rampant investment opportunities brought about with globalization, 
there has been empirical support for a home bias among investors, including 
U.S. institutional investors, meaning they evidence a tendency to overinvest in 
equities from their domestic market and are suboptimal in achieving sufficient 
ex post international diversification (Cooper & Kaplanis, 1994; Lewis, 1999). 
However, much of the home bias phenomenon can be explained by differences 
in corporate governance, as U.S. institutional investors prefer good governance 
practices (Gillian & Starks, 2003). Recent studies indicate that U.S. investors 
tend to invest less in countries and in firms with concentrated insider ownership 
(Kho, Stulz, & Warnock, 2006), weak accounting standards (Ammer, Holland, 
Smith, & Warnock, 2005), and weak shareholder rights and legal frameworks 
(Aggarwal, Klapper, & Wysocki, 2005). 
We propose that there will be no home bias among U.S. pension plans 
with regard to their SRI in the United Kingdom. First, the United States and 
United Kingdom have similar legal and regulatory environments for corpora­
tions and financial institutions, rooted in the common law tradition. U.S. and 
U.K. governance systems rely on strong legal protection for investors 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and reflect that they are highly developed systems 
of wealthy countries who were early industrializers (Pedersen & Thomsen, 
1999). Their Anglo model of governance (Norburn, Boyd, Fox, & Muth, 
2000) includes a large number of widely held publicly traded firms available 
for investment (Denis & McConnell, 2003). All of the mentioned factors 
should serve to reduce any tendency toward investment home bias. 
Second, there is recent regulatory and legal movement in both countries 
that promotes (or ceases resistance to) SRI among pension plan managers. 
In the United States, social investing is not inconsistent with fiduciaries’ 
responsibilities per ERISA pension regulation, as clarified by the Pension 
and Welfare Benefits Administration (Arrington, 1999). However, the fidu­
ciary must determine that the investment will yield a return equal to others 
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of similar risk and take into account the often higher costs of social invest­
ment funds due to their active management (Peterson, 2001). In the United 
Kingdom, there are pressures to consider SRI in investing decisions, with 
legal requirements to identify the role of social, environmental, and ethical 
considerations in investment planning (Office of Public Sector Information, 
1999) and for industry trade bodies to set social agendas (e.g., Local 
Authority Pension Fund Forum, 2002; National Association of Pension 
Funds, 2005). There is also significant public interest in social investment 
in the United Kingdom. 
We therefore put forward that U.S. pension plans will be global in out­
look with regard to SRI, seeking CSP as has previously been hypothesized, 
within the context of generally following a neutral market index such as the 
S&P 500 or FTSE All Share. Given the same market benchmark and simi­
lar preferences for CSP, there is no reason to expect a difference in the U.K. 
holdings of U.S. pension plans and the U.K. holdings of U.K. pension plans 
with regard to their portfolio firms’ CSP dimensions. U.S. union plans will 
extend their concerns for workplace practices to the United Kingdom, as it 
is similarly an industrialized country whose union membership is endan­
gered with globalization. U.S. private pension plans, given their business 
sensibility and understanding that good community relations are often good 
for CFP, will extend their interest in the community dimension of CSP to 
their U.K. equity holdings. U.S. foundation pension plans will pursue their 
interest in environmental performance to their U.K. investments, realizing 
that the effects of environmental issues extend beyond national borders. 
Last, U.S. state pension plans will invest only according to CFP in the 
larger, nondomestic arena. 
Hypothesis 5: There will be no difference in SRI per pension plan type 
among U.S. and U.K. plans in their U.K. investments. 
Method 
Data 
The data set used in this study details pension plan ownership of U.K. 
listed firms in 2002. This time period is chosen for two reasons. First, it fol­
lows an episode of significant stock market decline and volatility and thus 
may coincide with listed firms’ placing greater value on long-term out­
comes such as CSP. Second, disaggregated institutional ownership data are 
not available prior to this date. Our sample of firms is the largest 300 firms 
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of the FTSE All Share index. These market-value-weighted index con­
stituents represent 97% of the U.K. market. We restrict our sample to the 
top 300 firms for two reasons. First, less analyst coverage about smaller 
stocks makes it difficult to stay informed outside of one’s domestic market 
and so it is informationally efficient to focus on larger stocks (O’Brien & 
Bhushan, 1990). Second, higher costs of investing internationally provide 
incentives to focus on large, liquid stocks in which trading costs are lower. 
Ownership data for the sample firms were drawn in June 2002 from a cor­
porate ownership database maintained by one of the United Kingdom’s largest 
company registrars. It is usual for large U.K. companies to delegate share reg­
istry and investor account management to a third party registrar. The registrar 
contacted for this study continuously updates shareholder account information 
for 2,000 U.K. firms via daily changes in ownership as recorded by equity 
transaction information on the London Stock Exchange. The data are com­
mercially available and used extensively by investor relations departments to 
understand investor demographics and by investment professionals to monitor 
ownership changes and to source stock for trading. For every holder of stock, 
the database records the following information: name of the pension plan (e.g., 
State of Wisconsin), country of domicile (e.g., United States), name of the 
fund manager (e.g., Fidelity), name of the security (e.g., British Airways), and 
the number of shares held. A relational database was used to query the pen­
sion plan share holding information. We identified all pension plan holdings in 
the sample companies and coded each state plan, foundation plan, and so on. 
Next, we sorted pension plan holdings by the country of domicile to extract 
U.K. holdings of shares by U.S. pension plans. The same process then 
extracted U.K. holdings of shares by U.K. pension plans. 
Market data were obtained from the London Stock Exchange and 
BARRA, an investment software and research company. Financial data 
were obtained from Datastream, and contextual data from Factiva, a Dow 
Jones and Reuters product, and the Ethical Investment Research Service 
(EIRIS). Independent variable data are mostly collected as time series 
extending back to 2001 and then averaged. Drawing on this detail is rele­
vant because the profile of pension plan held stock drawn in June 2002 is a 
reflection of pension fund managers’ investment decisions made prior to 
this date. Missing data reduced the initial firm sample of 300 firms to 271. 
Dependent Variables 
To calculate the dependent variables, the pooled number of shares held 
by each category of pension plan to the total number of shares outstanding 
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Table 1 
Calculation Method of Pension Plan Ownership in a Firm 
X 
Shares owned by pension plan x in firm i at time t 
X = 1Mean percentage holding i = 
Shares outstanding in firm i at time t 
Mean percentage holding is the proportion of firm i owned by a category of pension plan 
(e.g., state), where X is the total number of pension plans in the specified category, and 
firm i is a FTSE 300 security. 
Shares outstanding are adjusted for free float. Adjusting firms’ share capital for free float 
overcomes situations where an investor owns a proportion of a line of stock that is 
unlikely to be for sale and so ensures an accurate representation of the proportion of a 
firm’s stock that is available for portfolio investors. 
per sample firm is computed. This calculation is presented in Table 1. This 
yielded consolidated U.S. and U.K. pension plan measures and measures 
for each of the four pension plan types. 
Independent Variables 
As stated, information developed by KLD is often used to operational­
ize CSP (e.g., Graves & Waddock, 1994; Johnson & Greening, 1999; 
Turban & Greening, 1997). We draw on the equivalent information about 
U.K. firms from the EIRIS, the United Kingdom’s oldest independent 
research company specializing in the assessment of CSP for investors and 
having the largest and most complete multidimensional social performance 
coverage. The three dimensions of CSP included in the study are as follows: 
Workplace. Data for health and safety make up a text-grade rating encom­
passing health and safety systems, convictions, and fines paid for violations, 
for each sample firm. Data for equal opportunities make up a text-grade rating 
encompassing policies, systems, and performance. Training and development 
is a single aspect. Using the approach of Graves and Waddock (1994), each 
text-grade rating is translated into a number-grade rating starting at 1 and 
increasing with greater performance. To arrive at a single factor for health and 
safety, equal opportunities, and training and development, we normalized the 
score on each of the dimensions so as to give them equal weight. This gener­
ates a possible range of scores from 3 to 12. 
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Community. Data for community relations are a single factor encom­
passing philanthropy, in cash and in kind, and relationships with public and 
external stakeholders. Each text-grade rating is translated into a number-
grade rating that increases with greater performance. 
Environment. Data on the environment encompass relevant policies, sys­
tems, reporting, and performance for each sample firm. As with the previ­
ous two variables, each text-grade rating is translated into a number-grade 
rating that increases with greater performance. 
Control Variables 
The following conventional market and financial investment proxies are 
used: 
Firm size. We control for firm size because empirical work finds institu­
tional security holdings concentrated around large companies (Rosenberg, 
1974). Firm size is computed by the dollar value of company assets. 
Free float. Free float is the proportion of shares tradable within the market 
place for a given stock. Pension plans should prefer a higher free float because 
it supports trading in larger blocks. Free float varies from 0 to 1, where 1 is 
complete stock availability and 0 is no stock availability. 
Trading volume. Pension plans that trade frequently and in large vol­
umes will prefer a company whose stock has high trading volume because 
trades can be executed quickly and at low cost (Anderson & Dyl, 2005). 
Less trading-intensive pension plans with longer investment time horizons 
should be less sensitive to trading volume. Trading volume is measured as 
shares traded per month divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
Growth/value. To profit from mispricing, asset managers take systematic 
investment positions relative to the current valuation of a security. Pension 
plan managers may tend toward “growth” stocks that are then held for long 
periods. Alternatively, managers may seek out value stocks because they 
are undervalued, overlooked, and “cheap” and so represent an opportunity 
for quick profit once the market reappraises their worth (Lofthouse, 2001). 
As growth and value are highly negatively correlated, only the BARRA 
growth variable is used. 
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Stock price volatility and stock beta (expected return). According to finance 
theory, institutions are expected to be averse to risk (stock price volatility), 
although heterogeneously so. As expected return (beta) is a function of risk 
preference, and because a linear relationship between risk and expected return 
is theorized, an institution may select a stock with a high or a low beta based 
on the institution’s preferred level of risk. Empirical work indicates that insti­
tutions are mostly found to have greater ownership in firms with a higher beta, 
and therefore a preference for high beta is expected (Badrinath, Gay, & Kale, 
1989; Eakins et al., 1998; O’Brien & Bhushan, 1990). Stock price volatility is 
the variance of stock price returns over the previous 60 months. Stock beta is 
the slope of 60-month stock returns regressed on the market after reflecting 
changes to the company’s financial structure and business operations. 
Measures are provided by BARRA. 
News stories. Investors may prefer a security about which there is more 
news arrival, for it reduces the potential for informational surprise and secu­
rity revaluation (Bushee & Noe, 2000; O’Brien & Bhushan, 1990). Data are 
drawn from Factiva, a product covering nearly 8,000 news sources includ­
ing Dow Jones and The Wall Street Journal. To compute this variable, the 
total number of news stories is collected for each sample firm for the years 
2000 through 2002. A 2-year geometric rate of growth of news stories is 
then calculated. 
Industry. We define a set of industry dummy variables, as ownership of 
firms across different industries may be influenced by the relationships 
industries have with risk and expected return. Industry sectoral dummies 
were created using the FTSE Global Industry Classification System, which 
groups listed stocks into 10 economic groups. 
Estimation Technique and Statistical Method 
The estimation model used is as follows: 
PHi = α + βXi, + ei, 
where PHi is the proportion of security i held by a class of pension plan and 
Xi is the vector of variables that explains share ownership. One problem 
exists—corporate ownership is a censored variable in the sense that it can­
not take a negative value. When data are censored, instead of observing y*, 
we actually observe y, of the form 
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y = 0 if y* ≤ 0 
y = y* if y* ≥ 0 
OLS estimations of the influences on the extent of pension plan share 
ownership in companies would introduce sample selectivity biases and, 
therefore, the use of a truncated regression technique is necessitated to 
avoid the biased and inconsistent parameter estimates that can be associated 
with OLS estimation. A variety of approaches exist that overcome such sta­
tistical difficulties (see Greene, 1993). A commonly adopted solution is to 
estimate a Tobit model: 
yi* = βXi + εi 
where an observed dependent variable, yi (which is equal to yi*), is gener­
ated if βXi + εi > 0 and is otherwise equal to zero. An OLS model, not 
reported, using heteroskedasticity-consistent (White) standard errors with 
intercept included, is also estimated and has similar results. 
Results 
Consolidated Results 
Table 2 reports that 352 U.S. pension plans and 1,334 U.K. pension 
plans hold shares in the sample firms.1 The share holdings of U.S. pension 
plans in U.K. companies range from 0.0% to 9.1% with a standard devia­
tion of 1.5%, whereas the share holdings of U.K. pension plans range from 
0.0% to 37.8% with a standard deviation of 6.1%. Thus, compared with 
U.K. pension plans, there are approximately one quarter as many U.S. pen­
sion plans having about one quarter of the range of percentage share hold­
ings and one quarter of the standard deviation of percentage share holdings 
as U.K. pension plans. This suggests very similar plan investment sizes in 
U.K. companies, of benefit in directly comparing U.S. and U.K. plans. 
Table 3 presents correlation coefficients for the control and independent 
variables. The magnitudes of the correlation coefficients suggest some very 
limited evidence of multicollinearity, but at these levels, it is unlikely to 
present significant statistical difficulties (Greene, 1993). We estimate vari­
ance inflation factors and in no instance do these exceed 3. 
Table 4 shows how U.S. pension plans investing solely on the basis of 
MPT would be expected to decide their portfolio allocation among public 
listed firms. 
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Table 2
 
Descriptive Statistics on U.K. Financial Times Stock Exchange
 
(FTSE) 300 Holdings of Shares by Type of Pension Fund
 
# of U.S. # of U.K. 
Type of Pension Plan Pension Plans Pension Plans 
Labor union 9e 36f 
Corporate 212a 1105b 
Foundation (university, charity, church) 20c 54d 
Labor union 9e 36f 
State 111g 139h 
Total number of plans 352 1334 
Range of consolidated share holding 0.0%–9.1% 0.0%–37.8% 
Standard deviation of consolidated share holding 1.5% 6.1% 
a. For example, Minnesota Mining PF, Mobil PF, Monsanto PF, New York Times PT, Nortel 
Networks PF, Northern Telecom PF, Northern Trust Co. PT, Northwest Airlines. 
b. For example, Bristol & West Staff PF, Bristol Myers Squibb PF, Bristow Group Staff PF, 
Britannia Airways SF, Britannic Assurance Staff PF, British Airways PF, British American 
Tobacco U.K. PF, British Aviation Insurance Group PF. 
c. For example, Brown University Endowment Pool, College REF/Teachers Ins. Ann. 
Association, President & Fellows Harvard College, Stanford University, State Universities 
Ret. System, University of Michigan, University of Texas RF, University of Washington RS. 
d. For example, Trinity College Oxford RBS, Universities SS, University of Bristol, University 
of Birmingham General Pool, University of Edinburgh No. 1 Trust, University of Glasgow 
Bursers, University of Liverpool Main Fund, University of London SF. 
e. For example, Western Pennsylvania Teamster PF, Laborers Dis. Council & Contractors PP, 
Labour Union Co-operative RF, Carpenters PF, Ohio Carpenters PP, Massachusetts State 
Carpenters RF, Northern States Power PF, YMCA RF. 
f. For example, Electrical Contractors Association, Engineering Emp. Fed. Staff PF, Institute 
of Electrical Engineers PF, Iron & Steel Trades Confed. SF, Milk PF, Pilots National PF, 
Plumbing & Mechanical PF, Press Association 1992 PF. 
g. For example, Alabama Teachers RS, Arizona State RS, Arkansas Teachers RS, Austin Police 
RF, California Public Employees RS, California State Teachers RF, City of Austin Police RS, 
City of Baltimore RS. 
h. For example, Shropshire CC PF, Somerset CC Pension Fund, South Yorks PF, Staffordshire 
CC PF, Strathclyde PF, Suffolk CC SF, Surrey CC PF, Tyne & Wear County Council SF. 
Moving from the left to the right of Table 4, the leftmost column lists the 
Global Industry Classifications or sectors used by S&P and FTSE in 2002. 
The second and third columns list the index weight of each industry in the 
U.S. and U.K. markets, respectively. In terms of pension plan investments 
in the United Kingdom, the U.K. FTSE 300 industry allocation is the most 
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Table 4
 
Industry Allocation for the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 Versus
 
Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 300, Mid-2002
 
U.S. S&P U.K. FTSE 300 U.S. S&P Weight Minus 
Sector 500 Weight (%) Weight (%) U.K. FTSE Weight (%) 
Resourcesa 8.1 16.8 –9 
Basic industriesb 3.0 2.8 0 
General industriesc 7.8 2.3 6 
Cyclical consumer goodsd 2.3 0.3 2 
Noncyclical consumer goodse 22.3 20.3 2 
Cyclical servicesf 14.3 14.0 0 
Noncyclical servicesg 5.4 12.3 –7 
Utilitiesh 3.1 3.3 0 
Financialsi 19.8 26.5 –7 
Information technologyj 13.9 1.3 13 
Total 100 100 0 
a. Mining, oil, gas. 
b. Chemicals, construction and building materials, forestry & paper, steel & other metals. 
c. Capital goods: aerospace & defense, diversified industrials, electronic & electrical, engineering 
& machinery. 
d. Consumer discretionary (production): automobile & parts, household goods & textiles. 
e. Consumer staple (production): beverages, food, tobacco, personal & health care, household, 
pharmaceuticals. 
f. Consumer discretionary (consumption): general retailers, leisure & hotels, media & enter­
tainment, transport. 
g. Consumer staple (consumption): food & drug retailers, telecommunication services. 
h. Electricity, gas, water. 
i. Banks, insurance, investment companies. 
j. Information technology hardware, software & computer services. 
obvious default position from the standpoint of MPT, because it represents 
the market portfolio. U.S. and U.K. pension plan portfolio investments in 
the United Kingdom can therefore both be expected to hold the FTSE 300 
market in terms of industry composition; that is, there is no reason to expect 
any systematic industry difference observable between U.S. and U.K. plans 
per type at the industry level. The final column shows that for U.S. pension 
plans, the U.K. market is a relatively rich source of oil and gas, as well as 
mining companies (Resources sector), supermarkets and telecommunica­
tions (Noncyclical Services), and financial companies (Financials), com­
pared with their home market. 
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Table 5
 
Portfolio Allocation of U.S. Pension Plans Versus U.K. Pension Plans
 
in Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 300 U.K. Companies,
 
Mid-2002
 
All U.S. 
vs. All State Union Corporate Foundation 
Sector U.K. Plans (%) Plans (%) Plans (%) Plans (%) Plans (%) 
Resources 1 1 13 1 –1 
Basic industries –2 –3 –5 –1 –4 
General industrials 0 2 14 0 –5 
Cyclical consumer goods 0 0 –2 0 0 
Noncyclical consumer 3 5 1 2 1 
goods 
Cyclical services 1 0 –15 0 10 
Noncyclical services 1 0 1 0 1 
Utilities 1 1 1 0 1 
Financial companies –4 –4 –2 –3 –3 
Information technology –1 –3 –6 0 –1 
Net over/underweight 0 0 0 0 0 
The actual portfolio weights for U.S. pension plans relative to U.K. pen­
sion plans concerning their investments in the United Kingdom are pre­
sented in Table 5. 
Column 1 indicates that U.S. pension plans tend to be “overweight” rela­
tive to U.K. pension plans in some of the same sectors (i.e., Resources and 
Noncyclical Services) in which the United Kingdom is a relatively rich source 
of specific industry exposure. As these industries are less available at home, 
we offer that U.S. pension plans may indulge in these sectors when investing 
overseas to obtain more optimal diversification and risk-return combination. 
This evidence suggests that U.S. pension plans are using the United Kingdom 
for purposes primarily associated with portfolio return and to augment supe­
rior risk-return combinations. This seems to occur, at least in part, by gaining 
exposure to oil and gas, mining, supermarkets, and telecommunications, for 
the United Kingdom offers a wide choice of stocks in these areas. Additional 
analysis (results not shown) further indicates that U.S. pension plans are over­
weight in some industries within the Noncyclical Consumer Goods sector, 
including tobacco, breweries, and pharmaceuticals. The industry results sug­
gest that we will not find CSP to be a major criterion in overseas investment 
strategy. Indeed, some of the industries sought by U.S. pension plans in their 
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U.K. investments are renowned for their paucity of CSP. This finding appears 
in contrast to the CSP preferences the same pension plans are found to express 
when investing in their “home” (i.e., U.S.) market (Johnson & Greening, 
1999). 
Tables 6 and 7, which follow the same layout, document Tobit estimates 
for the independent and control variables regressed on the relative holdings 
of shares by U.S. and U.K. pension plans, respectively. Industry variables 
are excluded for reasons of space. On average, the model explains approx­
imately one half of the variation in corporate ownership by U.S. pension 
plans and approximately one fifth of the variation in corporate ownership 
by U.K. pension plans. This compares favorably with existing studies both 
in finance and in management (Coffey & Fryxell, 1991; Del Guercio, 1996; 
Graves & Waddock, 1994). We have organized the independent and control 
variables in Tables 6 and 7 according to market characteristics relevant to 
MPT and financial performance—trading volume, growth/value, stock 
price volatility, stock beta, size, and free float—and CSP characteristics— 
workplace, environment, and community. 
U.S. pension plan consolidated findings. We will first review findings 
with regard to the control and then the independent variables. Moving down 
the column of Table 6 associated with All U.S. Plans, U.S. pension plans 
own more of companies whose stock is associated with lower transaction 
costs (trading volume p < .01) and is undervalued, overlooked, and thus due 
for upward market reappraisal (growth/value p < .05). These preferences 
point to a desire for liquidity and short investment planning horizon, despite 
that pension plans have been thought to have the opposite tendencies based 
on their largely predictable financial outflows to plan beneficiaries (Brown, 
1998). The negative coefficient on stock price volatility (p < .01) and posi­
tive coefficient on stock beta (expected return) (p < .01) follow theoretical 
and empirical work on MPT (Del Guercio, 1996; Gompers & Metrick, 
2001). Greater amounts are invested in U.K. firms of large size (p < .05) 
and in companies characterized by less than full free float (p < .01), possi­
bly because these are less institutionally held, and more exploitable return 
opportunities may be available when fewer other professional investors are 
present (Bushee & Noe, 2000). 
With regard to the independent variables, only community is significant, 
and it is positive (p < .05). Thus, U.S. pension plans, in aggregate, have sig­
nificant investment in firms with good community relations, but environment 
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Table 6
 
Characteristics of U.K. Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 300
 
Securities Regressed on Holdings of Shares by U.S. Pension Plans
 
All U.S. Union Corporate Foundation State 
Plansa Plans Plans Plans Plans 
Model fit 
Overall R2 0.49*** 0.12** 0.37*** 0.32*** 0.41*** 
Adjusted R2 0.45*** 0.05** 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.37*** 
N 271 271 271 271 271 
Independent variables 
Intercept 0.055 –0.007 0.030 –0.003 0.026 
(0.174)*** (0.008) (0.010)*** (0.005) (0.010)*** 
Trading volume 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.0003)*** (0.001)*** 
Growth/value –0.002 0.0001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 
(0.001)** (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003)** (0.0006) 
Stock price volatility –0.132 0.003 –0.052 –0.029 –0.072 
(0.024)*** (0.008) (0.015)*** (0.007)*** (0.014)*** 
Stock beta (expected 0.037 –0.002 0.015 0.009 0.020 
return) 
(0.008)*** (0.003) (0.005)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)*** 
Size 0.001 0.0003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.001)* (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002)*** (0.0005) 
Free float –0.021 0.003 –0.013 –0.0003 –0.010 
(0.008)*** (0.005) (0.005)*** (0.002) (0.004)** 
News stories 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) 
Environment 0.0001 0.00003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) 
Workplace –0.001 0.001 –0.001 –0.0005 0.0003 
(0.001) (0.0004)*** (0.001)* (0.0003) (0.001) 
Community	 0.002 –0.0004 0.002 0.0004 0.0004 
(0.001)** (0.0004) (0.001)*** (0.0003) (0.001) 
Note: Tobit estimates. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
a. Consolidation of union, corporate, foundation, and state plans.
 
*Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.
 
and workplace are insignificant. These results are in contrast to prior work by 
Johnson and Greening (1999), who demonstrated that U.S. pension plan 
domestic investment tilts toward firms with better environmental, as well as 
community, records. 
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Table 7
 
Characteristics of U.K. Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 300
 
Securities Regressed on Holdings of Shares by U.K. Pension Plans
 
All U.K. Union Corporate Foundation State 
Plansa Plans Plans Plans Plans 
Model fit 
Overall R2 0.21*** 0.09 0.17*** 0.12** 0.20*** 
Adjusted R2 0.15*** 0.02 0.11*** 0.06** 0.14*** 
N 271 271 271 271 271 
Independent variables 
Intercept 0.387 –0.003 0.267 0.011 0.030 
(0.086)*** (0.002) (0.069)*** (0.008) (0.015)** 
Trading volume –0.012 –0.0003 –0.011 –0.001 0.0002 
(0.006)** (0.0002)* (0.005)** (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth/value –0.010 –0.0001 –0.008 0.001 –0.003 
(0.005)** (0.0001) (0.004)** (0.0005)** (0.001)*** 
Stock price volatility –0.544 –0.004 –0.395 –0.020 –0.072 
(0.120)*** (0.003) (0.095)*** (0.011)* (0.021)*** 
Stock beta (expected 0.158 0.001 0.114 0.005 0.022 
return) (0.039)*** (0.001) (0.031)*** (0.004) (0.007)*** 
Size –0.017 0.00001 –0.011 –0.001 –0.001 
(0.004)*** (0.0001) (0.003)*** (0.0004)** (0.001)* 
Free float 0.059 0.003 0.041 0.008 0.012 
(0.038) (0.001)*** (0.030) (0.004)** (0.007)* 
News stories 0.001 0.0001 –0.0002 0.0004 0.001 
(0.007) (0.0002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
Environment 0.012 0.0001 0.009 0.001 0.002 
(0.006)** (0.0001) (0.004)** (0.0005)** (0.001)* 
Workplace 0.0002 0.0003 0.001 –0.0003 0.001 
(0.006) (0.0002)** (0.005) (0.0005) (0.001) 
Community	 –0.009 –0.0002 –0.006 –0.001 –0.002 
(0.005)* (0.0001)* (0.004) (0.0005) (0.001)*** 
Note: Tobit estimates. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
a. Consolidation of union, corporate, foundation, and state plans.
 
*Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.
 
U.S. pension plan unconsolidated findings. With regard to the control 
variables, moving from left to right in Table 6, trade volume is significant 
(p < .01) for all four types of plans, indicating that more is invested in firms 
whose shares can be bought and sold quickly and in large amounts. U.S. 
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plan managers may not understand foreign firms as well as they do domes­
tic firms and so hold foreign stocks that can be rapidly bought and sold 
should their risk be materially different from what was anticipated. It is evi­
dent that corporate, foundation, and state plans invest according to MPT, 
with the coefficients for stock price volatility being negative (p < .01) and 
stock beta (expected return) being positive (p < .01). It is also notable that 
the investment strategy of these U.S. plan types with regard to their U.K. 
investments reflects similar preferences for the fundamental indicators of 
financial performance, despite very different predicted socio-political 
motives about the plan types (Ryan & Schneider, 2002). The coefficients 
relating to U.S. union plans are economically different, indicating an idio­
syncratic investment strategy that does not conform to the other plan types 
or predictions of investors as rational economic actors in efficient markets 
drawn from MPT. 
Turning to the independent variables, there is support for Hypothesis 1, 
as U.S. union plan portfolio firms tend toward high levels of workplace 
practices. There is also support for Hypothesis 2, as private plan portfolios 
tend toward high levels of community relations. However, the finding for 
private plans must be tempered by their negative relationship with work­
place practices, as private plans promote the community dimension of CSP 
at the expense of its workplace dimension. We note that although U.K. 
firms with better workplace practices attract U.S. union plan investment 
(p < .01), U.K. firms with better workplace practices deter U.S. private plan 
investment (p < .10). There is no support for Hypothesis 3, as foundation 
plan portfolios evidence no tendency toward any of the three dimensions of 
CSP including the hypothesized positive relationship with environment. 
There is support for Hypothesis 4, as U.S. state plans evidence no tendency 
toward investing in U.K. firms with high ratings in any of the three CSP 
dimensions. This adds to the growing body of evidence that public sector 
pension plans rigorously apply modern investment techniques. 
In summary, we found that no U.S. plan type invests significantly more in 
U.K. firms with better environmental records and that the pension plan port­
folio relationship with workplace practices varies according to pension plan 
type, being positive for union plans and negative for private plans. Private 
plans are unique in their preference for firms with better community relations. 
U.K. pension plan consolidated findings. Moving down the column of 
Table 7 associated with corporate ownership by All U.K. pension plans, 
trading volume is negative (p < .05), in contrast to the U.S. pension plan 
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regression. Because U.K. pension plans own more of companies whose 
stock costs more to trade, this provides important clues that these securi­
ties are intended to be infrequently traded and that U.K. pension plans 
may use activism with their portfolio firms to extract firm performance. 
A preference for smaller firms (size p < .01) with higher free float (p < 
.10) also points to activism, because in smaller firms with no block 
holders, a pension plan’s investment will be more significant and influen­
tial. The coefficients on stock price volatility (p < .01) and stock beta 
(expected return) (p < .01) follow the expectations placed on investment 
fiduciaries to follow MPT. 
Turning to the independent variables, the coefficient on environment is sig­
nificant and positive (p < .05). This is analogous to the finding of Johnson and 
Greening (1999) that U.S. pension plans prefer domestic firms with better envi­
ronmental records, suggesting that pension plans in different countries with 
similar legal and other institutions have similar investment behavior with regard 
to domestic investment. However, the coefficient for workplace is not signifi­
cant, and for community it is significant and negative (p < .10). It may be that 
firms with better community relations are also the larger firms that U.K. pen­
sion plans seek to avoid, because their activism will be less influential (Fry 
et al., 1982). 
U.K. pension plan unconsolidated findings. Turning to union, corporate, 
foundation, and state plans, whereas all types of U.S. pension plans invest 
more in the shares of U.K. firms that trade in higher volumes, the opposite 
is generally true of U.K. pension plans, alluding to longer investment time 
horizon preferences and, thus, incentives for activism. The coefficients on 
stock price volatility are negative and significant for all but union pension 
plans, confirming expectations of risk aversion drawn from portfolio 
theory. The relationship between each type of pension plan and stock beta, 
or expected return, is positive; however, only for corporate and state plans 
is the coefficient significant (p < .01 and p < .01, respectively). The coeffi­
cients on size suggest that smaller firms are preferred by all but union plans. 
One motivation for smaller firm size may be that a larger investment posi­
tion can be built that, in turn, facilitates outcomes associated with activism. 
Foundation plans are unique in their preference for growth stocks (p < .05), 
being the only pension plan type evidencing an orientation toward tomor­
row’s companies. Examples of growth industries include alternative fuels, 
low carbon technologies, research and development, and biotechnology. 
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Turning to the independent variables, the coefficient on environment 
is significant and positive for three types of plan: state, foundation, and 
private. Union pension plans are the only plan type that does not tilt 
toward firms with better environmental records; they instead invest greater 
amounts in firms with better workplace practices, in support of Hypothesis 
1 (p < .05). Although private plans are interested in environment, they are 
not interested in community relations, and thus there is no support for 
Hypothesis 2. U.K. private plans are interested in CSP, albeit not in the 
hypothesized dimension. 
U.K. foundations plans were found to have a positive relationship with 
environment, in support of Hypothesis 3. Whereas U.K. state plans have no 
relationship with workplace practices and a negative relationship with com­
munity relations, tentatively supporting Hypothesis 4 calling for no positive 
relationship between state plans and any dimension of CSP, state plans do 
have a positive relationship with environment; therefore, the results indicate 
no support of Hypothesis 4. Similar to the finding for U.S. private plans 
above, U.K. state plans favor one aspect of CSP at the expense of another, 
and we had hypothesized that state plans would not favor any dimension. 
Test of hypothesis concerning country context. To determine whether there 
is support for Hypothesis 5—that the U.S. and U.K. environments are suffi­
ciently similar so that no differences in SRI per plan type will be found—we 
will contrast U.S. and U.K. pension plan results for the four pension plan 
types. Hypothesis 1, concerning a positive relationship between union plans 
and workplace practices, was supported for both U.S. and U.K. plans. 
Hypothesis 2, calling for a positive relationship between private plans and 
community relations, was supported for U.S. plans but not for U.K. plans. 
However, U.S. private plans also had a negative relationship with workplace 
practices, and U.K. private plans were instead interested in the environment. 
Hypothesis 3 called for a positive relationship between foundation plans and 
environment. We found no support for it among U.S. foundation plans, who 
evidence no interest in any dimension of CSP but did find support for 
Hypothesis 3 in U.K. foundation plans. Hypothesis 4, suggesting no positive 
relationship between state plans and any CSP dimension, was supported for 
U.S. plans but not for U.K. state plans, the latter of which have a positive rela­
tionship with environment but have a negative relationship with community. 
In general, we found little support for Hypothesis 5, as U.S. pension 
plans—other than union plans—evidence less interest in SRI in their U.K. 
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investments than do U.K. pension plans. The domestic shareholdings of 
each U.K. pension plan type reveal preferences for at least one dimension 
of CSP, with U.K. union plans favoring workplace practices, and U.K. state, 
foundation, and private plans favoring the environment. In comparison, 
when U.S. pension plans invest in the United Kingdom, the most liquid 
European securities market and a major international location for firm list­
ings, no dimension of CSP is favored by state and foundation plans and 
there is no interest for CSP’s environmental dimension. The results suggest 
that labor union pension plans are the only type that adopts the same share 
selection procedures when investing domestically and internationally, being 
interested in workplace practices. This may be because union pension plans 
are the most politicized plan type and seek investments that match their 
core beliefs, a result that is important because their investment behavior has 
received little scholarly attention. 
Discussion, Limitations, and Conclusions 
Our results indicate that, other than labor union plans, U.S. pension 
plans per plan type are less inclined toward SRI in their U.K. investments 
than their U.K. counterparts; instead, in aggregate, they are interested in 
large companies whose stocks have low trading costs and are undervalued, 
overlooked, and thus due for upward market reappraisal. Aside from labor 
union plans, more is invested in firms whose shares can be bought and sold 
quickly and in large amounts. Again, aside from labor union plans, the 
tenets of MPT are applied by U.S. pension plans in their investment strat­
egy, which appear to invest in the United Kingdom primarily for portfolio 
return and to augment superior risk-return opportunities. Overall, we find 
that U.S. pension plans tend to invest in U.K. firms for their CFP rather than 
for their CSP. In particular, they evidence a short-term investment horizon 
and seek liquidity in positions, in contrast to expectations based on the 
long-term and predictable nature of their obligations to retirees. 
A limitation of our exploratory study is its lack of comparable data for 
U.S. pension plan domestic investment and U.K. pension plan investment 
in the U.S. market, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions. It is 
possible that, compared with U.K. pension plans, U.S. pension plans tend 
to invest based on CFP criteria in their domestic as well as nondomestic 
equity markets, so that our results would not indicate a U.S. pension plan 
domestic bias with regard to SRI. However, our results with regard to U.S. 
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pension plan investment in the United Kingdom can be compared with 
those of Johnson and Greening (1999), who demonstrated that U.S. pension 
plan domestic investment tilts toward firms with better environmental, as 
well as community, records. This comparison suggests that there might be 
a U.S. pension plan home bias concerning SRI. Further research is needed 
to investigate whether there is a U.S. pension plan home bias concerning 
SRI and whether SRI home bias is also evidenced by non-U.S. pension 
plans. This research will be constrained by country-level reporting require­
ments. For example, there has been relatively little study of variation in 
share selection procedures across types of pension fund because official 
U.S. security holding data do not provide information to allow for the par­
titioning of data with this level of precision.2 
As trends should be considered in understanding investment strategy, 
our study is limited in being cross-sectional. We suggest that Johnson and 
Greening’s (1999) finding of greater levels of SRI among U.S. pension 
plans for 1996 relative to our finding for 2002 might perhaps be explained 
by a possible pension plan shift away from CSP toward greater emphasis 
on CFP in response to the “dot-com” market downturn, due to a sense that 
earning high investment return now requires focus on narrower, relevant 
investment criteria.3 In support of this suggestion, the burgeoning growth of 
hedge funds, which strictly stress CFP and are activist in so doing (Atlas, 
2005; Smith & Sender, 2005), is in part due to increased investment in them 
by pension plans (Brittain, 2001; Getmansky, Lo, & Mei, 2004; Sweeney, 
2005). Longitudinal research would help to ascertain whether there has 
been a trend away from SRI by pension plans. A possible shift away from 
SRI toward investment based solely on CFP criteria could well be short­
sighted, as there might be a lagged, positive relationship between CSP and 
CFP (Cox et al., 2004). Any possible shift away from SRI would raise a 
concern for those whose values are aligned with SRI and CSP, reinforcing 
the need for more research and advocacy. 
The finding that U.S. and U.K. state pension plans evidence little inter­
est in SRI might be explained in part by their recent increases in external 
portfolio management, including use of hedge funds (“Hedge Funds,” 
2005). Growing concern about the funding inadequacy of U.S. state pen­
sion plans (Braunschweig, 2005; Solomon, 2006), which remain largely a 
defined benefit with guaranteed annuities, may have affected investment 
strategy, so that past evidence of social and local investing by U.S. state 
pension plans (Duhlebohn, 1995; Romano, 1993) may no longer be the 
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case. We note that there is also concern about U.K. state pension plan fund­
ing adequacy (Blake & Mayhew, 2006), which could indicate similar pres­
sures on U.K. state plans. However, forces in the United Kingdom to 
consider SRI in investing decisions and significant U.K. public interest in 
social investment mitigate these pressures. 
Another finding of our study is that U.S. foundation pension plan port­
folios, which include religious pension plan portfolios, have no relationship 
with any of the three dimensions of CSP. U.S. religious pension plans do 
engage in activism concerning the social issues aspect of CSP by sponsor­
ing shareholder proposals that target multinational corporations about inter­
national human rights and labor standards (Holstein, 2006; Proffitt & 
Spicer, 2006). The activism among religious plans in social issues might 
appropriate their interest in other CSP dimensions. It is also possible that 
religious plan shareholder activism could at times be targeted at companies 
that are low in CSP, with the intent to reform them. Although this activism 
is well intended and sometimes effective, all pension plans should be mind­
ful of their fiduciary responsibilities (Peterson, 2001). Pension plans should 
not place overemphasis on the social issues aspect of CSP and should not 
neglect the dimensions of CSP that have a better possibility for alignment 
with fiduciary responsibility, such as those used in this study. 
As an extension of this research, we recommend studies of pension plans 
from other domiciles and their investments in domestic and nondomestic 
equities. We also recommend studies concerning the domestic and nondo­
mestic SRI of other types of institutional investors, in particular mutual 
funds that specialize in SRI. The increased power of institutional investors 
during the latter part of the 20th century will likely not abate in the early 
part of the 21st century, so that further research concerning their socially 
responsible investment is in order. 
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Notes 
1. Excluded from the analysis are four U.S. federal plans: Forth Worth, Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corp., Atomic Weapons Establishment PF, and the Government Pension Investment 
Fund. 
2. Per the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), investment managers are allowed to 
aggregate the assets of the different institutional clients rather than separately report each client 
account (Del Guercio, 1996; Gompers & Metrick, 2001). State pension funds are not required to 
file relevant statements with the SEC (Badrinath & Wahal, 2002), largely precluding their holdings 
from research. As a case in point, Murphy and Van Nuys (1994) found data on equity holdings for 
only 13 state pension funds when searching a 5-year period, 1987-1991, on Spectrum tapes that 
document official 13F security filings of U.S. investment institutions. 
3. In 1996, the time of Johnson and Greening’s (1999) study, the S&P 500 index, a com­
posite of equity market valuation, rose 19.4%. In 2002, it declined 23.8% (S&P 500 historical 
data available from http://finance.yahoo.com). 
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Introduction 
In 2006 the Government set out some ideas for responsible investment (RI) 
within Personal Accounts. In 2007 this was developed further through an 
academic fellowship funded by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
and the Economic and Social Research Council. One aim of the fellowship 
was to assist the DWP develop an understanding of institutional investment
and responsible investing. This was achieved through a study that interviewed 
and surveyed 25 fund management firms between June and November 2007.  
1 The author also holds a part-time seconded position in the investment team at the Personal 
Accounts Delivery Authority. Prior to academia the author was a fund manager. 
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The fund management firms selected had broadcast a capability in RI via two 
networking sites; the UK Social Investment Forum and the Enhanced 
Analytics Initiative. 
25 out of 28 fund management firms agreed to interview. This represented 
more than 90% of the UK RI fund management industry by assets under
management. A major unintended benefit was that the sample was also
statistically meaningful in terms of the entire UK fund management industry. 
As at 31 December 2006, the 25 firms held UK£680 billion in UK equities out
of an estimated total market of UK£940 billion under management by UK fund 
management firms. This accounted for 73% of all equities under management
in the UK (IMA, 2007a). 
The 25 fund management firms represented a variety of industry sub-sectors, 
including life insurance firms, independent fund management firms, fund 
management firms owned by banks and pension funds with their own inhouse
fund managers. The fund management firms managed RI mandates on a 
segregated and on a pooled basis, on an active and passive (index)
management basis, and used specialist, balanced and benchmark driven 
mandates for institutional and retail clients. The funds invested in UK,
European, emerging and global securities. 
This manuscript presents the results of this research. The principal finding is
that RI works, but there are major questions concerning when, and by how 
much. 
Summary
The research finds that RI is now an accepted and for some an important part 
of what fund management is about. At its heart, RI means something less
precise than executing on an investment decision in response to a single 
catalyst that is going to impact in a specific time period.  
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RI means something longer term. It means having an expectation that future 
improvement in financial performance will come from giving more thought to
the longer term than has traditionally been the case. It is looking ahead and 
bringing to light risks that are in the system some time before they impact. It is 
talking about how the story may go when the risks impact and deciding on 
action whilst the risks remain latent. It is doing things at that early stage based 
often on an imprecise probability of something happening over some
unspecified time period. It is doing things that do not always seem especially 
relevant from the perspective of what is expected to immediately happen next.
For many fund managers this meant that RI stood apart from conventional 
investment. 
Behind this action stood another difference from conventional investment. 
This is the idea that undertaking such activity can lead markets to have a 
straighter run. This comes from the perspective that investment risk and 
volatility are not pre-determined but are able to be shaped and influenced. 
They are socially constructed phenomena and not a given. The continual 
activity of RI analysts and fund managers reacting to the different directions 
that markets might conceivably take according to how they expect RI shocks
and stresses to arrive and impact as well as how long-term sustainability 
themes and issues play out as events unfold means that markets are more 
able to go straight on. 
Any investment process that claims to lead markets to be more stable and 
less likely to change to the extent that they otherwise might have warrants
close attention. It represents a potentially powerful outcome for the ultimate 
beneficiaries of most institutional investment activity which are those who hold 
medium and long term pensions, life insurance and term policies. Many
millions of people stand to benefit from investment outcomes that can improve
security of financial welfare close to, and in, retirement. 
The conclusion of this study is not that RI is right for all investors. Additional
charges are incurred to crystallise performance which, although there, is itself
subject to uncertain timing, impact and even measurement. This makes 
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evidence on performance difficult to firm-up, which in turn means that a 
potential investor will require at least some belief that it can be sufficiently
informed and persuasive in its investment and in its influence on RI to make a 
positive difference to performance and outcomes. 
Contribution 
The research makes three particular contributions. One contribution is insight
and evidence on how responsible investment emerges as financial 
performance. Fund managers gave three reasons. One way was to
understand and capture the financial dividend attached to more responsible 
firms. The paper performs an extended literature review to examine this. A 
second way involved bringing about influence at the level of the firm. The third 
way involved bringing about influence at the level of public policy that would 
then benefit all of a fund’s holdings. The paper provides an extended 
description on each of these as well as case examples. 
A second contribution is insight and evidence on operational and delivery 
aspects of responsible investment. This includes detailed examination of
information and staff as inputs into responsible investment, the measurement
of the quality of responsible investment within fund management firms, and 
examination of costs and charges associated with the range of responsible 
investment possibilities. This more discursive analysis develops and extends
understanding of responsible investment within an institutional fund 
management setting. 
A third contribution is insight and evidence on behind-the-scenes 
communication between fund managers, as investors, and corporate 
directors, as stewards of investors’ funds. Fund managers gave a total of six
reasons for communicating with corporate directors. These were obtaining
investment information as ideas for trading securities, communicating to
achieve influence, building and maintaining relationships, consultancy,
corporate disclosure and influence on public policy. The paper provides an 
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extended description for each reason, ranks their importance, and highlights 
conflicts through the use of case examples. 
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Chapter Summary
Chapter 1 examined why the fund management firms had participated in RI. 
In all, the fund managers gave 6 reasons. These were interest in 
sustainability, valuation, evidence on climate change, universal ownership, 
fiduciary duty, and legislation and encouragement. There was a pattern to the 
reasons given. For example, fund managers of pension assets tended to
highlight universal ownership. Fund managers of charity assets tended to 
highlight legislation. Fund managers that focused on a best-in-class approach 
to RI tended to highlight sustainability, and fund managers that focused on an
integration approach tended to highlight valuation.  
Chapter 2 presented the four approaches to RI in evidence amongst the fund 
management firms. These were screening, best-in-class, influence and 
integration. Very few firms remained at all interested in screening. Fund 
management firms that did screen tended to have charities or individuals as 
their major clients rather than institutions. A best-in-class approach was most 
in evidence amongst smaller, more specialist RI fund management firms. An
influence approach to RI was most apparent amongst fund management firms
with an activist approach as well as those that had a separate engagement
and voting service offered to other investors. Overall, by far the greater focus
was an integration approach. For some fund managers integration rarely 
meant a radically different weighting or investment holding period to 
conventional investment. At best it meant cutting a little here, adding a little 
there, or weighting securities the same as conventional investment but 
holding them a short while longer or less. Due to this, the approaches most in
evidence were not necessarily those most likely to make a major difference to 
solving structural problems based around long-term sustainability. Rather,
they tended to be those whose performance was the simplest to realise, most 
straightforward to measure, and that fit easiest with the existing fund 
management investment process. 
Chapter 3 reported that in order to perform RI, fund management firms sought
a large quantity and broad range of information. The fund managers desired
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granular and detailed RI information that was not publicly available. The most
important source of this was private one-to-one meetings with corporate 
directors. The information obtained was useful of itself in trading securities. It
also added to inhouse knowledge on issues, themes, sectors and companies.
When mixed with inhouse knowledge new insight and evidence often 
emerged. This was described as an information mosaic and was a further 
major source of knowledge and understanding for fund managers. The 
company annual report was a more important source of information than 
broker research, which was seen as unreliable except for its factual 
information. Research published only upon major developments or on an ad 
hoc basis was less relied on. Acquiring RI information rarely meant obtaining 
a single piece of information that markets would respond to following a 
specific catalyst over a specific time period. Rather, it involved acquiring many 
types of information, some it timely, some of it not, some highly reliable, some 
not so, some of it precise and some of it not. This information became general 
and background research as well as contributed to specific viewpoints and 
actions on companies, issues and themes.
Chapter 4 focused on why communicating behind-the-scenes with corporate 
directors was so important to RI fund managers. The fund managers gave 6 
reasons. The most important was obtaining investment information as ideas 
for trading securities to improve the financial return of the portfolio. This was 
most used by fund managers with best-in-class and integration approaches to 
RI. Next in importance was communicating to achieve influence. Building and 
maintaining relationships was a reason that all fund managers met with 
corporate directors regardless of their approach to RI. The other three 
reasons; consultancy, corporate disclosure and influence on public policy,
were sought by very few fund managers but those that did emphasise these 
reasons had a very high conviction in their benefits. When communicating 
with one another both fund managers and corporate directors were aware of 
what could and could not be said due to price sensitivity and materiality rules.
Importantly, because RI focused on the longer term, many more issues could 
be discussed in more detail before coming up against issues of materiality. 
This made discussion of topics around RI a very good way of understanding 
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companies. The value that these conversations bring for the trading of 
securities is one possible explanation why influence was much less sought by
a majority of fund managers. 
Chapter 5 reported on staff resources used to execute RI. On average, 85% 
of the total cost of providing RI was staff and 15% was information.
Commission allocation was used to pay for most of the information cost. Both 
active and passive managers used commission allocation to purchase 
information and research. RI staff were mostly employed in fund management
and analytical positions. These staff would move across to support marketing, 
client servicing, corporate governance and voting as circumstances required. 
The median number of full time equivalent RI staff in each fund management 
firm was 4. The most frequent occurring number was 3. The highest quality RI
took place in small, specialist RI fund management firms. The lowest quality
RI took place within index fund management firms. This was based on a 
measure of quality from an analysis of the relationship between the number of 
full time equivalent RI staff and the number of lines of stock held by each fund 
management firm. 
Chapter 6 focused on the ways in which RI became financial performance. 
One way was to understand and capture the financial dividend attached to 
more responsible firms. This was the most sought by fund managers with a 
best-in-class or integration approach. The other two ways involved seeking 
influence. One involved bringing about influence at the level of the firm. The 
other involved bringing about influence at the level of public policy that would
then benefit all of a fund’s holdings. The outcomes of influence based on RI
were not straightforward to measure. Staff who had done this for a while 
spoke about instinctively knowing when there was a successful outcome. The 
performance tended to elude measurement but all insight and intelligence was
informing them that it was there. Ironically, it was often RI that was the least 
measurable that stood to impact the most. A single programme of influence 
based on public policy was in principle capable of delivering more than any 
single programme of influence based on a single firm or piece of integrated 
financial analysis could achieve. A screening approach to RI was also said to 
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bring about influence at the level of the firm, but to do so in a way that was
negative for portfolio performance because at the point of change the portfolio 
is not a holder of the security and so completely misses out on any market 
reappraisal of the security. 
Chapter 7 examined limitations to financial performance as a result of higher 
RI valuations, charges and costs. The fund managers strongly believed that
more responsible firms did not yet trade on higher valuations. This meant that 
the dividend was available to those that researched it. There were additional 
charges for RI. On average RI added 18% to the fund management fee for a 
£100m mandate, 14% to a £200-£500m mandate and 13% to a £1bn 
mandate. The precise value of the extra charge depended on the degree of RI
undertaken. For example, a low charge RI fund tended to undertake 
screening only. A higher charge RI fund tended to undertake integration,
influence and screening. The fund managers said that any extra charge 
needed to be put into perspective because it was not the most important 
determinant of the overall fund management fee. A small number of fund 
management firms did not charge more. These also allocated the fewest
resources to RI and so had some of the lowest quality RI. The large majority
of fund managers said that their approach to RI had exactly the same portfolio 
trading costs as conventional funds. A small number of fund managers
disagreed, and provided evidence that their approach to RI meant lower
portfolio trading costs. In effect, valuations of more responsible firms and RI
portfolio trading costs were neither higher nor lower than conventional 
investing, but that fund management charges were on average 14% higher. 
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Chapter 1: Participation in Responsible Investment 
Notation 
Most fund managers used the term Responsible investment (RI) to mean an 
approach that focused on using information on the environment, society, 
workplace and governance in the selection of investments and to influence a 
company’s corporate directors for the improvement of corporate performance.
The term ethical investment tended to mean an approach that included the 
screening of prospective investments for whether they meet ethical and 
values-based thresholds. This paper uses the same terms according to the
meanings above. The focus of fund managers was the social responsibility of
the firms that they held investments in and not of their own employers. 
The fund managers gave 6 reasons for their firms’ participation in RI. These 
were interest in sustainability, valuation, evidence on climate change, 
universal ownership, fiduciary duty, and legislation and encouragement.
Overall, there was a pattern to the reasons given by the fund managers. For
example, fund managers of pension assets tended to highlight universal
ownership. Fund managers of charity assets tended to highlight legislation.
Fund managers that focused on a best in class approach to RI tended to
highlight sustainability, and fund managers that focused on an integration 
approach tended to highlight valuation. 
Each of the reasons given by the fund managers is developed further below:
1. Interest in Sustainability
The fund managers pointed to increasing interest in sustainable development,
including a growing market for responsible saving and investment and 
11
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growing wholesale and retail markets for products and services consistent 
with a more sustainable lifestyle (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004). 
2. Valuation 
A large number of fund managers pointed to an emerging consensus that the 
environment, society, workplace, business values and governance impact 
corporate fundamentals, valuation, and investment performance. The fund 
managers gave three reasons for this development. First, the role of
intangible drivers of firm value has expanded. Intangibles include skills,
knowledge, innovation, information technology, reputation, business ethics
and values, interactions with the environment, society and the workplace. 
Second, globalisation means that there is greater social, political and 
environmental complexity that firms need to manage. Third, developments in 
corporate social and environmental reporting mean that these issues can 
more easily be brought into the estimation of valuation and the future 
trajectory of a firm. Developments in reporting include the Global Reporting 
Initiative and Carbon Disclosure Project. 
3. Evidence on Climate Change 
The 2006 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change had firmed-up 
demand for RI. The fund managers said that the Stern Review had illustrated 
the impact that not pursuing responsible investment might have on companies
and the economy. According to the Stern Review climate change “is the 
greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen” (Stern, 2006 i). If the 
world does not act to limit carbon dioxide emissions “the overall costs and 
risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP 
each year, now and forever” (Stern, 2006 vi). “Markets for low-carbon energy
products are likely to be worth at least $500bn per year by 2050, and perhaps
much more” (Stern, 2006 xvi). Climate change policy will reform inefficient
energy systems and remove distorting energy subsidies on which 
governments around the world currently spend around $250bn a year. The 
motivation for individual companies is that performing business in a 
12
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responsible way may help mitigate risk, capitalise on forthcoming 
opportunities, reduce existing inefficiencies, and draw attention to money-
saving opportunities. 
4. Universal Ownership 
Fund managers that had large pension fund clients or who worked inhouse 
within pension schemes in particular emphasised universal ownership. The 
concept of universal ownership is founded on the belief that the interests of 
large investors are very broad. The typical universal owner is a large pension 
fund with a spread of portfolio holdings around the world. With investments 
diversified across countries and industries this type of investor will own a part 
of the global economy. As such, the interests of a universal owner are aligned 
with the broad interests of the global economy. One interest of a universal 
owner is to ensure that companies bear the full economic cost of their
activities. Not doing so might mean that costs are passed onto another 
company within the global investor’s portfolio, with the result that there is no 
investment gain. For example, if a company offloads its waste into the sea, 
this may have a negative impact on the fishing and hospitality industries. 
Although the first company avoids the cost of dealing responsibly with its
waste, this is felt in another area of the economy, which leads the universal 
owner not to gain by this behaviour. In some instances the cost of negative
externalities may exceed their cost of mitigation, resulting in a net loss for the 
economy and the investor, for example, emissions that lead to global climate 
change (Stern, 2006).  For the universal owner, externalities are not a positive 
sum game and are unlikely to lead to wealth creation. This creates an 
incentive for the universal owner to minimise negative externalities and 
maximise positive ones across portfolio holdings. 
5. Fiduciary Duty
Many fund managers considered that the traditional view of fiduciary duty, in 
which trustees must act solely in the narrow financial interests of
beneficiaries, was an outdated interpretation of the law. This was not intended
13
 
147
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to mean that there is a fiduciary duty to take decisions on the basis of RI, only
that a position on RI was not of itself a violation of fiduciary duty. One 
participant who worked inhouse within a pension scheme had received legal 
advice that integration and engagement based on RI principles should take
place where the issues might be material to investment performance.
Screening on an ethical basis fell outside of fiduciary responsibility and could 
leave trustees open to challenge. 
‘Our trustees decided that ethical screening was something they could 
not do and that still is the legal advice today. We cannot screen on an 
ethical basis alone, that falls outside our fiduciary responsibilities and
could leave us open to challenge. These ESG [environmental, social,
governance] issues – we call them extra-financial because they are not
non-financial – where they are material to investment decisions they
should be included, that’s the legal advice that we have. The problem 
with materiality is over what time frame. As a pension fund we do not
need to attract clients or sell a story. We need to be doing things which 
maybe in the short term are not relevant to us but in the long term may
benefit our fund’.
Another inhouse fund manager within a pension scheme stressed that when 
taking investment decisions on long-term issues it can be difficult not to take a 
position on RI, even though this might not be borne from an explicit position 
on responsible investment: 
‘We do not generally concern ourselves with responsible investment
per se. Our advice is that our managers must be free to make
economic decisions. We believe our starting point is to ensure that the 
investment remit sets incentives for managing for the long term. It just 
so happens that companies that are expected to perform well in the 
long run are also those that tend to follow RI policies themselves. As a 
result of investing for the long term we tend to also invest responsibly,
but I need to stress that this relationship is indirect. We do not come 
about this from any goal for RI’.
14
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A third fund manager said that its firm had decided that the RI remit is borne 
out of fiduciary responsibility and is therefore part of the proposition to all 
clients. 
‘The responsible investment remit comes from fiduciary responsibility. We 
engage with companies so that we can understand them and because we 
believe that environment, society and corporate governance matters may be 
linked to financial performance and company value’. 
6. Legislation and Encouragement 
In recent years government and industry have sought to strengthen the role of 
RI within fund management. The fund managers pointed to a number of 
initiatives. These are listed below, starting with statutory legislation, and 
moving through to industry encouragement: 
i. Legislation
Statutory Instrument 1999 No. 1849 and 3259 
A 1999 amendment to the 1995 Pensions Act (Statutory Instrument 1999 No. 
1849 and 3259), commencing July 2000, requires that trustees of
occupational and local government pension schemes disclose in the 
Statement of Investment Principles (Pensions Act, 1999a and 1999b): 
‘The extent (if at all) to which social, environmental and ethical considerations
are taken into account in the selection, retention and realisation of
investments’. 
This legislation had the effect of putting pressure on pension schemes to at
the very least disclose that they were doing something in this area, which in 
turn prompted fund managers to demonstrate that they were too. 
Charity Commission Guidance 2003 
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In 2003 the Charity Commission published guidance for trustees of charities
on permitted ethical investment (Charities Act, 2003). This suggested that a 
charity may invest its endowment2 in a way that does not conflict with the
charitable purpose. If a charity was not to do so it may put-off potential 
financial donors and alienate supporters (Charity SRI, 2008). This means that 
screening of investments is acceptable even though doing so may, in theory 
at least, lead to incomplete investment diversification.  
ii. Industry Encouragement 
Life Insurance industry 
The 2001 Association of British Insurers’s (ABI) report, ‘Investing in Social 
Responsibility’, aimed to convince life insurance members that good practice
within fund management meant both RI and encouraging corporate issuers to 
improve social and environmental reporting. It suggested that members adopt
the report’s recommendations on RI and engage with companies based on 
the disclosure guidelines for corporate issuers on social and environmental 
reporting. 
Local Authority Pension Funds 
The Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF, 2008) has set a mission 
statement for its many Local Authority pension scheme members that
includes responsible investment, this being to: 
‘promote the investment interests of local authority pension funds, and to
maximise their influence as shareholders whilst promoting corporate social
responsibility … amongst the companies in which they invest’. 
2 The aim is to safeguard its value as well as grow it further. 
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Chapter 2: Approaches to RI 
The fund managers participated in RI through four broad approaches. Three 
approaches involved portfolio construction. These were screening, best-in-
class and integration. The fourth approach was different. It started with a 
portfolio that had already been constructed on the basis of financial suitability.
The principles of RI were then applied to this portfolio for the improvement of 
individual firms as well as the entire portfolio. The most precise term for this 
fourth approach was influence. Sometimes the less precise term of 
engagement was used. The term engagement was less precise because it 
was a mixed use term. The closest meaning of the term engagement was
communicating with corporate directors. The reason for this communication 
might be influence, but equally it might not. For example: 
‘We actually engage with companies for three purposes. One is
information and research, a second part is engagement for influence 
and change, and the third thing is we do is relationship building.
Usually the engagement delivers one of two of those, but occasionally
it may deliver all three or deliver nothing’.
Due to engagement being a mixed use term, this study will use the term 
influence to describe the fourth approach to RI. Further detail on the term
engagement is provided in Chapter 8. The four approaches to RI in evidence
among the fund management firms are developed below: 
1. Screening 
Screening involved testing a potential or actual investment against a set of RI 
measures, for example performance on the environment, society, the 
workplace, ethics and business values. Only investments that pass the 
various tests were considered candidates for portfolio inclusion. Whether or 
not investments that pass are then selected for portfolio inclusion depended 
on their financial suitability. The type and intensity of the screens was often 
decided with input from the client. According to one fund manager: 
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‘We avoid investment in companies whose main business is gambling,
tobacco or armaments. This policy also applies to bonds issued by 
companies in these sectors. Before making an investment in a property 
we make sure that it is subject to an appropriate environmental risk
report’. 
Most fund managers said that considerably less than 10% of their funds under 
management involve RI screening. This is because pension funds and other 
institutional owners had little demand for screening. Most fund management
firms only screen when requested by a large client. Where there was 
institutional demand for screening, this tended to be based on conformance 
with international declarations and agreements.  
‘We do offer screened ethical funds for investors who want to exclude 
companies engaged in certain activities. The institutional market does
not have a strong interest in screening although we do have some 
institutional clients that have some screening’. 
Church and charity funds tended to still demand screened investments. This
market segment was served by a small number of dedicated fund 
management firms, for example CCLA, as well as charities divisions within the 
larger fund management firms. This meant that a small number of fund 
management firms still routinely screen investments. 
2. Best-In-Class 
The aim of a best-in-class approach was to identify companies and industries
which are the best social, environmental, and ethical operators. Best-in-class
might mean looking at the best companies within their resident industry. 
‘When we say RI, the process is to do sector reports, developing an 
idea of what best-in-class might be, what laggards might be and 
identifying areas of risk in companies we hold or might want to hold.
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This naturally becomes best-in-class. We do this for our main stream
process’. 
‘The way we operate is to look at each company in its industry context. 
We only invest in companies which are on top’. 
Alternatively, best-in-class might mean looking at the best industries within the 
global economy. The aim was to identify which industries are the best
operators from the viewpoint of a more forward looking and sustainable form 
of capitalism, and invest more in them3. 
‘We are trying to work to a way now whereby the capitalist model starts 
taking more account of environmental drivers rather than just
performance. If you look at each company in isolation I don’t think the 
fund manager will have enough information to base investment on. The 
information would be disjointed and I don’t think that process would 
work’. 
In order to be best-in-class, a firm or industry needed to score well against a 
range of factors. The fund managers claimed that this meant the approach
was good at identifying firms and industries with a more comprehensive 
performance record. For example, the approach placed a major focus on how 
profits were generated and the sustainability of the profit generating model 
rather than just the quantity of profits over a short time horizon. Smaller, more 
specialist RI fund management firms tended to focus most of all on a best in
class approach. A number of major investors were starting to allocate a small 
part of their active management risk budget to such funds. 
3. Integration 
A major aim of integrated financial analysis was to investigate risks and 
opportunities not covered by conventional financial analysis. Integration 
3 This was sometimes referred to as sustainable investing.
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usually meant bringing the environment, society, workplace, ethics, business 
values and governance into the evaluation and valuation of an investment. 
Where these issues were material to the firm they were brought into the 
investment decision. This was said to result in a more complete evaluation of
risks, opportunities and long-term performance and a more enlightened 
financial valuation. Integration naturally led to a greater focus on intangibles,
globalisation and complexity for social, environmental, workplace and 
governance issues are more prevalent within these topics.  
‘We integrate environment, society and corporate governance across 
all funds - we take across the qualitative factors that are pertinent and 
what we think will be relevant. This intelligence is passed to the fund 
managers’. 
Some fund managers used the term integration to mean something more
encompassing. To them, the aim of integrated financial analysis was to draw 
on the widest possible range of risks and opportunities. Remarks by fund 
managers that fell into this category included:
‘We unearth missing links in value. That is our value proposition to 
clients’.  
‘Research is whatever is significant to a particular firm and industry’. 
 ‘The goal of lowering risk for clients defines the areas of research’.
‘There is a constant search for financial materiality and how such 
themes play out at the level of the firm’.
This form of integration promised a great deal but when asked to give details
about what this looks like the responses tended to lack conviction and clarity.
Further detail on this can be found in Chapter 8. In spite of vagaries about 
how integration was discharged a significant number of fund managers said 
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that there was substantial client demand for this approach to RI. There was
more focus on integration than any other approach. 
In other situations fund managers’ approaches to integration closely 
resembled conventional investment. Here, RI rarely meant a radically different 
weighting or investment holding period to conventional investment. At best it
meant cutting a little here, adding a little there, or weighting securities the 
same as conventional investment but holding them a short while longer or
less. 
Integration was most pursued by active fund managers with a growth 
investing style, a mixed style that was benchmark driven and neither growth 
nor value, or a value style based on firms that were efficient and well 
managed but inexpensive and undervalued.
Growth and Value 
Growth investing involves identifying securities with rapid growth prospects
often at an early stage of development. This tended to involve a focus on 
small and mid capitalisation firms where there is less analyst following and
where the science behind the firm may only be patchily reported. It also meant 
investing in large companies where there is an expectation that the market 
has underestimated the firm’s growth prospects. 
The form of value investing described above involves identifying efficient firms 
that are overlooked or unfashionable, and therefore inexpensive and 
undervalued. Yardsticks were used to identify inexpensive securities with 
adequate safety margins versus fair value. The strategy was then to wait for
the market to correct or to sometimes encourage the market to correct by a 
higher level of reporting and disclosure. 
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4. RI Influence 
Before influence can operate a portfolio is first of all constructed according to
financial suitability. The principles of RI are then applied to individual firms in 
the portfolio as well as the portfolio as a whole. 
Influence based on RI involves encouraging the corporate directors of a 
company, where appropriate, to bring about improvement in matters of the 
environment, society, the workplace, ethics, business values and governance. 
It also involves exercising investment and ownership rights in a manner that is
consistent with a fund management firm or client policy on RI, corporate 
governance and voting.  
The aim of influence was to encourage and support corporate directors strike 
the best balance between risk and return that is in the best interests of long 
term owners. 
‘We’ve very much taken the influence route. A stock which the fund 
manager is interested in can be bought even with a poor extra-financial 
rating. We engage with the company to understand why they have this
poor rating and what they are doing to improve it’.
The process of influence may involve one-to-one-meetings with corporate 
directors, questionnaires, phone calls, written correspondence and 
collaboration with other fund managers. The intended outcome of this effort is 
that companies will have greater willingness to: 
◊	 Act in a responsible way and consider their impact on the environment and 
society. 
◊	 Consider the changing nature of business in society. 
◊	 Consider the business importance of managing factors external to the firm,
such as climate change and pollution. 
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◊	 Consider how legislative developments can turn economic externalities
into financial liabilities and transform products with zero value into ones
with value, such as waste and recycling. 
◊	 Work with major shareholders to identify these factors early, and to consult
on how to manage them. 
Fund managers highlighted the need to sometimes become more involved. 
For example there may be actual and immediate underperformance, a 
material reputation risk, or a corporate trajectory may have been identified
that could lead to significant underperformance. This required being more
persuasive and influential in dialogue and approaching issues with greater 
firmness and persistency. This was often aided by working together with like-
minded institutional owners, especially coalitions of investors from more than 
one country. The fact of a coalition served to increase influence and expedite 
change more efficiently on certain issues, but it was second order in 
importance to the need to be informed and persuasive. 
Influence was pursued most by fund managers with an activist approach and 
also fund management firms that also offered an outsourced engagement and 
voting service to other investors such as pension funds and charities.  
Activism
An activist approach meant investing in firms that were either not performing 
as well as they could from an economic perspective, were in some way 
financially distressed, or were in a special situation in which share ownership 
had the means to be particularly influential, for example an expected takeover 
situation. Influence was exerted to bring about improvements in corporate 
governance, corporate strategy or management quality. Further detail on 
activism can be found in Chapter 6, Section 2. 
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Chapter 3: Fund Managers Use of Information to Perform RI 
The key to RI fund management lay in bringing capable and skilled staff into
contact with a large quantity and broad range of appropriate information, data,
advice, recommendations, and reports. This endeavour led to research 
outputs in the form of insight, evidence and knowledge that informed fund 
managers decisions. Information and staff are therefore fundamental to RI.
Information is the focus of this and the next chapter. RI staff within fund
management firms is the focus of Chapter 5.  
In this current chapter the term information is used to include data, 
communication and dialogue, advice, recommendations, news and reports.
There are three sections in this chapter. Section 1 examines where fund 
managers obtained RI information. Section 2 examines the importance 
attached to RI information. Section 3 gives examples of uses of RI 
information. 
1. Sources of RI Information 
Every interview revealed that fund management firms were sophisticated 
gatherers and users of RI information. This is consistent with findings from
other interview-based research (Holland, 1998a; Barker, 1998; Gaved, 1997; 
Stapledon, 1996) as well as non-interview-based accounting and finance 
research (Aggarwal and Rao, 1990; Utama and Cready, 1997; Bushee and 
Goodman, 2007; Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2005). In order to meet their
need for RI information, the fund managers drew on information from 
companies, brokers and other research organisations. Each of these is
described below. 
Companies 
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Companies provided RI information via the annual report and accounts, by 
communicating directly with corporate directors and through other company 
media. 
The annual report and accounts 
There was a broad consensus that company reporting on interactions with
society and the environment had made significant progress in recent years, 
particularly among large UK firms. The fund managers said that RI relevant
information was very useful when it was integrated with the main annual
report because the annual report is independently audited. There was little 
interest in separate corporate responsibility reports because these were not
subject to accounting standards or independent audit. Although the annual 
report was a key source of factual RI information about companies, it was not 
able to meet all fund managers RI information needs. This is because the 
annual report is a record of the past, has limited forward looking information, 
is designed to meet the information needs of many different stakeholders, and 
there are limits to what can reasonably be printed within one document. 
Direct communication with corporate directors 
As major shareholders, fund managers regularly communicated in private with 
corporate directors. This included written communication, phone calls and 
one-to-one meetings. Written communication was used to express a formal 
opinion, because there was not the time or fund manager resources to meet 
face-to-face, or because written feedback was desired. For example, an RI 
analyst may send a questionnaire for the firm to complete and return. A phone 
call tended to be put to the company only when an RI matter had arisen that
could not wait until the next regular face-to-face meeting. For example, a fund 
manager may need clarification on an issue before coming to a voting 
decision in time for the annual general meeting.  
One-to-one meetings with corporate directors were conducted in private and 
face-to-face. Meeting with corporate directors was a chance to directly and 
personally learn about the company, competitors, industry and market. The 
meetings provided a chance for the fund managers to uncover new RI
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relevant facts, fill gaps in RI knowledge, confirm their existing thinking about
the firm, clarify opinions, and test their views on what corporate directors were 
thinking. Most of all, RI information in relation to corporate strategy was 
sought. Operational RI information was sought in instances where external 
performance metrics are not well developed and where accounting standards
and statements require few public disclosures. So important was direct 
communication with corporate directors that it is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
Other company media 
Occasionally the fund managers drew on a variety of other company media,
including conference calls, road show presentations, investor relations 
activities and the company website. These were rarely used due to their
limited reporting of RI information and the unaudited nature of the reporting. 
Brokers 
The research, sales and trading desks of investment banks, or brokers, 
provided RI information via published research and broker organised 
meetings with companies. 
Broker published research 
Brokers published specific research on RI, as well as integrating RI
information within mainstream company research. Broker research on 
companies was useful for its factual and background information, but not for 
its forecasts and recommendations. Brokers’ forecasts and recommendations
on companies were seen as overly optimistic and self-serving. This stemmed 
from a belief that brokers want fund managers to trade regularly in order to 
generate commission income from trading. The fund managers also believed 
that there was a favourable report bias due to brokers wanting to please
corporate directors in order to win future investment banking business and to
ensure continuing good access to company executives. The fund managers 
said that broker research that focused on sectors, industries and RI themes 
was better quality and far more useful than that which focused on companies.
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Broker organised company meetings 
Brokers were in a good position to arrange meetings between fund managers 
and corporate directors due to their close relations with both groups.  In 
attendance would be the broker, one or more company directors and a small 
number of invited fund managers. The meeting format could be relatively
small and intimate, involving one or two fund managers, or a larger roundtable 
discussion involving five or sometimes more fund managers. Since the fund 
managers did not receive the company’s sole attention, they tended to ask 
only those questions that they did not mind others in the room hearing the 
responses to. The fund managers said that this meant the meetings were of
less value than if they had held a one-to-one meeting with corporate directors. 
Other Research Organisations 
The fund managers drew on a network of other organisations. This network 
included dedicated independent investment research providers4, providers of
social, environmental and governance research, non-governmental 
organisations, lobby groups, grassroots activists and expert individuals. Some
of these organisations were regulated by the Financial Service Authority
(FSA), but many were not. The quality and timeliness of the RI information 
was said to vary a great deal. Also, some research was only published upon 
major developments. This tended to make it difficult for fund managers to rely
on, and as a result it was less important than other sources of RI information.  
2. Importance Attached to Sources of RI Information 
The fund managers were asked about the importance they attach to the 
different sources of RI information. They were also asked about the 
importance of this information when it was combined with existing inhouse
knowledge. Some fund managers used the term information mosaic5 to
4 Independent investment research providers have rapidly grown during the first decade of this century
in response to initiatives by the Financial Service Authority to encourage commission unbundling.
5 The term dates back to Loomis (1972). 
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describe this mix of external information and inhouse knowledge. The table 
below summarises the fund managers’ responses. Results are in descending 
order according to the mean score given by the fund managers. A five point
scale was used; where 4 is ‘very important’ and 0 ‘not at all important’. The
maximum possible mean score is 4 and the minimum 0. 
Importance Attached to Sources of RI Information as Revealed by Fund Managers, 2007 
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Company: Direct communication  
Information mosaic 
4.00 
3.71 0.14 
Broker: meetings with companies 
Company: annual report 
Broker: research
3.30 
3.21 
2.80 
0.54 
-0.63 * 
-1.08 *** 
-0.40 
-0.49 
-0.94 ** 
-0.09 
-0.54 0.45 
Other research organisations  
Company: other media  
2.72 
2.53 
1.12 *** 
-1.32 *** 
0.99 *** 
-1.18 *** 
0.59 
-0.78 
0.49 
0.69 
0.05 
0.24 -0.20 
***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
In the table above, the second column in from the left presents the mean 
score for each source of information. The fund managers reported that direct
communication with corporate directors was the most important source of RI 
information. Most of all this involves one-to-one meetings with corporate 
directors. This result supports earlier work by Barker (1998) that fund 
managers find one-to-one meetings with companies the most important
source of information. The second most important source of RI information is
information mosaic – the outcome of mixing external information with inhouse 
knowledge to reveal fresh insight and evidence. Third in importance is broker 
organised meetings with companies. 
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Columns three to nine from the left present estimates of an analysis of
variance (ANOVA). The ANOVA examines the variation in the scores given by 
fund managers for all the possible pairings of sources of RI information. 
Numbers with asterisks highlight statistically significant differences between 
each information pair. One noticeable result is that the top three sources of RI
information; direct communication, information mosaic and broker arranged 
meetings with companies, are not statistically different from one another. 
Looking further down the table, it is notable that fund managers give more 
importance to the annual report than broker research. Reasons for this
include the credibility provided by auditors in the annual report and a lack of 
independence and peer review in broker research. Statistically, direct
communication is a more important source of RI information than the annual 
report (10% level of significance), broker research, other research 
organisations and other company media (each 1% level of significance).
Other than direct communication with corporate directors, no other source of 
RI information is statistically more important than the annual report at the 10%
level or better. This highlights that fund managers do attach major importance 
to the annual report despite criticisms sometimes made of it. This also means
that in at least one sense direct communication with corporate directors 
stands apart from all other sources of RI information.  
Other research organisations are of slightly lower importance than broker
research. This may reflect the variable quality and timeliness of this source of 
RI information. The least important source of RI information is other company 
media. This reflects a belief that the company may use these communication 
channels to deliver a particular message rather than a balance of information.
There is no independent auditing of this RI information. 
3. How Fund Managers used RI Information  
Acquiring RI information from the various sources described above rarely
meant obtaining a single piece of information that markets would respond to
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following a specific catalyst over a specific time period. Rather, it involved
acquiring many types of information, some it timely, some of it not, some
highly reliable, some less so, some of it precise and some of it not.  
‘We desire access to information not in the public domain, granular and 
detailed. The information we gather privately is not specific enough to 
be price sensitive in the short term; it’s about highlighting risk over the 
long term. You are not identifying a specific factor which is going to 
come to light in a specific time frame following a specific catalyst. You
are highlighting a higher risk of something happening at some stage in 
the future’.
The value was in piecing the information together, as well as combining it with 
existing inhouse knowledge and understanding. 
One use to which this information was put concerned research on issues and 
themes. These often transcended national borders. Examples of issues and 
themes include access to clean water, access to medicines, health and 
obesity, pandemics, ageing populations, human rights, immigration,
employment, climate change, biodiversity, renewable energy, technology and 
the internet. Once an issue or theme had been identified, an on-going base of
long term research was undertaken. Of itself, this base of research was 
neither precise nor short term enough to take investment action on. An 
additional research task therefore involved looking for specific catalysts that
might cause one or more issues or themes to rapidly grow in investment
importance. This needed to mean something more than assigning a 
probability to an event occurring over some unspecified future period. It 
needed to mean having a high conviction that the market was going to react 
to a specific catalyst over a specific period in a way that was material to the 
trajectory of a security, sector, or market. The most frequently mentioned 
catalysts were regulation, legislation and the tax system. Changes in these 
might lead one or more issues or themes to move up or down global and 
national agendas and bring about investment significance. For example, the 
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introduction of carbon credits in Europe has forced all fund managers to bring 
the cost of carbon into the evaluation of investments. 
Examples of how information was used 
A Base Theme 
One example of a base theme is climate change. The fund managers pointed 
to the significant body of scientific evidence that climate change is real, and 
that the impact for global GDP is more severe the longer action to stop it is 
delayed (Stern, 2006). Yet a high probability of a significant reduction in GDP 
at some unspecified point in the future was not something the fund managers
were willing to meaningfully act on today. The topic lacked urgency because it 
lacked a specific catalyst that would make the impacts felt over a specific time 
period. As it currently stood, the topic was too large, too complex, and too 
long term to lead to a fundamentally different way in which RI portfolios were 
constructed even though many fund managers believed that it one day would. 
A Base Theme that Grew in Importance 
An example of a theme that had gradually grown in importance is palm oil. In 
this instance concern lay with a particular industry. For several years the 
planting and harvesting of crops for fuel had been looked at by a small 
number of fund managers. In 2007, and in response to growing media about
rainforest destruction and the extinction of the orang-utan, several fund 
management groups contacted European companies in the food retailing, 
production and utility and energy sectors to raise biodiversity issues. 
Companies that had not already done so were encouraged to join the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. This was said to have led to a 
successful outcome because it averted a higher risk of a greater negative 
market impact in the future. 
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Company Issues that Rapidly Grew in Importance 
An example of an issue that rapidly grew in importance is human rights. In this
instance concern started with a particular company. Bulldozers from
Caterpillar, a heavy goods manufacturer, were reported to be amongst those 
that pulled down homes and built the separation barrier around parts of the 
West Bank. In 2004, The International Court of Justice ruled that the barrier
was illegal. As a result of this ruling, several fund managers began to have
concerns about adverse human rights impacts. Fund managers increased the 
intensity of their research in this area. Based on this, most decided that
influence and learning through consultation with Caterpillar was a more 
appropriate way forward than divestment. Being in conversation with the 
company was a means to filling a major gap in knowledge and a means by
which concerns expressed from both sides could be heard and responded to. 
Furthermore, Caterpillar had local managers and staff on the ground, so was 
well placed to monitor end impacts, reduce the potential adversity to people’s
lives, and feed back information to the fund managers.  
A second example of an issue that rapidly grew in importance concerns the 
rights of workers. Concern again started with a particular company. In 2006,
British Airways (BA) suspended an employee for wearing a necklace with a 
pendent cross suggesting the Christian faith.  Suspension was based on a 
breach of the company’s uniform code.  BA’s uniform and dress codes
allowed people of various faiths to display signs of their faith, including 
Muslims and Sikhs, but not Christians. The Church of England’s ethical 
investment advisory group and the Church of England’s investment bodies
interacted with BA. Initial public disagreement gave way to effective behind-
the-scenes dialogue which helped establish a workable solution for a new 
uniform policy. In early 2007 BA made a public statement in support of a 
change in its uniform policy that would allow Christians to display their faith 
through a visible pin, as well as allowing some flexibility to wear a cross on a 
chain. This may not have impacted financial performance but the media story 
was impacting reputation, and considerable corporate resources were being 
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diverted to dealing with a defence of reputation rather than improving 
corporate performance. 
Firm Issues used in Trading Securities 
In other situations, RI information led to a specific viewpoint and then trading. 
One example is waste. More than one fund manager said that some of the 
questions that RI fund managers ask when they and go to talk to companies
are of the sort that conventional investment fund managers feel uncomfortable 
asking. They are seen as not serious, too low in priority or not of the type that 
one should put to corporate directors in the precious one hour of meeting time 
available. 
‘By asking questions such as how much waste does the company
produce and what does its waste cost, once you have been talking to 
these companies for a while you can work out who the efficient 
operators are’. 
Some RI fund managers had used research on waste to draw a conclusion 
about a significant and imminent increase in landfill prices for waste. This was
married to an evaluation of the quantity and type of waste that companies
produced as well as their profit margins. An investment strategy was then 
executed that involved selling firms that had narrow profit margins and 
produced large quantities of waste and investing more in companies with 
sizeable waste management businesses. One such company was Viridor. For 
a long time analysts had assigned a very low valuation to Viridor. Viridor is the 
waste management and renewable energy businesses of Pennon PLC.
Investing more in Pennon and other companies with major waste 
management businesses in anticipation of an increase in landfill prices that
conventional investors had overlooked had been a good source of extra 
performance. 
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Chapter 4: Communication with Corporate Directors 
So important was directly communicating with corporate directors that it is the
subject of this chapter. Fund managers used the terms communication,
interaction, dialogue, conversation and engagement to describe this process
of communicating with corporate directors. This chapter will use the term 
communication. 
Fund managers gave six reasons for communicating with corporate directors
from the viewpoint of RI. These were information for investment, influence, 
relationship building, consultancy, corporate reporting and public policy. Each
of these is developed further below. 
1. Information for Investment 
Communicating with corporate directors was the principal source of
information for investment. Better information for investment meant a 
competitive advantage relative to other investors that fund managers could 
exploit through trading securities. Most of all, information for investment was
provided during one-to-one meetings with corporate directors. The objective 
of the meetings was to obtain information to support the trading of securities
and improve the financial return of the portfolio. 
Stapledon (1996), Gaved (1997), Barker (1998), Marston (1998), Holland 
(1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2005, 2006) and Holland and Doran (1998) provide 
theory and evidence that meetings with company directors are a key channel 
by which fund managers become better informed. During one-to-one 
meetings the activity of uncovering new facts, filling knowledge gaps and 
developing a fuller understanding of each company led to information being 
acquired that was not in the public domain.  
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Each piece of information obtained was rarely price sensitive. Rather, it was 
information that had not been publicly printed or spoken about mostly
because there is a limit on the amount of information that realistically can be. 
‘We meet with companies to acquire more information. This is
fundamental to research and our research is all about fundamentals. 
We are trying to generate an informational advantage that we can 
exploit for our clients. Dialogue is a terrific way, yet another way to 
generate that advantage over your competitors’.  
‘The main purpose of meetings is information. We need to understand 
the views of management, their direction, how they plan to take the 
business forward. The issues we seek are long term, often 5-10 years. 
We want to come away feeling that we know something about the 
stock that the market does not know. That is not to say that we have 
inside information, it just means that we have proprietary information 
that we are using to our advantage’.
There is so much information and insight you get from direct dialogue.
It is so valuable to keep that in house to build your own team’s
expertise and to trade ahead of your competitors’. 
From the viewpoint of standard setters, behind-the-scenes meetings between
fund managers and corporate directors are perfectly acceptable. Knowing 
more about individual firms means that fund managers will initiate trades,
which contributes to more accurate security price formation, which improves
the allocative efficiency of markets that is supportive for economic growth and
development. The RI information obtained by fund managers when
communicating with corporate directors was intentionally not price sensitive6. 
6 The fund managers said that all parties were aware of what could and could not be said due to price 
sensitivity and materiality rules set by the FSA (FSA, 2007a, FSA, 2007b, FSA, 2008a, FSA, 2008b, 
FSA, 2008c). 
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‘When a chairman says ‘between you and me’ does that make you an 
insider? The legal advice we have received is that it doesn’t. In many 
meetings you get hints that things are changing and often receive 
information that could be price sensitive if it wasn’t for the fact that 
markets to some degree already suspect and have anticipated most of 
the information received. I have never been in the situation where I 
have been told ‘we are doing this, and by the way, you now can’t talk 
about it to anybody’. I have never been made an insider without being 
warned that I am about to be by the company itself.’
‘I don’t think we are dealing with the sort of information that would 
make us insiders. Most of the issues we are discussing with 
companies are long term issues. They are management issues, they 
are indicators of good management, they are indicators of the way the 
strategy will go.’ 
‘As a shareholder you want to bail out before the market figures out 
what you know or a firm announces it to the market. I’m not saying all 
extra-financial information is material, but some of it is at the margin. 
For example, information on how house builders manage waste may 
not move the share price but it could over time tell you how good they 
are at being efficient. If you figure that the firm is less efficient than the 
market figures that is material to you. It gives you a trading advantage’. 
‘It is more generally at a corporate governance level where there is 
more risk of companies asking if we wanted to be taken inside or not. 
That obviously limits our trading. RI is the same as financial 
information in that there is a limit to how deep you can drill without
picking up price sensitive information. Normally if you are speaking to a 
company they will say “we can tell you this but it will make you
insiders”. They have a duty to warn you’. 
2. Influence 
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Communication with corporate directors was also an opportunity to seek 
influence and to work with companies to help create change where it would 
benefit shareholders. 
‘The direct communication process starts with change; this is its 
primary purpose. We aim to be informed and thorough in our due 
diligence – so that dialogue reflects companies’ individual 
circumstances and can make a difference’. 
‘We aim to be persuasive and pragmatic in dialogue so that we 
achieve change that enhances the bottom line, rather than imposing 
prescriptive demands on companies’.
A fund manager has to have first of all developed sufficient understanding of a 
company in order to have a meaningful dialogue with corporate directors
about the company’s performance. Fund management firms that allocated low 
resources to researching company fundamentals often had difficulty doing so.
Corporate directors were quick to ascertain an uninformed fund manager and 
meaningful dialogue and influence was then foreclosed. 
For the informed fund manager, the process of seeking influence would next
involve using meetings with corporate directors to identify and agree on areas
of potential or actual corporate underperformance. For example, a firm may
be slow to adapt to new opportunities and risks, or its product proposition or 
service delivery may be less than optimal. The understanding and mutual
respect necessary to get to this point of focus was not to be underestimated. 
The fund managers would then aim to exert influence. The aim was to be firm 
and persistent in dialogue in order to advance and protect shareholders 
interests and the ongoing success of the company. Some fund managers
found that a willingness to listen only came about when a firm was
underperforming. Others found that influence tends to only work with firms in 
which there is a willingness to listen to a minority shareholder and there exists 
a culture in which these ideas can be properly voiced and considered. Also 
relevant was the need for a corporation’s institutional framework to be 
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organised such that it allowed a minority share owner to act as a catalyst for 
influence and change.
‘A lot of our meetings are about why a company is not as highly valued 
as we think it can be and what management can do to change that. 
With management we identify specific factors which are responsible for 
the discount in the company’s share price and the actions that are 
likely to remedy the situation. If there is a particular issue that has not
been dealt with then you will have a series of meetings to seek
change. You want to make sure that the changes the company
consider are the most appropriate ones’.
‘We follow an agency theory framework. 100% of our private dialogue 
is for change. Behind the theory lie informational asymmetries. We are 
the owners, if we were also the operators there would not be a 
disconnect, but we are not and there are’.  
Fund managers recognised that as a result of attempts to exert influence and 
change a more formal relationship was formed with corporate directors in 
which they would not be as forthcoming with information for investment that 
was integral for trading securities. Due to this, fund managers desiring 
information for investment tended to give low priority to influence. 
3. Relationship building 
Most of the fund managers believed that building and maintaining the right
relationship was key to being able to convert communication with corporate 
directors into successful outcomes. Relationship building meant getting to
know the key people within each firm, so that you know who to go to when 
something more is needed. This included getting to know the names of
managers at lower than board level so that direct contact could be made to
obtain more operational RI information when needed.  
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‘Maintaining the relationship is very important. We have conversations 
all the time to maintain relationships. We do it to monitor, to put 
specific issues to companies that we feel are material, and  we do it so
that when there is a problem its not the first time we’ve met, its just part 
of an ongoing communication process’. 
The fund managers that prioritised obtaining information for investment in 
their communication with corporate directors mostly sought a closer 
relationship with corporate directors in the belief that this would lead to better 
quality information and competitive position relative to other fund managers.
They were highly reluctant to raise issues with corporate directors that might
be considered awkward or controversial. There was a belief that doing so
would close the door on obtaining the RI information they need to gain the 
competitive advantage they desire in trading securities. 
‘We don’t tend to do a lot of debating with companies, we do not 
sponsor resolutions and we are very careful about aligning ourselves 
with collaborative engagement’.
‘We seriously consider actions that may interfere with the building of
good relationships with management; it would send a signal that we do 
not wish to encourage. It goes back to the importance of building the 
right relationships with management’.
‘Investment emphasis relies on close contact with companies. We 
always want to ensure that our relations with firms are good in order to
obtain the research we need’.
In contrast, the fund managers with an influence approach to RI said that they
needed to be more persuasive and influential in dialogue. This stems from a 
belief that corporate directors are more likely to act if fund managers 
approach issues with firmness and persistency. The fund managers
recognised that corporate directors will, as a result, be less forthcoming with 
RI information useful for trading securities. This was not an issue because 
39
 
173
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
trading securities was not the primary way that an influence approach to RI 
sought financial performance. 
‘At every stock review we do we look to find companies that we really
like but that have problems in which we think we can find a way of
getting that value out. We then have a series of meetings to seek 
change. Often it is about maintaining contact. You want to make sure
that the changes the company considers are the most appropriate 
ones. We constantly communicate, and we constantly monitor specific 
issues about companies that we feel are material. There is no 
expectation of amiable relations with corporate management, but we 
expect appropriate consideration of our views’. 
4. Corporate Reporting and Disclosure 
Prior to company meetings a small number of fund managers looked to 
develop an opinion about whether a firm’s approach to corporate reporting 
and disclosure was harming its market value. If so, they would communicate 
with the corporate directors to suggest that the company address this. This
usually involved a need for further clarification or more visibility about an issue
or area of the business. If the particular company did not resolve the
disclosure issue satisfactorily or if the disclosure itself heightened concern the 
fund managers might threaten to divest. The small group of fund managers
who talked about this form of communication with corporate directors tended 
to be managers of ethical investment funds.  
‘Often we tell the company our own views on its policy. Based on that 
the company might say: “actually we have done a really bad job of 
explaining how this works”, and then they might make a public
disclosure. We encourage them to do that’.
‘We often encourage firms to improve disclosure where this would help 
alleviate a significant market uncertainty. If company silence is
damaging they may be encouraged to disseminate RI information’. 
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In contrast to this view held by a few fund managers, the vast majority
believed that disclosure was a matter for the company. 
‘We don’t push companies to release information. Most of the issues
we discuss are about long term strategies, they are not immediately 
material or sensitive. It’s up to them to draw the line on what is 
commercially sensitive and not valuable to disclosure’. 
‘It is completely up to the companies, we never tell them what they
should or should not do. You have to respect that they should know 
where they should make a public disclosure’. 
5. Public Policy
A further small number of fund managers communicated with corporate 
directors to encourage them and their corporate boards to work with standard 
setters and regulators in order to raise standards in accounting, remuneration, 
corporate governance, as well as working for better securities markets. The 
aim was to bring about a positive influence on all share holdings because it is
most often the case that a large proportion of shareholders in any one firm will 
also be shareholders of many others companies throughout the world. Due to 
this, shareholders of firms had financial interests that went beyond those of 
any single firm, industry or even country. By taking an interest in the 
investments of an entire fund, the fund managers hoped that corporate boards
would support them in encouraging public policy where it is in shareholders 
broad financial interests. 
‘Our interest has moved on towards mega themes. We have really 
been trying to take a step back and ask “what are the different issues
which affect all of our funds over the long term?” It is a lack of 
information in markets, it is poor governance structures, it is valuation. 
We want to talk to the organisations in these areas both here and 
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elsewhere and we want the firm in which we are share owners to 
support our efforts to improve markets’. 
‘There is a whole other area about engaging with policy makers for 
better markets and better public policy for business, society and the 
environment. We need to distinguish engagement by a fund manager 
who is motivated only to make a better trading decision from our 
engagement which means talking to companies and standard setters 
to get a change of some kind. What fund managers do for the 
purposes of trading is not what we call engagement’.
This view that the interests of a large, modern institutional owner are very
broad because investments are spread around the world is developed further 
in the next chapter. 
6. Consultancy
Different to the other communications aims described above was consultancy. 
This was different because it involved corporate directors requesting a fund 
manager they knew was an expert in a particular area to advise them on how 
the firm should move forward. For those fund managers that corporate 
directors looked to for help it was a chance to learn a great deal more and to
come to a more enlightened view than could have been acquired via others 
forms of communication with the firm. It often meant becoming an insider. The 
fund managers were not concerned about this for they were long term holders
of the firm’s securities. 
‘The process gets interesting when it is a form of consultancy on where 
the company is going or ought to go. Our focus is only on 
environmental issues and we do not undertake activism on any issue 
at all. Companies know us for this and trust us. Several have asked us
for advice and strategic input on environmental issues within their 
business strategy. We get taken inside and are happy to stay there 
whilst questions relevant to that business are solved’.
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This meant something more than the not so unusual situation in which 
corporate directors might use a one-to-one meeting to warm a major 
shareholder of the latest strategic thinking or to develop an understanding of 
potential market reaction to different business scenarios. 
Importance of the Reasons for Communicating with Corporate Directors 
The fund managers gave estimates for the emphasis they attached to the six 
reasons for communicating with corporate directors. Because there may be 
more than one reason for a single communication, the fund managers were 
asked to estimate the emphasis placed on each of the 6 reasons for 
communicating as a proportion of 100. The results are presented in the chart
below, and sorted by order of importance. 
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On average, the fund managers placed more than 60% of the emphasis of 
communicating with corporate directors on obtaining information for 
investment. This emphasis was more than twice that of any other
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communication aim. A significant minority of fund managers said that more 
than 90% of the emphasis was on information for investment. The fund 
managers that placed more than 90% of the communication emphasis on 
obtaining information for investment were active fund managers that used 
integrated financial analysis to support their particular investment styles. 
Investment styles included growth investing, best-in-class, value investing and 
benchmark driven. 
In contrast, a small number of fund managers placed more than 90% of the 
emphasis of direct communication on influence and change. Some of these 
fund managers had an activist approach to investing. Others were fund 
management firms that owned and managed a specialist engagement and 
voting service offered to other investors. 
A third group of fund managers placed roughly equal weight on investment
information, influence, and relationships. They lacked a strong pull towards
any one aim. These fund managers tended to have insurance company 
parents that sold long-term life and pension products to retail investors. The 
nature of these long-term insurance products did not require outperformance 
in the same way that fund managers offering specialist mandates did. The 
investment approach tended to be benchmark driven and involved holding a 
mixed portfolio that was neither growth nor value. Since the investment 
proposition of long-term products was different, so too was the emphasis on 
communicating with corporate directors. This was often relatively weak in its 
purpose, perhaps expressing polite reservations about strategy, but in effect
serving no more than to remind corporate directors that shareowners have the 
right to meet with and monitor corporate directors should they choose to do
so. Several fund managers said that life insurers did not want to harm good 
relationships with corporations by seeking influence and change for
corporations are major buyers of pension and insurance products. The small 
number of life insurers that allocated relatively significant resources to RI
communicated more, but the mix of aims was similar. 
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The communication emphasis of index fund managers had a similar mix as 
the life insurers. There was no great need for information for investment as 
this type of fund management was not based on trading securities for profit. 
There was also a low emphasis on influence. This came about because so
few resources were devoted to researching company fundamentals yet many 
lines of stock were held. The business model was low cost. This meant fewer 
experts within analysis. Some non-index fund managers said that this led to a 
relatively low degree of understanding of each company and so less ability to
be persuasive in dialogue with corporate directors in order to bring about 
influence. Some non-index fund managers also mentioned that index fund 
managers were myopic on influence because some of their largest clients are 
pension funds of corporations with whom they were said not to want to harm
beneficial relationships. 
Building and maintaining relationships was a reason that all fund managers 
met with corporate directors regardless of their approach to RI. Whilst of itself
not a major emphasis it stands apart because all fund managers mentioned it.
The other three reasons; consultancy, corporate disclosure and influence on 
public policy, were sought by very few fund managers but those that did 
emphasise these reasons had a very high conviction in their benefits. This
was most evident in the area of public policy, an aspect that seems to have 
risen in prominence as a result of the financial crisis and is discussed further 
in chapter 6. 
Chapter 5: RI Staff within Fund Management 
The basis of RI fund management lay in bringing capable and skilled staff into
contact with significant amounts of appropriate information. Information was
the subject of chapters 3 and 4. This chapter examines RI staff within fund 
management firms. There are three sections within this chapter. Section 1 
reports the allocation of RI staff within fund management firms. Section 2 
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examines the number of RI staff within fund management firms. This informs 
on the quantity of staff brought to bear on RI. Section 3 attempts to estimate 
the quality of RI that results from the number of RI staff employed. It does so
by reporting the relationship between the number of RI staff and the number
of different lines of stock held for each fund management firm.  
1. The Allocation of RI Staff within Fund Management Firms 
Fund management firms employed RI staff in several areas of the business.
These included fund management (portfolio construction, security selection), 
analysis (research, fund management support, measurement of firms against 
standards of corporate governance, establishment of voting decisions), 
marketing and client servicing. 
90% of RI staff were employed for fund management and analytical positions, 
and 10% for marketing and client servicing positions. This gives only a partial 
picture however. This is because the staff roles were not rigid. When required, 
fund management and analytical staff would move across to support
marketing and client servicing. This meant significant sharing of tasks. The 
allocation of RI staff by time across different areas of the business is
presented in the chart below. The chart uses a five point scale, where 4 is
‘high and 0 ‘low. The maximum possible mean score is 4 and the minimum 0. 
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The chart above reveals that the allocation of RI staff by time to different 
areas of the business is much more evenly spread than the allocation of RI
staff by employed position. The latter revealed a split of 90% fund 
management and analytical, and 10% marketing and client servicing. Both 
marketing and client servicing are more important than this allocation 
suggests. Particularly notable is client servicing, which is important of itself
and more so than marketing. Fund managers said that RI clients tended to 
prefer a high level of reporting on engagement and voting activity than 
conventional investment clients. 
2. The Number of RI Staff within Fund Management Firms 
The total number of RI staff within each fund management firm was used as 
an indicator of the quantity of RI staff resources. This measure relies on fund 
management firms self reporting their number of RI staff. The chart below 
reports the total number of RI staff on a full time equivalent basis within each 
of the sample fund management firms.  
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The number of RI staff within the sample fund management firms ranged from 
1 to 53. The mean, median and modal number of RI staff for the 25 fund 
management firms was 6.7, 4.0 and 3.0 respectively. This means that the 
most frequent occurring number of staff, the modal value, was 3.  
This result is similar to surveys by the United Nations Principles of 
Responsible Investment and the Investment Management Association (IMA, 
2007b; PRI, 2007). The surveys above, like this study, report a broad 
measure of RI staff as self reported by the firms themselves. A significant
number of fund management firms count staff employed in corporate 
governance and voting within their total for RI. This was based on reasoning
that these areas input into RI. Other fund managers said that this overstated 
the significance of RI resources and was not strictly correct because 
corporate governance and voting need to take place regardless of any view 
on RI and in accordance with the Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
(Combined Code, 2008). 
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Six fund management firms hired 7 or more RI staff. Three of the 6 were life 
insurers. These firms managed significant long term retail funds inhouse and 
had a long history and significant involvement in RI. The other 3 were fund 
management firms whose number of RI staff was boosted due to their also
owning an outsourced engagement and voting service offered to other
investors such as pension funds and charities. If these 3 latter firms are 
removed from the sample the mean and median number of RI staff for the 
remaining 22 fund management firms are both 4. If all 6 firms that employ 7 or
more RI staff are removed from the sample, the mean and median number of 
RI staff for the remaining 19 fund management firms are both 3.  
‘There is myself and two others on ESG issues; we are specifically
dealing with all ESG issues. Clearly there are separate fund 
management issues, you need someone to run that and you need to 
collect the data. It’s bringing together information and reporting back to 
clients’. 
‘Three staff cover voting, corporate governance, analysis and advice to 
fund managers. This limits what we can drill down to but it works for 
clients’. 
‘We have a team of 4 people on responsible investment. It costs 
money to run 4 people and to attend meetings, buy research and 
allocate 5% of our research budget and that’s just on enhanced 
analytics. We also get voting research; we buy-in specific RI sources’. 
The fund management firms with greater numbers of RI staff tended to use
their extra resource to perform inhouse research on issues, themes, sectors 
and industries. This included specific work on tax, legislation and regulation,
climate change, people’s access to fresh water, labour standards, renewable 
energy, technology, changes to sustainable consumption patterns, health, 
immigration, global pandemics, obesity, security of supply of inputs for
production, resource scarcity and potential defaults in bank lending due to
sustainability. 
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‘By focusing on sectors and themes you really get to understand the 
players, their role, the technology, and the conflicts. We find a lot of
early stage trends in technology this way, you pick up quite a lot of
those sorts of things that you would not by looking at each company in 
isolation’. 
The fund management firms with fewer RI staff tended to rely on buying in 
information. Buying in information was cheaper than hiring RI staff. The fund 
managers reported that on average 85% of the total cost of providing RI was
staff and 15% was information. One reason that information was so much 
cheaper is because clients directly pay a major proportion of it. On average,
four-fifths of the total cost of information was directly paid by the client in the 
form of commission allocation and one-fifth by the fund management firm. Of 
the one-fifth that the fund management firm pays, this may later be passed on 
to the client via the fund management fee or alternatively absorbed by the firm 
within its financial statements. 
It is conventional practice to use client money to directly pay for information 
via a commission allocation system. When trading securities, fund 
management firms allocate an extra commission for research above the 
commission payable to only execute trades on behalf of clients. In effect, one 
commission is paid for trade execution services and one commission is paid 
for information and research services. The commission for information and 
research accrues in a specific research allocation account. The accrued 
amounts are periodically paid across to research providers that have 
contributed the best information. Separate payments for trade execution and 
information should lead to a better quality of fund management service. When 
they were combined, as was the case prior to 2006, investors often paid a 
higher trade execution cost in order to access good research7. Research
commission is a client cost not included in the fund management charge. Both 
7 In 2006, The FSA introduced regulations that formally unbundled trading and information related
parts to commission. In the UK fund managers must now disclose to their clients how much they are 
paying for execution services and research services. 
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active and passive managers purchased information and research using client
money in this way. 
3. Relationship between the Number of RI staff and the Number of Lines 
of Stock Held by Fund Management Firms 
An attempt to estimate the quality of RI that is undertaken was performed by 
comparing the number of RI staff to the number of lines of stock held per fund 
management firm. 
This measure is based on reasoning that the more lines of stock a fund 
management firm holds, the greater will be the scale of RI tasks that need to 
be performed. This happens because attached to each line of stock or 
security is a unique set of investor rights, corporate actions and 
considerations. As more lines of stock are held, more RI staff are needed if
the quality of RI is to be maintained. 
The relationship between the number of RI staff and the number of lines of
stock held by fund management firms is reported in the chart below. The lines 
of stock held by each fund management firm were obtained from Thomson 
Financial. 
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In the chart above two dotted lines originate from the origin and slope up and 

to the right. The upper dotted line refers to a situation in which RI has no
 
economies of scale and a member of staff is able to acquire and maintain 

good knowledge of 100 lines of stock. The line plots 1 RI staff for every 100 

lines of stock held. The choice of 1 member of RI staff for each 100 lines of
 
stock was based on a judgement following the interviews. Admittedly there is
 
an arbitrary element to this number but even if it were 75, 125 or any other
 
number the effect would be the same. 

The lower dotted line that is curved refers to a situation in which there are 
economies of scale and each new member of RI staff is able to acquire and 
maintain good knowledge of the same number of lines of stock as the 
previous member of staff, plus 10% more. Economies of scale are 10%. 
Whichever line is the focus for comparison, specialist RI fund management 
firms as a group offer the highest quality RI. This is because more of the firms 
are above the dotted lines. Index fund management firms offer the lowest 
quality RI since they are the greatest distance below the lines. Active fund 
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management firms offer higher quality RI than index fund management firms. 
It is notable that whilst a small number of life insurers are sometimes held out
as exemplars of high quality RI, they tend not to appear so high quality when
scaled for the lines of stock they hold. 
The very highest quality RI using the measurement system above was a fund 
management firm that also owned and managed an engagement and voting 
service. It had in excess of 50 full time equivalent staff. In order to bring this 
firm onto the chart above the vertical axis has been significantly compressed 
above 16 staff. 
The lowest quality RI using the measurement system above was an index 
fund management firm that more than any other undertook factor matching, or 
optimisation, as an indexation technique. The practical reality according to
one fund manager was that very last thing this fund management firm wanted 
to do was to influence firms within the portfolio. Doing so risked changing their 
characteristics. This might change their nature, which in an optimised portfolio 
based on an index is exactly the opposite of what is desirable. This is
because changing stock characteristics held in an optimised portfolio 
increases tracking error. This will mean more rebalancing than would have
otherwise been the case, an increase in costs and a loss of clients. Other 
indexation techniques such as stratified sampling or duplication did not suffer
this fundamental conflict between portfolio construction technique and the 
bringing about influence and change in firms where appropriate to do so.  
A final notable finding was that of no statistical significance between the
number of RI staff and the number of lines of stock held. The expectation was
that RI staff would increase with increases in the number of lines of stock 
held. If it did, this would lead to a positive correlation. For the full 25 fund
management firm sample, the correlation coefficient was 0.39. Removing the 
3 fund management firms that offered an outsourced engagement and voting 
service to other investors, the correlation between RI staff and lines of stock 
for the remaining 22 fund management firms was -0.09. The absence of a 
positive economic relationship between RI staff and lines of stock held for 
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these 22 fund management firms was a notable result. The negative
relationship was due to the presence of index fund management firms.  
Chapter 6: How RI Achieves Financial Performance 
Bringing RI staff (Chapter 5) into contact with RI information (Chapters 3 and 
4) led to financial performance in 3 ways. 
One was via a financial dividend attached to the more responsible firm. This
required identifying more responsible firms and investing in them at the right 
time and at the right price. This type of performance was the most frequently
sought. 
A second was via influence at the level of the firm. This required fund 
managers and corporate directors working together to evolve a firm that 
strikes the right balance between risk and reward that is in the best interests 
of long term shareholders. This might mean trying to increase a quantity 
variable such as profits, but alternatively it might mean influencing a quality 
variable such as how profits are generated or how repeatable and durable
profits and the profit generating model are.  
The third was via influence at the level of public policy. This required 
anticipating major RI related shifts and events in advance of them coming 
through. This might mean influencing public policy to help the whole portfolio 
perform. In other situations the purpose of influence might be tangential to 
immediate improvements in performance. This might mean encouraging the 
creation of new international institutions for the improvement of leadership in 
this area, or to evolve and develop compacts of existing global institutions
with a willingness to act. The aim is to create institutions and frameworks so 
that influence can be applied for the improvement of markets and therefore,
ultimately, performance. 
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There are three sections to this chapter. Each investigates one of the 3 ways
in which RI becomes financial performance. Section 1 reports on the dividend 
attached to the more responsible firm. Section 2 describes performance as a 
result of influence based on firms. Section 3 describes performance as a 
result of influence based on public policy 
1. A Dividend Attached to the More Responsible Firm 
A significant empirical academic literature developed over the last thirty years
is generally supportive of the existence of a financial dividend attached to the 
more responsible firm. Companies that discharge their performance in a 
responsible way are more likely to flourish financially. Furthermore, a firm that 
anticipates and responds early to the changing nature of what it means to be 
responsible may be lower risk. This overall result is not without contradictory 
findings. Findings, both supporting and contradicting, are organised in 
Appendix 2. 
It should be borne in mind that the existence of a dividend does not
necessarily mean it is available at the level of the portfolio once the fund 
management costs to find it and trade on the basis of it are taken into 
account. This is the subject of Chapter 7 on valuation, charges and costs.  
2. Financial Performance from Influence Based on Firms 
The aim of influence based on firms was for fund managers and corporate 
directors to together evolve a firm that strikes the right balance between risk
and reward given the expected trajectory of the firm and industry. Avoidance 
of certain risks, appetite for other risks, and awareness of future opportunities
would over time lead a company to superior long-term performance. 
Responding early to potential risks might mean a firm does not confront an 
eventuality that it otherwise would. In other cases a potential risk may
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materialise but impact in a more benign way than it would have. For example, 
a company may have reduced the amount of waste going to landfill prior to a 
rise in landfill prices, or switched to low carbon sources of power prior to a rise
in the price of carbon. Performance is improved through there being a 
smoother future path for the business. 
‘A lot of our engagement is driven by government policy closing down 
market opportunities for companies in dirty market sectors and 
switching resources towards new areas. We see that as a continuing 
theme and basis for discussion with companies operating in these 
markets. If companies don’t address these issues and opportunities 
presented to them across all sectors they are going to find themselves
lagging behind their competition’.
‘As sustainable development problems get more acute, the scale of the 
government response to them will step up. The challenge for us is to 
work with firms to stay ahead of policy makers and government actions
so that our investments are winners, not losers’.
A number of fund managers said that financial performance from engagement 
based on firms was often difficult to measure statistically.  This is because
there was no yardstick for what the future trajectory of the firm would have 
been in the absence of RI engagement. Also, companies respond to so many 
drivers and stakeholders. It was often not possible to attribute influence from
fund managers to subsequent actions and performance from companies.
Even a seemingly successful outcome for a fund manager may in fact be due 
to many influences all working in the same direction at the same time, only
one of which was the fund manager. It always took a leap of faith for a fund 
manager to attribute this change to its own work. In the end, the activity of 
influence requires a belief that a major investor can be sufficiently well 
informed and persuasive in its dialogue to make a positive difference to 
performance. 
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Activism
A more focused form of influence was activism. This meant identifying 
companies which were not economically performing to their potential. Poor 
performance could have its origins in the portfolio firm’s financial structure,
governance and management, operations, strategy, product proposition, 
service delivery, or its slow adaptation to new opportunities and risks. An RI
issue might feed into this process where it was material to economic
underperformance at that particular time. Concentrated investments in 
underperforming firms are taken. Influence and change was sought through 
persistent dialogue and, if necessary, more formal sanctions such as the 
threat of removal of one of more directors. Once the market reflects the 
improvements in performance and the greater potential for performance, the 
holding would be sold. The value added to the portfolio is then appraised in 
absolute percentage terms as well as relative to a yardstick such as an index 
of shares. A small number of fund management firms undertook activism to 
some degree. 
‘Our strategy is to buy and hold operationally riskier firms and employ
our influence to bring down the level of risk, improve performance, and 
so increase valuation. In doing so we focus on firms below certain 
quantitative and qualitative thresholds. Actively engaging in this sense 
means getting involved in underperforming companies and working 
with their boards to bring about change that will lead to superior long-
term performance by the company’.
There is mixed evidence on the value and performance of activism. Smith 
(1996) finds that activism that leads to successful changes in governance is 
associated with greater subsequent stock returns. Strickland, Wiles and 
Zenner (1996), Barber (2006) and Nesbit (1994) find a positive association 
between active monitoring by shareholders and improvements in corporate 
performance. Gillan and Starks (1999) and Bhagat, Black and Blair (2004)
report mixed evidence on corporate governance induced restructuring and 
stock market returns. In a survey of studies, Karpoff (2001) finds that
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shareholder activism can produce small changes in target firms' governance 
structures but negligible changes to share values and earnings8. Different to
the US results above, Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2008) examine UK 
shareholder activism and find abnormal returns associated with engagements,
as well as success in bringing about corporate restructuring. International 
results can be difficult to pull together because the term activism tends to 
mean different things in different countries. 
3. Financial Performance from Influence Based on Public Policy
The aim of influence based on public policy was to anticipate major RI related 
shifts and events in advance of them coming through. Where these might 
harm the value of some or all of the portfolio holdings the aim was to involve 
regulators, standard setters, governments, supra-national organisations and 
industry trade associations in order to promote recognition of issues, build a 
consensus on the need for action, and to execute action in time to mitigate 
impacts or prevent their occurrence. Few fund managers mentioned this type 
of performance but those that did had a high conviction in its benefits.  
The aim of responding early to perceived risks was based on the belief that 
markets would subsequently take a smoother path than they otherwise would 
have done in the absence of intervention. This is because either the risks do 
not materialise or do so in a more minor way. Responding early to perceived 
risks might mean that markets globally, and therefore all of a fund manager’s
or client’s investments, do not confront an eventuality that they otherwise 
would. 
8 This research often adopts an event study methodology because the prices at which fund managers
bought and sold the shares of target firms at are not observable.  
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Examples of Influence Based on Public Policy 
An example is depletion of the earth’s natural capital. This involved concerns
that the global economy’s use of resources exceeds the earth’s biophysical
limits. It was better to direct concern about depletion of the earth’s natural 
capital to standard setters, governments and supra national organisations
because there is little that RI influence based on individual firms can achieve. 
The problem is too large scale and cross border. Worse still, fund manager
influence aimed at supporting activities within individual companies to boost 
earnings may ultimately leave all worse off if this comes at the cost of growing
economic externalities. Here, engaging on public policy involved working with 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as well as supporting 
organisations such as the Carbon Disclosure Project, Carbon Trust and 
Global Reporting Initiative that act for the measurement and disclosure of
carbon by all corporations. 
A second example is pension fund led dialogue with the pharmaceutical 
industry. This involved discussion with the main firms in the pharmaceutical 
industry about their operating and revenue model pricing and R&D, changes
in societal expectations, growth in importance of the ‘emerging markets’,  and 
how the pharmaceutical industry communicates and interacts with consumers 
in the marketplace. The aim was to influence the whole industry in order that 
long term shareholders can remain supportive of it. 
There were also attempts to influence public policy around more standard
areas of investment management, including corporate governance, company 
law, investor protection, excessive executive remuneration, tax, legislation
and changes in accounting standards and disclosure. 
More Examples of Influence Based on Public Policy 
For example, in 2007 several large pension schemes communicated with the 
European Commission to oppose abolition of the 2nd Company Law 
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Directive: Simplification of Capital Maintenance Rules. This was because it 
proposed a repeal of shareholder pre-emption rights (which serve as a 
mechanism to protect the shareholdings of existing investors from becoming 
too diluted when a new issue of shares is made) that might harm the position 
of investors in pension and savings vehicles who are long term holders of
shares. 
Also in 2007, one large pension scheme communicated with US companies to
encourage the adoption of an advisory shareholder vote on executive 
compensation. An advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation was
said to be beneficial for all parties because it gave all shareholders a voice,
provided the board with input on how the market evaluates executive 
compensation decisions, gave shareholders an alternative to voting against
director candidates in order to address compensation practices, and had a 
positive impact on alignment of management interests with long term
shareholders. 
Fund managers mentioned difficulties of statistically demonstrating 
performance. There was no obvious way of knowing when this form of 
influence was working, and by how much it had influenced outcomes that
would have prevailed but that now would not. Fund managers that undertook
this form of influence had an interest in their client’s whole financial situation 
as well as believed that this approach could make a difference. 
Another drawback was the lack of international organisations to approach. 
Many attempts to influence public policy transcend national borders, for 
example climate change, executive compensation and accounting standards.
Approaching a single national regulator did not have much meaning and stood 
to achieve little. This type of influence meant more when there existed 
international institutions that had powers to put pressure on national 
regulators to move for the betterment of investors globally. Influence here 
might mean encouraging the creation of new international institutions for the 
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improvement of leadership in this area, or to evolve and develop compacts of
existing global institutions with a willingness to act. The aim is to create 
institutions and frameworks so that influence can be applied for the 
improvement of markets and therefore, ultimately, performance. 
Chapter 7: Limitations on Performance Due to Valuations, 
Charges and Costs 
The previous chapter identified the existence of a financial performance 
dividend attached to more responsible firms as well as benefits due to forms 
of influence. This does not necessarily translate to better portfolio 
performance because there may be higher valuations, charges and costs to 
pay that are specific to RI. These will erode the benefits previously identified.
1. Valuations
In a competitive market in which information is well dispersed, knowledge of a 
performance dividend to more responsible firms will sow the seeds of its own
destruction. An investor who holds shares in a more responsible firm will 
require a higher price to sell to another investor because the additional 
dividend makes the firm worth more. Security prices will adjust. If the 
valuations of more responsible firms have been bid up, some of the 
performance dividend attached to more responsible firms is no longer
available. An RI fund manager that has bought into the investment at a higher 
price will find it that much harder to subsequently outperform.  
Most fund managers believed that this is not the way that markets operate. 
The market is poor at projecting the future. Due to this the market discounts
the worth of future projects and scenarios into today’s terms at too high a rate.
This is especially the case with RI because so many of the issues are long 
term. Having discounted at too high a rate, the market in today’s terms 
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attaches too low a value to RI. The financial dividend attached to more 
responsible firms remains available. In other situations the market treats
future RI events as improbable rather than probable and so attributes no 
value to them. This gives fund managers an opportunity to capture the 
performance dividend that comes with researching RI fundamentals. The 
concept of valuation was seen as not relevant to an approach based on 
influence due to the way that influence delivers its benefits. Overall, the fund 
managers strongly believed that more responsible firms did not yet trade on 
higher valuations. This meant that the dividend was available to those that 
researched it. 
2. Charges 
Time and resources are needed to persistently identify more responsible 
companies. Valuation skills need to be applied so that the securities of more 
responsible companies can be bought and sold at the right time and at the 
right price. Appraisal skills must be brought to bear to ensure the securities 
selected fit with the investment mandate, diversify the portfolio when bought in
combination with other securities and are available in sufficient quantity and at
low cost. Expert and specialist analysts that are separate to the fund 
managers may then discharge influence based on RI. In all, this comes
through as an additional cost. According to one fund manager: 
‘There are extra costs I think you need for decent RI or integration.
There are the analysts who’ve got that expertise which isn’t part of a 
CFA or IMC qualification. There are different research sources and 
contracts you need to pay for. For governance and engagement
services there will be an increase in the fees for that. All in all I think to
do this properly I would say you are talking half a million pounds’.
The costs of administering RI are either charged to the client or absorbed by
the fund management firm and carried in its financial statements. A number of 
studies report on the costs of RI. A majority reveal the existence of a higher
fund management charge. Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003) find that
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average total expense ratios (TERs) of RI funds are 24% higher than those of
conventional funds. Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2004) find that average TERs
of German RI mutual funds are 35% higher than conventional mutual funds, 
those of UK RI funds are between 4% to 12% more, and US RI funds 6%
more. In contrast, Statman (2000) finds that average total expense ratios of
US RI mutual funds are 4% lower than that of conventional US mutual funds.  
The fund managers reported how much RI adds to the fund management 
charge of a conventional fund according to different placement sizes. The 
results are presented below. 
Additional RI Fund Management Charge for Different Placement Sizes 
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On average, RI adds 18% to the fund management fee for a £100m mandate, 
14% to a £200-£500m mandate and 13% to a £1bn mandate. Although a 
higher charge will serve to erode the performance dividend attached to more
responsible firms, the fund managers emphasised that these charges for RI 
should be put in context. This is because RI is not the most important driver of 
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the overall fund management charge. The contribution of components to the 
overall fund management charge is presented in the chart below.  
Contribution of Different Components to the Fund Management Charge 
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On average, the placement size of the fund contributes 29% of the total fund 
management fee, mandate idiosyncrasies 22% (for example, portfolio 
allocation limits on single stocks, industries, cash, depositary receipts and off-
index and off-exchange positions), RI 14%, investment geography 5% (for
example UK, emerging markets, North America), capitalisation 5% (for
example large capitalisation, small capitalisation) and client service level 
25%9. 
One point of emphasis was client service level. The fund managers said that 
this could take a low or high value depending on what feedback and reporting 
the client requires of the fund manager. In particular, when RI was written into
9 It is notable that investment geography and capitalisation make relatively little overall difference to 
the fund management fee. This means that a global small cap RI fund would not cost significantly more 
than a domestic large cap RI fund with similar size, client service level and mandate characteristics. 
This would suggest that international diversification and the potential for small cap fund performance 
are relatively inexpensive to acquire. 
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the investment mandate fund managers tended to raise the charge for client 
servicing. This is because not to properly document and communicate how RI
had been discharged, including its impact, might then be used to construct an 
argument for underperformance which was a reason for manager dismissal or
negotiation of a reduction or payback of fees. In order to be credible, reporting 
and communication had to be delivered by those who worked the area, which 
was the fund managers and analysts whose time is costly. Writing RI into the 
investment mandate therefore led to a more formal RI reporting environment. 
When RI was not written into the investment mandate, the reporting 
environment was less crucial and the charge for client servicing 
correspondingly lower. 
A second point of emphasis was the charge for RI. The average was 14%, but 
the values (not reported in the chart above) ranged from 5% to 22% of the 
overall fund management fee. An example of a low charge RI fund is one that 
uses negative screens only. An example of a high charge RI fund is one that 
uses integration, RI influence and negative screens. Fund managers reporting 
close to 14% might combine integration with negative screens, influence with 
activism, best-in-class with negative screens or some integration and some
influence. The fund managers gave estimates for the contribution of different
types of RI to the overall charge for a RI within the fund management fee. The 
results are presented in the chart below. 
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Contribution to the Overall Charge for Administering RI 
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The most important determinant of the RI charge was integration. Integration 
was the most expensive to perform. The second most expensive type of RI to
perform was influence. The least expensive to undertake was negative 
screens. In order to arrive at the total RI charge a fund management firm
would combine the charges for the different types of RI required. 
‘Cost depends on the strategy. A negatively screened fund would be 
about 5 to 10 thousand pounds per screen. If you wanted several 
negative screens then the most efficient way to do that after a certain 
point would be to buy the screened data from a research company
such as EIRIS. The starting figure would be something like £30,000 but 
the charge is on a funds under management basis. If you want to buy
our standard RI service you’re looking at 100 grand upwards charged 
on a funds under management basis’.
2.1. No Extra Charge 
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A small number of fund management firms did not charge for RI. Instead the 
cost was absorbed by the fund management firm and carried in its financial
statements. Due to the fund management firm bearing the cost, the amount
spent on RI tended to be low. The approach of not charging was said to work
well for those clients focused on keeping fund management charges low 
whilst requiring some RI activity. It also worked well for clients that wanted to
separate out RI influence and outsource the function to a specialist third party. 
Passive (index) managers tended not to charge more for RI. Active fund 
management firms that did not charge tended to focus on integration. This is
because integration was thought the most likely to benefit financial 
performance within the time frame most clients were interested in. One
reason given by an active fund management firm for not charging clients more 
was: 
‘If one includes RI on the basis that it could be material to financial 
performance, it becomes very difficult to ask clients to pay more for 
what amounts to carrying out tasks that are fundamental to discharging 
a basic fiduciary function for them’.
A different reason given was that if there are no charges to erode 
performance the client will see the financial performance and the firm will win
more mandates. 
3. Costs 
The large majority of fund managers said that their approach to RI would have
exactly the same portfolio trading costs as conventional investing. This is 
because portfolio turnover was driven by market conditions and the 
characteristics of the investment mandate. Responsible and conventional 
investment both led to the same trading of the portfolio because they both 
seek investment performance from the same underlying investment return 
generating process – that of buying low and selling high. There was too much
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pressure on performance not to trade in a similar way to conventional
portfolios. 
A very small number of fund managers disagreed, and said that their
approach to RI meant lower portfolio trading costs. This suggests a further 
performance dividend and one that is in addition to that attached to more 
responsible firms. The reason given was that RI involves looking ahead to the 
long term. Due to this, investments are held for longer and traded less often.
Less portfolio trading will reduce the client’s total cost. The fund managers
that disagreed reported that their portfolio turnover was 20% - 25% lower than 
like-for-like conventional portfolios. Similar to this, Geczy, Stambaugh and 
Levin (2003) find that the turnover of RI funds in the US is on average less
than half that of conventional funds. 
Chapter 8: Five Areas of Potential Interest and Value for 
Buyers of RI
1. Subject Area 
RI investigated risks and opportunities not covered by conventional financial 
analysis. Some fund managers had taken an extreme line on this and said
that the aim was to draw on the widest possible range of risks and 
opportunities. Common remarks by fund managers in 2007 were that RI
investigated ‘Whatever is significant to a particular firm and industry’ and that
‘The goal of lowering risk for clients defines the areas of research’. When 
asked what this looked like some said that to specify it was to miss the entire 
point of RI. 
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Hindsight suggests that this was misleading. The types of risk that contributed
to major world stock market declines were not once mentioned by any of the 
25 fund management firms. When asked in 2007 what major risks and themes
are likely to emerge over the next 5 years not one interview participant
mentioned the banking industry. Each fund manager’s response had a 
relatively narrow subject matter. 
Buyers of fund management services should be mindful of claims that RI is
executed over something more than its traditional subject area. In 2007 there 
was not the resource within most fund management firms to get close to 
executing on that. Clients interested in knowing more about what is performed 
might benefit from requesting that their fund managers give a clear articulation 
of what is capable and achievable within the resources available. This might
helpfully include a list of major intentions for the period ahead and why these 
have been selected as the most prescient and in clients’ best interests. If a 
client decides that this is not sufficient and wants more it then knows that it
has to either build the capability to do that or contract separately for it.  
2. Type of RI 
In order to develop an understanding of how each fund management firm had 
organised its RI a good starting place for the buyer of RI is each fund 
management firm’s organogram. It was a fairly reliable indicator of the type of 
RI being pursued. Look for the presence of a high ranking senior officer,
board member or the board contracting expert advice. Look for the location of 
the RI team and its key people within the organisational hierarchy and how 
embedded or independent they are from investment committees and trading. 
Look for the way information and insight flows. 
3. Influence 
Influence based on RI was most effective when it was at arms length to
regular internal investment committees that discuss the origins of the next
basis points of performance and allocate financial resources accordingly.
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Look for fund management firms that ring fence the activity whilst allowing 
information and intelligence gained to pass across to investment decision 
makers. Look for resources relative to lines of stock, and look for how 
influence objectives are set. A small number of fund management firms carve 
out their influence activity into a separate business. Some of these offer a 
significant pooling of resource and forum for collective action. Independence 
and shared resource were major benefits, but a downside was the absence of 
an effective mechanism for passing the information and intelligence gained 
back out of the service to the client or the client’s fund managers. A further
downside was their distance from security ownership. Both of these can be 
overcome, and a buyer of RI might want to pursue solutions. 
4. Measurement 
Some fund management firms did a poor job explaining their activity around 
influence. Improvements in this area are relevant because influence based on 
RI is not straightforward to measure. A standardised reporting framework for
activity on influence was a long way off but buyers of RI should try to progress 
this with their fund managers. A reporting standard might start by including 
aims, motivation, justification, expected outcomes and milestones. Asking
fund management firms to do this and more would help bring clarity to what 
the action was targeting, and why, as well as draw attention to how influence 
programmes work, and when. 
5. Engagement 
Engagement was a mixed use term. It might just as often be used in the 
context of seeking information for trading as interacting in order to monitor or 
influence. At face value, it is not at all clear what engagement is seeking, 
doing or achieving. Due to this, engagement is confusing by itself as a unit of 
explanation or observation. Buyers of RI, regulators and standard setters 
should all be mindful of claims that the existence of a particular level of 
engagement provides any evidence whatsoever that fund management 
groups exercise their responsibilities as owners in the spirit that the Combined
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Code on Corporate Governance intends. Examples of how the meaning of
engagement varied across fund management firms include: 
‘We distinguish our engagement from what our fund managers do to 
make a better decision; we don’t call that engagement as it is what 
fund managers do. Anyone who says that is engagement is lying. 
Engagement means talking to a company to get a change of some
kind. Many fund management groups employ the term engagement to 
obscure their sole purpose as traders’. 
‘I think it is wrong to see engagement as at all confrontational. We 
invest in companies that have good management. We would not be 
investing in the company in the first place if we did not think they were 
doing a good job. It is seeking influence occasionally rather than 
routinely’. 
‘We need to be clear. We are not being paid a retainer to help the firm,
and we do not have a mandate to change the firm. Engagement may
be several things but it is not this’.
‘There are occasions where we find ourselves in a position where we 
do have to engage because we see that our clients are being 
undermined right now’. 
‘I am sceptical about engagement for change. There is very limited 
scope to change what the company actually does, why bother?’
When fund managers use the term engagement buyers of RI might want to 
inquire about the planned objective, process, and intended outcome of this
programme of communication. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Research Methods 
The research followed grounded theory methods. This is an empirical method 
that allows a researcher to adopt a broad view on a subject that is not well 
understood and to derive theory based upon observation (Barker, 1998).  
Grounded theory methods do not detail data collection techniques. Rather, 
they introduce analytical procedures that help the investigator organise and 
reduce the already collected data to manageable research problems and
proportions and to ground out new theory and frameworks through 
development, refinement and interrelations (Charmaz, 2000, p510). This
leaves it up to researchers to collect good data and provide confidence that
reliable sample selection and data collection methods have been undertaken
(Charmaz, 2000; Glaser, 1992). 
Sample 
The investigative population was UK fund management firms that broadcast
RI capability. These firms were observable because they advertised 
themselves through membership of the UK Social Investment Forum (UKSIF)
and the Enhanced Analytics Initiative (EAI)10. The fund management firms of 
interest were either domiciled in the UK or domiciled overseas but with 
substantial fund management capability based in the UK. The focus was firms 
with more than £1 billion of equities under management in the UK because 
they were more likely to have greater RI resources. The large majority of fund 
management firms met this criterion. 
Combining the membership lists of UKSIF and EAI, and removing fund 
management firms with less than £1 billion of equities under management, 
yielded a potential sample of 28 fund management firms. The Investment 
10 The UK Social Investment Forum is the UK's principal network for sustainable and responsible 
financial services. The Enhanced Analytics Initiative is an asset manager forum committed to
furthering RI research.  
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Management Association (IMA) reviewed this list for omissions. No additions
or deletions were suggested. 
25 the 28 fund management firms agreed to interview. Of the three that 
declined one was undergoing restructuring, a second said that it was wrongly
associated with RI, and the third said it had recently sold its RI capability and 
related investment mandates to another manager. Agreement of 25 out of 28
fund management firms represented a response rate of 90%. This compares
favourably with the 40% response rate of Barker (1998) and 55% response 
rate of Hendry, Sanderson, Barker and Roberts (2006). 
As at 31 December 2006, the 25 firms managed UK£680 billion in UK equities
out of an estimated total market of UK£940 billion managed by UK managers.
This accounts for 73% of the entire UK fund management market in equities
(IMA, 2007a). This compares favourably with the 24% of the value of UK
equities of Barker (1998). This means that the study happened to also 
achieve very high coverage of the entire UK fund management industry. This 
is because almost all large fund management firms have RI capability and 
broadcast it. This was an unintended benefit because the sample aim was
only to provide statistically meaningful coverage of fund management firms
that focus on RI. 
The 25 fund management firms represented a variety of industry sub-sectors, 
including life insurance firms, independent fund management firms, fund 
management firms owned by banks, and pension funds with their own 
inhouse fund managers. The fund management firms managed RI mandates
on a segregated and on a pooled basis, on an active and passive (index) 
management basis, and used specialist, balanced and benchmark driven 
mandates for institutional and retail clients. The funds invested in UK,
European, emerging and global securities. 
The final sample of 25 firms compares favourably with other studies that have
used interview based research with fund managers, including the 16 of Barker 
(1998), 11 of Hendry et al (2006), and 27 of Holland and Doran (1998). 
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Method 
The data collection method involved face-to-face semi-structured interviews
as well as a survey. Semi-structured interviews have the advantage of
allowing interviewees to express opinions on wide-ranging, pre-determined 
issues (Barker, 1998). 
An initial semi-structured question set was constructed from the relevant 
literature in consultation with expert individuals. Five pilot interviews were
performed. Pilot interview selection was based on a stratification of the 25 
fund management firms. During the pilot interviews fund managers were 
asked to consider the appropriateness of the questions as well as propose 
new and different questions that ought to be asked but had thus far not.  
Each new pilot interview embodied the revisions suggested from the previous 
pilot. The number of revisions reduced with each new pilot. By the fifth pilot no 
further amendments to the question set were suggested. This was interpreted 
as the point when additional pilot interviews would yield no new properties,
dimensions, or relationships to add to the question set (Holland (2005; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This is sometimes referred to as a point of
theoretical saturation. The emergence of an appropriate question set through 
practitioners highlighting what is significant was invaluable to the research 
design as well as informative in its own right (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
Parker and Roffey (1997) suggest that this is especially appropriate for
dimensions of accounting and finance where there is relatively little existing 
literature. Last, experts were consulted with to provide final oversight and 
comment on the question set. This included the IMA, UKSIF and expert 
individuals.  
The question set underwent significant change as the pilot interviews
progressed. The main purpose of the pilot interviews was to discuss an 
appropriate question set and its wording and not to provide responses. 
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Following the pilot interviews the question set was fixed for the 25 live
interviews.
As performed by Holland (1998b), phone calls were used to first communicate 
the pilot and live interviews to the fund managers. This was a useful means of 
discussing the background and motivation of the research, answering 
questions, overcoming initial doubts about participation, fostering an open and 
trusting relationship, and setting the meeting date. Each phone call was
followed by a covering letter that formally introduced the project. The final 
question set was held-back and asked on the day in order to avoid rehearsed 
answers and encourage open-end narratives. 
Interviews
The interviews were conducted between June and November 2007 mostly at 
the fund management firms’ offices. Two researchers were common to all 
interviews. At the start of each interview the participants were asked to talk 
freely and from the viewpoint of existing and prior practitioner experience.
Commentary on each question was not disrupted. The researchers main roles
were to ask the questions, listen, take notes, and to develop a trusting 
atmosphere by being courteous, respectful, and acknowledging the privileged 
position of being given time and information by senior people. 
All meetings were audio recorded. This avoided subjectivity around taking 
notes on a narrative as it is spoken. All parties benefit from this because it
captures valuable conversation during limited meeting time. After each 
meeting the interview transcript was written-up in full. The written-up transcript 
helps the researcher get close to the original experience of the participant,
even if it is, at best, a narrative construction of the original experience. 
Detailed notes were also taken during each meeting. This gives additional
voice by highlighting points of particular vocal emphasis and salience. Notes 
represent focal points when married to the written-up transcript. In order to 
increase confidence that notes correspond to points of vocal emphasis more 
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than one researcher attended each interview. Meeting notes were then cross-
checked. 
Data Analysis 
The research data included interview transcripts, meeting notes, survey 
information, descriptive statistics, characteristics and typologies of the 
individuals and firms interviewed. Following Hendry et al (2006), attention was
paid both to the content and the contexts of the interviews. A key aim was to 
look for repetitions, themes and cross-interview commonalities. These 
indicate theoretical saturation in areas, and give confidence that emerging 
theoretical frameworks are grounded in the data and capture underlying 
processes rather than individual company policies. A 5 step analytical process 
was used that followed Charmaz (2000). This involved coding and
cataloguing, comparative methods, memo writing to construct conceptual
analyses, sampling to refine emerging theoretical ideas and links, and 
integration of the data into the constructed framework. The research followed
Holland (2005) by using quotations in order to give voice to the respondents,
to represent them as accurately as possible, and to demonstrate grounding in 
the case data. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Literature on the existence of a financial dividend to the more 
responsible firm 
This appendix sets out academic literature on the existence of a financial 
dividend to the more responsible firm. Findings are organised according to 
three areas; society and financial performance, the workplace and financial 
performance, and the environment and financial performance.  
Society and Financial Performance 
A major focus of empirical research on society and financial performance has 
been corporate involvement in the community. Most evidence indicates a 
positive association between corporate community involvement and financial 
performance, although it remains unclear whether corporate community 
involvement leads to financial performance or financial performance leads to 
corporate community involvement.  
Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes (2003) find a positive relationship between 
philanthropy and financial performance. Useem (1988) and File and Prince 
(1998) find that disclosure of donations feature prominently in corporate 
publicity, suggesting that corporate community involvement has marketing, 
visibility, and reputation motives. Levy and Shatto (1980), Fry, Keim and
Meiners, (1982) and Brammer and Millington (2005) also find support for
public relations related motives to corporate community involvement. For
example, firms often delegate decisions concerning corporate giving to in-
house or external public relations departments. In other work, Saiia, Carroll,
and Buchholtz (2003) report international evidence that corporate community
involvement is strategic, and undertaken to enhance financial success. 
Altman (1998) finds that many corporate executives view community
involvement as a business imperative that creates a competitive advantage. 
Barnett and Salomon (2002) find that RI mutual funds which screen out firms 
with poor community relations records perform better than a benchmark fund.  
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Not all research confirms a positive relationship between society and financial 
performance. Berman, Wicks, Kotha, and Jones (1999) fail to find a 
significant relationship with corporate community involvement. Patten (1990) 
fails to find a relationship between corporate signing of the Global Sullivan 
Principles (these are based on the UN Declaration of Human Rights) and 
financial performance, and Seifert, Morris and Bartkus (2004) suggest that
corporate community involvement does not lead to greater financial 
performance but rather prior financial performance leads to greater corporate 
community involvement.  
Workplace and Financial Performance 
Aspects of the workplace examined in relation to financial performance 
include work environment quality, employer attractiveness, employee quality
and family-orientated policies. Work environment quality includes conditions,
rewards, help, training, listening, the formation of work groups and welfare. 
Berman, Wicks, Kotha, and Jones (1999) find a strong positive relationship 
between work environment quality and financial performance. Denison (1984) 
finds that work environment quality is positively associated with firm
profitability and that changes in firm profitability follow changes in work 
environment quality by 2 to 3 years. Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) find that 
work environment quality explains the largest proportion of the variance in firm 
performance within a model that includes several economic controls. Wright, 
Ferris, Hiller and Kroll (1995) find a significant positive stock price reaction to 
human resource affirmative action award announcements and a significant 
negative stock price reaction to announcements of settlement of lawsuits
concerning discrimination. 
Turban and Greening (1997), Greening and Turban (2000), and Backhaus,
Stone and Heiner (2002) find a positive relationship between more 
responsible firms and employer attractiveness, suggesting that more 
responsible firms draw on a deeper pool of prospective employees. Albinger
and Freeman (2000) find that attractiveness ratings of more responsible firms 
are higher for job seekers with high levels of job choice, suggesting that more 
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responsible firms draw on a more talented pool of prospective employees. 
Poe and Courter (1995) find that a large number of firms, including IBM, 
General Motors and Microsoft, broadcast responsibility as a recruitment tool 
by disseminating brochures that promote their companies’ philanthropic, 
social and environmental programmes to prospective applicants. An Ernst & 
Young Center for Business Innovation survey found that investors rank the 
ability to attract and retain talented workers fifth among 39 stock picking 
factors (Shellenbarger, 1997). 
In contrast to these positive results, family-orientated policies, including on-
site or near-site childcare centres, childcare referral services, paternity leave,
and opportunities for women to advance, are associated with lower financial 
returns. Explanations put forward in the literature for this finding are that 
family orientated policies are expensive, focus on few workers, and build ill 
feeling amongst non-targeted workers. Diltz (1995) finds that the market
penalises family-related benefits such as parental leave and dependent care 
assistance. Barnett and Salomon (2002) find that RI mutual funds that screen 
on the basis of labour relations performed significantly worse than a 
benchmark fund. Preece and Filbeck (1999) compare risk adjusted returns for 
firms with high family-orientated benefits to a matched sample of firms. Over a 
10 year period lower risk adjusted returns are observed on the high family-
orientated benefit portfolio. In a later study Filbeck & Preece (2003) employ an 
event study methodology and report negative abnormal stock returns to family
orientated award announcements. 
Environment and Financial Performance 
A significant body of research has examined whether environmental 
management can improve competitive position and financial performance. 
Overall, the evidence is consistent with environmental best practices changing
corporate fundamentals for the long term, though not all evidence points to 
this. 
Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, and Hughes (2004) find that good environmental 
performance is associated with good economic performance. Orlitzky and 
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Benjamin (2001) find that high environmental performance firms have lower
risk. Buhr (1994) reports that pollution abatement initiatives in mining firms 
resulted in higher yields and/or capture of a by-product that had market value. 
Nehrt (1996) finds that early timing of environmental strategies significantly
contributed to profit growth in firms. Bragdon and Marlin (1972) find a positive 
relationship between the Council for Economic Priorities pollution index and 
return on equity for a sample of pulp and paper firms. Riahi-Belkaoui (1976) 
finds a positive relationship between pollution disclosure and excess return. 
Spicer (1978a, 1978b) finds some support for a positive relationship between 
financial market performance and environmental performance in the pulp and 
paper industry. Holman, New and Singer (1985) find a negative relationship 
between federal pollution compliance liability costs and total rate of return. 
Shane and Spicer (1983) find negative abnormal returns for poor pollution 
performance (this positive relationship is demonstrated in a downward 
direction only). 
Cormier and Magnan (1997) examine water pollution in the pulp and paper, 
chemicals, oil refining, steel, metal and mining sectors and find that water 
pollution reduces a firm’s stock market valuation. The larger a firm’s pollution 
measure, the greater is the magnitude of implicit environmental liabilities
which investors subtract from its stock market valuation. Weak evidence is 
found that the valuation impact of corporate pollution is conditional upon a 
firm’s industry, with pulp and paper firms and chemical and oil refiners being 
penalised more severely for poor environmental performance than steel, 
mining, and metal firms. 
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) report significant positive abnormal stock 
returns following positive environmental events, such as environmental 
awards. The average market valuation of a firm rose $80 million. Reduction of 
hazardous emissions was also important for changes in valuation. First time 
award announcements were associated with greater increases in market 
valuation, and smaller increases observed for firms in environmentally less
clean industries. Significant negative returns were found for weak 
environmental management as indicated by environmental crises. Feldman, 
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Soyka, and Ameer (1997) find that improvements in environmental 
management and performance increase a firm’s stock price by up to 5 
percent. Lanoie, Laplante and Roy (1998) find that firms invest considerably
more in the environment than they would pay in penalties imposed by 
regulators were they to fail environmental compliance. 
Other benefits from improvements in environmental performance include 
product differentiation as a result of environmental certifications, redesign of
packaging and products in more environmentally responsible ways, 
development of new products, and improved power in advertising 
(Shrivastava, 1995; Christmann, 2000). Stead and Stead (1995) find that 
revenue enhancement for firms is the primary motivation for implementing 
environmental best practices. 
Not all empirical studies suggest a positive link between the environment and 
financial performance. Christmann (2000) finds mixed results for the 
relationship between environmental and financial performance, including 
studies that reveal no relationship, a positive relationship, and a U-shaped 
relationship. For example, moderate polluting firms outperform ones that
pollute the most and least. Stead and Stead (1995) find that the 
implementation of process focused environmental best practices had positive 
effects on revenues for 44 percent of sample firms but that 56 percent
reported zero or negative effects. Fogler and Nutt (1975) find no relationship 
between US Government pollution indices and price/earnings ratios. 
Rockness, Schlachter, and Rockness (1986) examine hazardous waste 
disposal in the chemical industry and find no relationship between two waste 
disposal variables and twelve indicators of economic performance. Freedman 
and Jaggi (1992) find no relationship between change in pollution output and 
financial performance. Berman, Wicks, Kotha, and Jones (1999) find no 
relationship between environmental performance and financial performance. 
Barnett and Salomon (2002) find that RI mutual funds which screened out 
firms with low environmental performance on average performed worse than
the benchmark fund. 
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